Fourteenth Court Rejects Modification Based on Alleged Change in Mother’s Attitude Toward Access

Khandria v. Al-Muslim, 14-25-00253-CV, April 30, 2026.

On appeal from 311th District Court, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

A party cannot use a modification suit to repair alleged non-jurisdictional defects in the original SAPCR decree. In Khandria v. Al-Muslim, the Fourteenth Court held that Father’s complaint that the divorce decree gave Mother unchecked control over access was an impermissible collateral attack, and the evidence—especially Mother’s cautious openness to reunification—did not compel findings of material and substantial change or present best interest under Family Code section 156.101.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters directly to Texas family-law litigators handling post-divorce custody and access disputes. It reinforces two recurring points in modification practice: first, complaints about an arguably overbroad or poorly structured original possession provision must ordinarily be pursued by direct appeal, not repackaged years later as a modification theory; and second, evidence of softened parental attitudes, standing alone, will not necessarily establish the material and substantial change or present best interest required to alter conservatorship or possession. For practitioners, the case is a reminder that modification remains a forward-looking evidentiary proceeding, not a vehicle to relitigate the legal correctness of the underlying decree.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties divorced by default after Father left the United States during the divorce proceedings. The decree appointed both parents joint managing conservators, granted Mother the exclusive right to designate the child’s primary residence, ordered Father to pay child support, and provided that Father “shall have no specific periods of possession or access to the child.”

Father did not directly appeal that decree. More than three years later, he filed a petition to modify seeking possession and access to the child and a reduction in child support. By the time of the modification trial, more than five years had passed since the divorce, and Father remained outside the United States.

At trial, Father testified that Mother had completely blocked his communication with the child since the year of divorce. He also described substantial upheaval in his own circumstances: Relocation to the UAE, business failure, movement to Syria and then Lebanon, litigation over custody of another child, inability to work legally in Lebanon, remarriage, and the birth of a son from that later marriage.

Mother testified that she had restricted access because she viewed Father as cruel and believed she was protecting the child. At the same time, she acknowledged that she wanted Father and the child to have a healthy relationship and, even without a court order, would want reunification therapy as a starting point. The evidence also showed the child had lost trust in Father. Father’s response to therapy was equivocal: He initially said therapy was unnecessary, then indicated limited willingness to participate, but would not commit to following a counselor’s recommendation if it went against immediate access.

The trial court denied modification, orally finding no material and substantial change in circumstances. The Fourteenth Court affirmed.

Issues Decided

• Whether Father could obtain modification by arguing that the original divorce decree was legally defective because it gave Mother unchecked authority over possession and access.
• Whether Mother’s claimed change in attitude—from blocking access to expressing openness to reunification therapy—established a material and substantial change in circumstances under Texas Family Code section 156.101.
• Whether the evidence required a finding that granting Father possession and access would be in the child’s present best interest.
• Whether Father proved a material and substantial change sufficient to reduce his child-support obligation under Family Code section 156.401.

Rules Applied

The court applied familiar but important modification principles:

• A collateral attack on a prior judgment is permitted only if the prior judgment is void, not merely voidable. The court relied on Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 902 (Tex. 2009), and Edwards v. Edwards, 624 S.W.2d 635, 637 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ), to hold that alleged non-jurisdictional error in the original decree could not be raised in a later modification proceeding.
• Orders denying modification of conservatorship, possession, and access are reviewed for abuse of discretion. The court cited In re H.D.C., 474 S.W.3d 758, 763 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
• Under Texas Family Code section 156.101, the movant must prove both a material and substantial change since rendition of the prior order and that the requested modification is in the child’s best interest.
• Under Texas Family Code section 156.401, a movant seeking child-support modification must prove either a material and substantial change or satisfaction of the three-year/20% or $100 guideline differential test.
• The court also referenced decisions recognizing that parental hostility or inability to cooperate can support modification in some cases, including In re A.P.L., — S.W.3d —, 2025 WL 2412903 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2025, no pet.), and Diers v. Diers, No. 03-97-00610-CV, 1999 WL 495605 (Tex. App.—Austin July 15, 1999, no pet.), while distinguishing those authorities from the record here.
• For the proposition that party agreement or apparent acquiescence does not itself require modification of a prior decree, the court cited Oldham v. Oldham, 135 S.W.2d 564, 569 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1939, writ ref’d).

Application

The court began by separating two theories that are often blurred in modification practice: an attack on the original decree, and proof that circumstances have changed since that decree. Father’s lead argument was not really about post-decree change at all. He contended that the original divorce decree was facially defective because it gave Mother uncontrolled discretion over access. The Fourteenth Court treated that argument as what it was—a collateral attack on the decree itself. Because the alleged defect was non-jurisdictional, any error rendered the decree at most voidable, not void. That meant the complaint should have been raised in a direct appeal from the default decree, not years later in a modification suit.

Once the collateral attack fell away, the case turned on whether Father proved the statutory predicates for modification. His main evidentiary point was that Mother had blocked access for years, yet at trial expressed a desire for Father and child to have a healthy relationship and mentioned reunification therapy. Father framed that as a decisive reversal in position. The court did not accept that characterization. It read Mother’s testimony as cautious and conditional, not as a wholesale abandonment of her concerns. She still testified that the child had lost trust in Father and that any resumption of contact should begin with therapeutic reunification.

Father’s own testimony weakened his modification case. Rather than embracing a gradual, child-centered reunification structure, he first minimized the need for therapy and then suggested only limited participation while rejecting the possibility that a counselor’s recommendations might govern access. That record allowed the trial court to conclude that Mother’s stance had become only marginally more open, not materially and substantially different, and that immediate modification was not shown to be in the child’s best interest.

The court treated the remaining changed-circumstance evidence similarly. The child’s aging from nearly nine to fourteen, her beginning therapy, Mother’s job change, Father’s relocation within the Middle East, and the existence of a half-sibling did not compel a finding of material and substantial change. The trial court could reasonably view the broader picture as essentially stable in the relevant sense: Father was abroad at the time of the decree and remained abroad at the time of trial, the relationship with the child remained fractured, and the evidentiary basis for immediate access remained undeveloped.

On child support, Father likewise failed to carry his burden. Although he emphasized business failure, inability to work in Lebanon, and a new support obligation for another child, the record also showed substantial liquid resources—nearly $270,000—and evidence of education and earning capacity. On that record, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing a downward modification.

Holding

The Fourteenth Court held that Father’s complaint that the original decree improperly vested Mother with unchecked authority over possession and access was an impermissible collateral attack. Any error in the original decree was non-jurisdictional and therefore made the decree at most voidable, not void. Because Father did not challenge the decree by direct appeal, he could not use a later modification proceeding to invalidate or reframe it.

The court further held that the evidence did not require a finding of material and substantial change under Family Code section 156.101. Mother’s testimony that she wanted Father and child to have a healthy relationship and would consider reunification therapy did not obligate the trial court to find that circumstances had materially changed, particularly where the same testimony reflected continuing concern, lack of trust, and a desire for therapeutic safeguards.

The court also held that the trial court acted within its discretion in determining that modification was not shown to be in the child’s best interest at that time. The fractured relationship, the child’s loss of trust, and Father’s ambivalence toward reunification therapy supported the denial of immediate possession and access.

Finally, the court held that Father failed to prove entitlement to a child-support reduction. His claimed financial setbacks were offset by evidence of substantial assets and earning capacity, and he did not meaningfully develop a guideline-based argument under section 156.401.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, Khandria is best read as a case about framing, proof, and timing. If the real complaint is that the original decree unlawfully delegated possession decisions or omitted enforceable access terms, that is appellate territory. Do not assume those defects can be rehabilitated later through a modification suit simply by alleging that the current arrangement is untenable. If the decree is merely erroneous rather than void, the modification court is not the forum for a disguised direct attack.

The case is equally useful on proof of changed circumstances. A parent’s softened rhetoric is not the same as a material and substantial change. Practitioners representing movants should develop evidence showing concrete, post-decree developments that affect the child’s functioning, the parents’ ability to cooperate, the feasibility of a possession schedule, and the child’s current therapeutic and emotional needs. Statements such as “I want the child to have a healthy relationship with the other parent” are too abstract unless tied to operational facts demonstrating that the barriers that justified the prior arrangement have actually changed.

The opinion also underscores the strategic value of reunification evidence. Where contact has been absent for years, the best-interest question is often inseparable from the structure of reintroduction. A movant who resists therapy, minimizes estrangement, or refuses to follow professional recommendations risks appearing focused on parental entitlement rather than child-centered transition. In a close modification case, that can be outcome-determinative.

For respondents, Khandria offers a roadmap for preserving a denial. Distinguish between aspirational openness and actual readiness. Acknowledge the importance of the parent-child relationship while documenting why a measured, therapeutic path remains necessary. That posture can blunt an argument that the respondent’s testimony itself establishes the change necessary for modification.

On support modification, the case is a reminder that evidence of reduced income is not enough if the record also shows access to substantial funds, educational attainment, or earning capacity. A clean financial presentation still matters.

Checklists

Preserve Direct-Appeal Issues Early

• Review the final decree immediately for possession and access language that may be vulnerable on appeal.
• Identify whether the complained-of defect is jurisdictional or merely legal error.
• Calendar appellate deadlines before exploring later modification strategy.
• Advise the client that a modification suit is not a substitute for a missed direct appeal.
• If the decree grants broad discretion over access, assess whether the error should be challenged directly rather than left to future litigation.

Build a Material-and-Substantial-Change Record

• Compare the facts at rendition of the prior order with the facts at the time of trial.
• Tie each alleged change to the child, the conservatorship framework, or the practical feasibility of possession.
• Avoid relying on generalized changes such as the passage of time, job changes, or relocation unless they meaningfully affect the child’s circumstances.
• Develop evidence showing how the prior reasons for restriction have materially shifted.
• Present third-party corroboration where possible, including therapist, school, or evaluator evidence.

Prove Present Best Interest in Reunification Cases

• Offer a concrete step-up or reunification plan rather than a generic request for access.
• Address the child’s trust, emotional safety, and therapeutic readiness with specificity.
• Show willingness to participate in counseling and to follow professional recommendations.
• Anticipate concerns about abrupt reintroduction after prolonged estrangement.
• Frame the requested relief as child-centered, gradual, and clinically informed.

Defend Against a Modification Petition

• Separate any attack on the original decree from the statutory modification inquiry.
• Emphasize that caution, guarded openness, or conditional willingness to reunify is not necessarily a material and substantial change.
• Document ongoing concerns affecting the child’s readiness for contact.
• Use the movant’s own testimony to show lack of insight, inflexibility, or resistance to therapeutic safeguards.
• Reinforce the abuse-of-discretion standard and the trial court’s latitude in weighing conflicting evidence.

Prepare Financial Evidence for Support Modification

• Present current income, assets, liabilities, and access to funds in a complete and credible format.
• Address earning capacity, education, and work history, not just present unemployment.
• Quantify any support obligations for later-born children.
• If relying on guideline disparity, calculate and plead the section 156.401 basis clearly.
• Anticipate that liquid assets may undercut a claim for immediate downward modification.

Citation

Khandria v. Al-Muslim, No. 14-25-00253-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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