Section 161.001(f) Reasonable-Efforts Requirement | In re M.S. (2026)

In the Interest of M.S., a Child, 07-26-00219-CV, October 06, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law No. 2, Lubbock County, Texas

Synopsis

The Seventh Court of Appeals held that constructive-abandonment termination requires clear and convincing evidence that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent. Because the Department neither provided or explained the completed service plan to Mother nor acted on treatment recommendations addressing her mental-health needs, the evidence was legally insufficient under Texas Family Code sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and 161.001(f); the court reversed and rendered judgment denying termination on that ground.

Relevance to Family Law

In re M.S. is directly relevant to parental-termination and Department conservatorship litigation because it treats reasonable reunification efforts as an independent evidentiary burden, not a formality satisfied merely by creating a service plan. A parent’s lack of progress, unstable circumstances, or limited contact cannot substitute for proof of what the Department actually did to facilitate reunification.

The opinion also carries strategic value in private custody litigation. Although the statutory reasonable-efforts requirement does not ordinarily govern a private modification or original SAPCR, the case illustrates the importance of separating a party’s alleged noncompliance from the adequacy of notice, access, and opportunities actually provided. Litigators addressing possession interference, counseling requirements, reunification therapy, geographic barriers, or mental-health conditions should develop evidence showing whether expectations were communicated and whether the required services were realistically available.

The decision has no direct effect on characterization, valuation, or division of marital property in a divorce. In a combined divorce and SAPCR, however, its evidentiary lesson remains useful: a court should not infer willful noncompliance when the record does not establish that the obligation was communicated, implemented, and capable of performance.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

M.S. was born on June 24, 2025. Three days later, the Department of Family and Protective Services removed the child from Mother’s care while Mother remained in the hospital, based on concerns about Mother’s mental health. The Department placed M.S. with her maternal grandparents, who intended to adopt her.

At the final termination hearing, the Department called one witness, permanency specialist Erin Quinstedt. The reporter’s record consisted of approximately thirty-five pages of testimony. Quinstedt testified that she maintained frequent contact with the maternal grandparents but had only one meaningful conversation with Mother despite attempting contact between July and September 2025.

During that conversation, the caseworker discussed generally what a future family service plan might require. No individualized plan had yet been created. Mother stated that she was living in Spur and appeared willing to participate in services. Later communications largely consisted of lengthy text messages in which Mother expressed concerns about a conspiracy. The caseworker attempted to redirect those communications, but they did not result in a substantive discussion of reunification services. The Department apparently scheduled one visitation, which Mother did not attend.

The Department eventually prepared a family service plan, and the trial court signed an order for actions necessary for the child’s return. But the caseworker admitted that she never discussed the completed plan with Mother, never explained its particular requirements, and never established that Mother received a copy. Mother did not sign the plan. When the Department offered the service plan at trial, the court excluded it on Mother’s objection.

The Department maintained that the plan had been tailored to Mother’s mental-health needs. Among other things, it required Mother to follow recommendations issued upon her discharge from Oceans Behavioral Hospital of Lubbock. Mother completed a mental-health program at Oceans, and the facility sent its continuing-care recommendations to the Department. Although the Department acknowledged receiving those recommendations, the record showed no responsive action to implement, coordinate, or facilitate the recommended treatment.

The caseworker nevertheless relied on Mother’s failure to participate in or benefit from services as a reason to terminate her parental rights. She further opined that Mother continued to experience severe mental illness and lacked the stability necessary to provide a safe home. The trial court found constructive abandonment and terminated Mother’s parental rights under section 161.001(b)(1)(N).

Issues Decided

The court addressed whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the findings required for constructive-abandonment termination, including:

Whether the Department proved by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to return M.S. to Mother under section 161.001(b)(1)(N).
Whether the evidence supported the corresponding reasonable-efforts finding required by section 161.001(f).
Whether Mother’s limited visitation and contact could sustain termination when the Department had not established meaningful reunification efforts.
Whether the record supported the required finding concerning a continuing danger in Mother’s home despite the Department’s reasonable efforts.
Whether the appropriate appellate disposition was remand for further proceedings or rendition denying termination on the constructive-abandonment ground.

Rules Applied

Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(N) permits termination for constructive abandonment only when clear and convincing evidence establishes that:

The child has been in the Department’s permanent or temporary managing conservatorship for at least six months.
The Department made reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent.
The parent did not regularly visit or maintain significant contact with the child.
The parent demonstrated an inability to provide the child with a safe environment.

The reasonable-efforts element focuses on the Department’s conduct. Under In re F.E.N., the Department cannot establish that element solely by pointing to the parent’s failures, shortcomings, or lack of progress. It must present evidence of meaningful efforts directed toward reunification.

Section 161.001(f) additionally requires an express, clear-and-convincing finding that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the child before trial. As discussed in D.F. v. Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, the trial court must state the required findings in a separate portion of the termination order, including the finding that a continuing danger remained in the home despite the Department’s efforts.

Implementation of a family service plan is a principal method by which the Department may prove reasonable efforts. The court relied on authorities including In re N.R.T., In re K.S.G., and In re A.L.H. for that proposition. The governing standard requires reasonable efforts rather than ideal or perfect efforts, but the plan must be more than a document created and retained by the Department.

Because termination requires clear and convincing evidence, legal-sufficiency review asks whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the finding, could permit a reasonable factfinder to form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. The court also reiterated that termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the parent because the parent-child relationship implicates a fundamental constitutional interest.

Application

The Department’s proof failed because the evidence did not show meaningful implementation of a reunification plan. Although a service plan was eventually created, the Department’s witness admitted that she never reviewed the completed plan with Mother, never explained its requirements, and could not establish that Mother received it. Mother never signed the plan, and the plan itself was excluded from evidence.

The Department’s preliminary conversation with Mother did not cure those deficiencies. At that point, an individualized plan had not yet been prepared, so the caseworker could discuss only what a plan might look like. That general conversation did not establish that Mother later received notice of the actual tasks required for reunification.

The mental-health evidence further demonstrated the disconnect between the Department’s asserted expectations and its reunification efforts. The Department characterized the plan as tailored to Mother’s needs and required compliance with the treatment recommendations made by Oceans Behavioral Hospital. Mother completed the Oceans program, and Oceans transmitted its continuing-care recommendations to the Department. Yet the record contained no evidence that the Department acted on those recommendations, arranged the recommended services, gave the recommendations to Mother, or assisted her in obtaining appropriate care.

Against that record, the Department emphasized Mother’s limited contact, missed visitation, lack of service participation, and continuing mental-health instability. But those circumstances could not substitute for evidence of the Department’s own efforts. The statutory inquiry was not simply whether Mother had shortcomings; it was whether the Department took reasonable steps to facilitate the child’s return.

The sparse record was particularly significant under the clear-and-convincing standard. The Department presented only one witness, and her testimony affirmatively established that the plan was neither explained nor shown to have been delivered. Thus, this was not merely an instance in which the factfinder resolved conflicting evidence against the parent. The Department’s own proof failed to establish a necessary statutory element.

Holding

The court held that the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that the Department made reasonable efforts to return M.S. to Mother. Creation of a service plan did not satisfy sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and 161.001(f) when the Department neither provided the plan to Mother nor explained what she had to do.

The court also concluded that the Department’s receipt of individualized mental-health recommendations, followed by its failure to act on them, undermined its assertion that it had made reasonable reunification efforts. The Department could not rely on Mother’s failure to complete or benefit from services when its evidence did not show that the relevant services had been communicated and implemented.

Because proof of reasonable efforts was legally insufficient, the constructive-abandonment ground could not support termination. The court reversed the termination judgment and rendered judgment denying termination on that ground rather than remanding for the Department to supply proof it failed to present at trial.

Practical Application

For counsel representing the Department, In re M.S. requires an evidence-driven account of reunification efforts. It is not enough to establish that a service plan was drafted, filed, or incorporated into a court order. The Department should prove when and how the parent received the plan, who explained it, what accommodations were made, which providers were contacted, and what follow-up occurred. The service plan itself should be properly authenticated and admitted.

For parent’s counsel, the reasonable-efforts element should be litigated independently from the parent’s compliance. Discovery and cross-examination should test whether the Department can prove actual delivery and explanation of the plan, referrals to specific providers, funding or transportation assistance, responses to provider recommendations, visitation arrangements, and modifications based on the parent’s disabilities or mental-health needs.

A missed visit or unsuccessful communication does not automatically establish constructive abandonment. Counsel should develop the circumstances surrounding each alleged failure, including whether the parent received notice, had transportation, understood the instructions, had access to treatment, or was experiencing a documented mental-health crisis.

Mental-health cases require particular attention to individualized implementation. If the Department relies on a parent’s diagnosis or instability, counsel should determine whether the Department obtained the treating facility’s recommendations and what it did with them. A recommendation sitting in the Department’s file is not evidence that the recommended treatment was made accessible to the parent.

In private custody litigation, attorneys can apply the same evidentiary discipline when a party alleges noncompliance with counseling, reunification therapy, supervised possession, or another condition. The proponent should prove that the obligation was sufficiently definite, communicated to the affected party, and realistically available. The responding party should build a record distinguishing unwillingness to comply from the absence of notice, access, or meaningful implementation.

Checklists

Department’s Reasonable-Efforts Trial Record

Obtain and authenticate the final family service plan.
Prove the date, method, and address or electronic destination used to deliver the plan.
Identify the person who reviewed each requirement with the parent.
Document the parent’s questions, responses, and stated barriers.
Establish that referrals were made to identified and available providers.
Prove that the parent received provider names, contact information, and appointment instructions.
Document transportation, payment, scheduling, language, and disability accommodations.
Show follow-up after missed appointments or unsuccessful referrals.
Explain any revisions made in response to changed circumstances.
Connect each service to the conditions that prevented the child’s return.
Present evidence of visitation opportunities and notice of each scheduled visit.
Address all treatment recommendations received from hospitals, evaluators, and other providers.
Secure the express findings required by section 161.001(f) in a separate portion of the order.

Parent’s Counsel: Discovery and Record Development

Request every version of the family service plan.
Obtain proof of delivery, including emails, certified mail records, electronic signatures, and case notes.
Request all communications in which the Department allegedly explained the plan.
Identify differences between the proposed plan, final plan, and court-ordered requirements.
Obtain provider referrals and records showing whether the provider accepted the referral.
Determine whether services were available in the parent’s location.
Investigate transportation, cost, work-schedule, disability, and technology barriers.
Obtain discharge instructions and continuing-care recommendations from treatment facilities.
Compare provider recommendations with the services actually arranged by the Department.
Develop evidence of the parent’s attempts to communicate or obtain assistance.
Document visitation requests, cancellations, notice failures, and transportation issues.
Object when the Department attempts to substitute generalized conclusions for specific reunification efforts.
Preserve separate legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges to each statutory finding.

Cross-Examination of the Department’s Witness

Confirm whether the witness personally delivered the completed service plan.
Establish whether the witness reviewed each requirement with the parent.
Ask whether the witness can identify the date and substance of that discussion.
Determine whether the plan bears the parent’s signature or acknowledgment.
Establish whether the witness can prove the parent received a copy.
Ask which providers were contacted and whether those providers were accepting clients.
Determine whether appointments were scheduled or the parent was merely given a telephone number.
Identify every response to the parent’s stated barriers.
Ask what action was taken on hospital or evaluator recommendations.
Distinguish unsuccessful contact attempts from meaningful reunification activity.
Require the witness to separate the parent’s failures from the Department’s own actions.
Confirm whether the witness’s opinion depends on materials excluded from evidence.

Preparing the Termination Order and Appeal

Track each subsection 161.001(b)(1)(N) element separately.
Include the specific reasonable-efforts finding required by section 161.001(f).
Include the statutorily required finding concerning continuing danger.
Place the required findings in the appropriate separate section of the order.
Verify that admitted evidence supports each finding by the clear-and-convincing standard.
Preserve objections to excluded or improperly admitted service-plan evidence.
Request findings sufficiently specific to permit meaningful appellate review.
Challenge legal sufficiency when the Department’s proof omits an essential element.
Request rendition when the evidence is legally insufficient rather than merely factually insufficient.

Citation

In the Interest of M.S., a Child, No. 07-26-00219-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 6, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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