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Dallas Court Affirms Child-Support Arrearage Award Despite Prior Modification Order

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child, 05-25-00773-CV, April 30, 2026.

On appeal from 469th Judicial District Court of Collin County, Texas

Synopsis

The Dallas Court of Appeals affirmed a post-remand modification order awarding Mother more than $63,000 in child-support arrearages, rejecting Father’s arguments that arrearages were not pleaded, were foreclosed by an earlier modification order terminating support, or were unsupported by the evidence. The opinion is a useful reminder that on remand, a trial court may enter an arrearage award consistent with the appellate mandate and the record, and that a party who affirmatively places support calculations in issue should expect the opposing party’s arrearage position to be in play.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family-law litigators, this case matters well beyond arrearage enforcement. It sits at the intersection of modification practice, appellate remand procedure, guideline support analysis, and proof of payment history. In divorce and SAPCR litigation, lawyers frequently treat a prior modification order as if it permanently resets the support landscape; this opinion underscores that when a prior order has been reversed and the case remanded, the trial court can revisit the support consequences and enter an arrearage award consistent with the governing decree, the evidence, and the appellate court’s instructions. Strategically, the case also highlights how requests for retroactive reductions, offsets, credits, and termination can expose the movant to a mirror-image arrearage determination if the evidence does not support the relief sought.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties divorced in 2013. The divorce decree appointed Mother sole managing conservator, Father possessory conservator, and ordered Father to pay $1,176.09 per month in child support beginning May 1, 2013. The decree also contained section 154.130 findings explaining why the ordered support varied from the standard guideline calculation.

In 2017, Father filed to modify, seeking a reduction in child support and termination of medical support. At the 2020 trial on that modification, Father contended he should have been paying substantially less support beginning in 2016 and that he had overpaid by more than $35,000. The trial court accepted that theory in large part, entered a September 11, 2020 modification order reducing support retroactively to January 1, 2016, ordering reimbursement to Father for overpaid support, offsetting that overpayment against future obligations, and terminating Father’s child-support obligation as of July 31, 2020, based on alleged prepayment.

Mother appealed. In 2023, the Dallas Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding the record and findings did not support the determination that Father had overpaid support, and further concluding the trial court had erred in its treatment of Father’s military retirement/disability-related income and in deviating from the Family Code framework without required findings.

On remand, the case was retried in February 2025. The exhibits included Father’s requested relief, his income summaries, DFAS records, VA payment history, banking materials, the Attorney General child-support payment record, and Mother’s summary requesting confirmation of arrearages totaling $63,508.86. Mother’s calculation was straightforward: for the 109 months from January 1, 2016, through February 1, 2025, Father owed $128,193.81 under the decree’s support amount, had paid $64,684.95 or thereabouts according to the record, and therefore remained in arrears by $63,508.86. The evidence also showed Father’s last child-support payment was made on July 31, 2020.

After hearing testimony from both parents, the trial court denied Father’s requested relief and instead found Father owed $63,508.86 in child-support arrearages, ordering repayment over 24 months at $2,646.20 per month. Father appealed again, this time attacking the arrearage award on pleading, preclusion, and evidentiary sufficiency grounds.

Issues Decided

The court decided the following issues:

  1. Whether the trial court erred in awarding child-support arrearages because Mother did not file pleadings requesting arrearages and the issue was not tried by consent.

  2. Whether the trial court erred in awarding arrearages because an earlier modification order had terminated Father’s child-support obligation.

  3. Whether the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the amount of the arrearage award.

Rules Applied

Although the court issued a memorandum opinion and stated the issues were settled in law, the opinion reflects application of several familiar family-law and appellate principles:

From the opinion text, the court’s analysis also sits against the backdrop of:

Application

The legal story here is really a remand story. Father had previously persuaded the trial court to retroactively reduce support, declare an overpayment, offset that overpayment against future obligations, and terminate support as of July 2020. But that 2020 order did not survive appellate review. Once the Dallas Court reversed and remanded in 2023, the foundation for Father’s “termination” argument largely disappeared. On remand, the trial court was required to reassess support issues under the Family Code and in light of the appellate court’s prior holdings.

That procedural posture mattered. Father again sought a retroactive reduction in support beginning January 1, 2016, this time requesting a downward deviation to $500 per month. Mother, in response, asked the court either to leave the original support intact or to set support based on Father’s more recent income. She also submitted a summary specifically requesting confirmation of arrearages in the amount of $63,508.86. The parties stipulated to the admissibility of the documentary evidence, including payment records and summary exhibits. In other words, the record on remand squarely presented the court with competing support calculations, competing views of Father’s income, and a concrete arrearage claim tied to the original decree and the lack of payments after July 2020.

Against that backdrop, Father’s pleading complaint was a difficult sell. The court rejected his assertion that arrearages were outside the pleadings or not tried by consent. The opinion indicates the arrearage issue was sufficiently before the trial court through the live remand proceedings, the parties’ requested relief, and the evidence admitted without dispute. When both sides try the amount of support owed over a historical period, put payment records in evidence, and ask the court to calculate what should have been paid, it is unsurprising that an arrearage determination follows.

Father’s second argument—that the earlier order terminating support barred an arrearage award—failed for the same reason the remand mattered. The 2020 order was reversed. The trial court on remand was not bound to treat that reversed order as permanently extinguishing support through the child’s emancipation date. Instead, it could deny Father’s requested retroactive reduction and calculate arrearages using the decree’s support obligation and the payment history shown in the record.

As to sufficiency, the record contained what appellate courts ordinarily want to see in an arrearage case: the operative decree setting support, the child-support disbursement record showing actual payments, Father’s own payment summary, Mother’s arrearage summary, and evidence concerning the period in question. The trial court was entitled to resolve conflicts in the evidence, reject Father’s theory of retroactive reduction and credit, and accept Mother’s arithmetic. The appellate court therefore concluded the arrearage amount was adequately supported.

Holding

The court held that the trial court did not err in awarding child-support arrearages despite Father’s contention that Mother failed to plead for that relief. The remand record demonstrated that arrearages were part of the live controversy and were supported by the evidence and requested relief presented to the trial court.

The court also held that the prior modification order did not prevent the trial court from awarding arrearages in the March 28, 2025 order. Because the earlier order had been reversed on appeal, Father could not rely on its termination language as a substantive bar to a later arrearage determination on remand.

Finally, the court held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the arrearage award. The trial court had before it the governing support order, the payment history, and Mother’s calculation of unpaid support, and it acted within its discretion in confirming arrearages of $63,508.86.

Practical Application

This case is a strong cautionary authority for lawyers pursuing retroactive support reductions in modification cases. If your client seeks recoupment, offset, or termination based on an asserted overpayment theory, you must evaluate the downside risk that the trial court may reject the premise and instead confirm arrearages. That is especially true where the original decree remains the operative benchmark absent a valid modified amount supported by the Family Code and proper findings.

The opinion also reinforces a recurring appellate lesson: do not overread a trial-court order that has already been reversed. Once an appellate court vacates the order underpinning your client’s “credit” or “termination” argument, the case is back in play to the extent allowed by the mandate. On remand, practitioners should brief the mandate carefully, frame the available relief with precision, and build a complete evidentiary record directed to the exact historical support periods at issue.

In practice, this case should affect how litigators handle several common scenarios:

Checklists

Preserve the Arrearage Issue on Remand

Plead and Try Support Calculations Carefully

Build a Defensible Evidentiary Record

Avoid the Non-Prevailing Party’s Errors

Use This Case in Litigation Strategy

Citation

In the Interest of L.S.B., a Child, No. 05-25-00773-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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