Loading Now

Dallas Court Affirms Child-Support Arrearage Award Despite Prior Modification Order

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child, 05-25-00773-CV, April 30, 2026.

On appeal from 469th Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas

Synopsis

The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a post-remand modification order awarding Mother more than $63,000 in child-support arrearages, rejecting Father’s arguments that arrearages were not pleaded, were foreclosed by an earlier modification order terminating support, or were unsupported by the evidence. The opinion is a useful reminder that on remand, a trial court may enter an arrearage award consistent with the appellate mandate and the record, and that a party who affirmatively places support calculations in issue should expect the opposing party’s arrearage position to be in play.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family-law litigators, this case matters well beyond arrearage enforcement. It sits at the intersection of modification practice, appellate remand procedure, guideline support analysis, and proof of payment history. In divorce and SAPCR litigation, lawyers frequently treat a prior modification order as if it permanently resets the support landscape; this opinion underscores that when a prior order has been reversed and the case remanded, the trial court can revisit the support consequences and enter an arrearage award consistent with the governing decree, the evidence, and the appellate court’s instructions. Strategically, the case also highlights how requests for retroactive reductions, offsets, credits, and termination can expose the movant to a mirror-image arrearage determination if the evidence does not support the relief sought.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties divorced in 2013. The divorce decree appointed Mother sole managing conservator, Father possessory conservator, and ordered Father to pay $1,176.09 per month in child support beginning May 1, 2013. The decree also contained section 154.130 findings explaining why the ordered support varied from the standard guideline calculation.

In 2017, Father filed to modify, seeking a reduction in child support and termination of medical support. At the 2020 trial on that modification, Father contended he should have been paying substantially less support beginning in 2016 and that he had overpaid by more than $35,000. The trial court accepted that theory in large part, entered a September 11, 2020 modification order reducing support retroactively to January 1, 2016, ordering reimbursement to Father for overpaid support, offsetting that overpayment against future obligations, and terminating Father’s child-support obligation as of July 31, 2020, based on alleged prepayment.

Mother appealed. In 2023, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding the record and findings did not support the determination that Father had overpaid support, and further concluding the trial court had erred in its treatment of Father’s military retirement/disability-related income and in deviating from the Family Code framework without required findings.

On remand, the case was retried in February 2025. The exhibits included Father’s requested relief, his income summaries, DFAS records, VA payment history, banking materials, the Attorney General child-support payment record, and Mother’s summary requesting confirmation of arrearages totaling $63,508.86. Mother’s calculation was straightforward: for the 109 months from January 1, 2016, through February 1, 2025, Father owed $128,193.81 under the decree’s support amount, had paid $64,684.95 or thereabouts according to the record, and therefore remained in arrears by $63,508.86. The evidence also showed Father’s last child-support payment was made on July 31, 2020.

After hearing testimony from both parents, the trial court denied Father’s requested relief and instead found Father owed $63,508.86 in child-support arrearages, ordering repayment over 24 months at $2,646.20 per month. Father appealed again, this time attacking the arrearage award on pleading, preclusion, and evidentiary sufficiency grounds.

Issues Decided

The court decided the following issues:

  1. Whether the trial court erred in awarding child-support arrearages because Mother did not file pleadings requesting arrearages and the issue was not tried by consent.

  2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding arrearages because an earlier modification order had terminated Father’s child-support obligation.

  3. Whether the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the amount of the arrearage award.

Rules Applied

Although the court issued a memorandum opinion and stated the issues were settled in law, the opinion reflects application of several familiar family-law and appellate principles:

  • A trial court may grant relief supported by the live issues and the record, including issues tried by consent when the parties develop the matter through evidence and requested relief.
  • On remand after reversal, the trial court acts within the scope of the appellate court’s mandate and may enter a new order consistent with that mandate and the governing law.
  • A reversed order does not retain the operative force Father attempted to assign to the 2020 modification order.
  • Child-support arrearage determinations must be supported by competent evidence, typically including the operative support order, payment records, and calculations showing the amount due and the amount paid.
  • Modification of child support remains governed by the Texas Family Code, including guideline analysis and any required findings for deviation.
  • Appellate review of support rulings generally proceeds under an abuse-of-discretion framework, with legal and factual sufficiency serving as relevant factors in evaluating whether the trial court had sufficient evidentiary support for its decision.

From the opinion text, the court’s analysis also sits against the backdrop of:

  • Texas Family Code section 154.130, concerning findings when support varies from guideline amounts.
  • The prior appellate opinion in In re L.S.B., No. 05-20-01079-CV, 2023 WL 1463423 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.), which reversed the earlier modification order and remanded for further proceedings.
  • Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.4, under which the court issued a memorandum opinion because the issues were controlled by settled law.

Application

The legal story here is really a remand story. Father had previously persuaded the trial court to retroactively reduce support, declare an overpayment, offset that overpayment against future obligations, and terminate support as of July 2020. But that 2020 order did not survive appellate review. Once the Dallas Court reversed and remanded in 2023, the foundation for Father’s “termination” argument largely disappeared. On remand, the trial court was required to reassess support issues under the Family Code and in light of the appellate court’s prior holdings.

That procedural posture mattered. Father again sought a retroactive reduction in support beginning January 1, 2016, this time requesting a downward deviation to $500 per month. Mother, in response, asked the court either to leave the original support intact or to set support based on Father’s more recent income. She also submitted a summary specifically requesting confirmation of arrearages in the amount of $63,508.86. The parties stipulated to the admissibility of the documentary evidence, including payment records and summary exhibits. In other words, the record on remand squarely presented the court with competing support calculations, competing views of Father’s income, and a concrete arrearage claim tied to the original decree and the lack of payments after July 2020.

Against that backdrop, Father’s pleading complaint was a difficult sell. The court rejected his assertion that arrearages were outside the pleadings or not tried by consent. The opinion indicates the arrearage issue was sufficiently before the trial court through the live remand proceedings, the parties’ requested relief, and the evidence admitted without dispute. When both sides try the amount of support owed over a historical period, put payment records in evidence, and ask the court to calculate what should have been paid, it is unsurprising that an arrearage determination follows.

Father’s second argument—that the earlier order terminating support barred an arrearage award—failed for the same reason the remand mattered. The 2020 order was reversed. The trial court on remand was not bound to treat that reversed order as permanently extinguishing support through the child’s emancipation date. Instead, it could deny Father’s requested retroactive reduction and calculate arrearages using the decree’s support obligation and the payment history shown in the record.

As to sufficiency, the record contained what appellate courts ordinarily want to see in an arrearage case: the operative decree setting support, the child-support disbursement record showing actual payments, Father’s own payment summary, Mother’s arrearage summary, and evidence concerning the period in question. The trial court was entitled to resolve conflicts in the evidence, reject Father’s theory of retroactive reduction and credit, and accept Mother’s arithmetic. The appellate court therefore concluded the arrearage amount was adequately supported.

Holding

The court held that the trial court did not err in awarding child-support arrearages despite Father’s contention that Mother failed to plead for that relief. The remand record demonstrated that arrearages were part of the live controversy and were supported by the evidence and requested relief presented to the trial court.

The court also held that the prior modification order did not prevent the trial court from awarding arrearages in the March 28, 2025 order. Because the earlier order had been reversed on appeal, Father could not rely on its termination language as a substantive bar to a later arrearage determination on remand.

Finally, the court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the arrearage award. The trial court had before it the governing support order, the payment history, and Mother’s calculation of unpaid support, and it acted within its discretion in confirming arrearages of $63,508.86.

Practical Application

This case is a strong cautionary authority for lawyers pursuing retroactive support reductions in modification cases. If your client seeks recoupment, offset, or termination based on an asserted overpayment theory, you must evaluate the downside risk that the trial court may reject the premise and instead confirm arrearages. That is especially true where the original decree remains the operative benchmark absent a valid modified amount supported by the Family Code and proper findings.

The opinion also reinforces a recurring appellate lesson: do not overread a trial-court order that has already been reversed. Once an appellate court vacates the order underpinning your client’s “credit” or “termination” argument, the case is back in play to the extent allowed by the mandate. On remand, practitioners should brief the mandate carefully, frame the available relief with precision, and build a complete evidentiary record directed to the exact historical support periods at issue.

In practice, this case should affect how litigators handle several common scenarios:

  • In modification trials, do not assume that an arrearage claim requires a standalone enforcement pleading if the support accounting issue is already being affirmatively litigated through requested retroactive relief and competing calculations.
  • In remand proceedings, align your requested relief with the appellate opinion. If the prior reversal identified defects in income calculation, guideline analysis, or findings, cure those defects directly rather than simply repackaging the same result.
  • In support cases involving military retirement, disability benefits, recoupments, or other nonstandard income streams, separate the income-source debate from the payment-history debate. Even if income characterization is disputed, arrearages often turn on a simpler question: what order was in effect, and what was actually paid?
  • In defending against an arrearage claim, challenge the math with admissible records and a coherent alternative calculation. Generalized complaints about pleading defects or prior orders are unlikely to succeed if the record shows the issue was fully litigated and the prior order has been reversed.

Checklists

Preserve the Arrearage Issue on Remand

  • Review the appellate mandate and opinion before drafting any post-remand pleading or trial brief
  • Identify which portions of the prior order were reversed and therefore no longer provide a valid basis for credits, offsets, or termination
  • State expressly in requested relief whether you seek confirmation of arrearages, denial of arrearages, retroactive modification, offset, or reimbursement
  • Attach or exchange updated arrearage summaries keyed to the exact date ranges in dispute
  • Make sure the operative order, payment history, and summary calculations are admitted into evidence

Plead and Try Support Calculations Carefully

  • Do not assume that only your requested support adjustment is before the court once you open the door to historical support calculations
  • If you contend arrearages are unpleaded, object early and specifically
  • If the opposing party’s summary or requested relief seeks arrearages, address it on the merits rather than relying solely on a pleading objection
  • Avoid trying support-accounting issues by consent unless that is a deliberate strategic choice
  • Request a continuance or special exceptions if you truly lack notice of the relief being sought

Build a Defensible Evidentiary Record

  • Offer the underlying divorce decree and any valid subsequent modification orders
  • Admit the Attorney General payment record or equivalent disbursement evidence
  • Prepare a month-by-month calculation showing support due, payments made, credits claimed, and resulting balance
  • Reconcile your client’s internal payment summaries with official child-support records
  • Where military or disability income is involved, present clean testimony and exhibits distinguishing gross receipts, net resources, statutory exclusions, and temporary recoupments
  • Anticipate cross-examination on whether claimed deductions or recoupments are legally relevant to support calculation

Avoid the Non-Prevailing Party’s Errors

  • Do not rely on a reversed modification order as if it still conclusively terminated support
  • Do not assume a prior appellate loss can be cured by reasserting the same accounting theory without correcting the legal defects identified on appeal
  • Do not present retroactive-reduction theories without addressing the possibility of an arrearage finding if the trial court rejects your income analysis
  • Do not leave the court without requested findings and a clear post-trial roadmap on disputed support calculations
  • Do not attack sufficiency on appeal unless the record genuinely lacks the operative order, payment history, or competent calculations

Use This Case in Litigation Strategy

  • Cite this opinion when opposing claims that an arrearage award is procedurally improper after support accounting was fully litigated
  • Use it to rebut arguments that a reversed order still bars relief on remand
  • Frame remand hearings as fresh determinations constrained by the mandate, not as ministerial reinstatements of the earlier trial result
  • Emphasize that support modification and arrearage confirmation are often analytically connected when the historical amount due is disputed
  • Treat payment records and summary exhibits as central trial exhibits, not housekeeping documents

Citation

In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child, No. 05-25-00773-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

~~c4773661-c484-4295-95b2-4066ec33325c~~

Share this content:

Tom Daley is a board-certified family law attorney with extensive experience practicing across the United States, primarily in Texas. He represents clients in all aspects of family law, including negotiation, settlement, litigation, trial, and appeals.