Section 102.004 Consanguinity Standing Excludes Step-Siblings | In re H.E.C. and E.G.C. (2026)

In the Interest of H.E.C. and E.G.C., Children, 06-26-00011-CV, August 25, 2026.

On appeal from 442nd District Court, Denton County, Texas

Synopsis

Section 102.004(a)(1) does not give a former stepparent standing to file an original SAPCR for stepchildren merely because the stepparent shares a biological child with the children’s mother. Under Government Code Section 573.022(a), consanguinity exists only if one person is the other’s descendant or they share a common ancestor, and a biological relationship to a child’s half-sibling does not satisfy that test.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters immediately in post-divorce custody litigation, nonparent conservatorship filings, and contested jurisdictional pleas involving blended families. For Texas family lawyers, the case sharply limits attempts to bootstrap SAPCR standing through household relationships or sibling ties and confirms that, absent adoption or a qualifying statutory ground, a former stepparent cannot convert a relationship with one child into consanguinity standing as to that child’s half-siblings. The opinion also carries a secondary practice point on attorney’s fees: even where standing fails, a fee claim must still satisfy Rohrmoos and related lodestar-proof requirements.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The case arose from a blended-family structure familiar to family litigators. Mother had two children from a prior marriage. She later married Stepfather, who became those children’s stepparent during the marriage. Mother and Stepfather then had a child together. That younger child was Stepfather’s biological child and the half-sibling of the two older children.

After Mother filed for divorce, Stepfather initiated a separate SAPCR concerning the older children. He did not claim standing based on adoption, nor could he claim that the older children were his descendants. Instead, he argued that his biological relationship to the younger child, combined with the younger child’s biological relationship to the older half-siblings, made him a relative of the older children within the fourth degree by consanguinity under Texas Family Code Section 102.004(a)(1).

Mother responded with a plea to the jurisdiction challenging standing. The trial court agreed, dismissed the SAPCR for lack of standing, and also awarded attorney’s fees against Stepfather. On appeal, the Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the no-standing ruling but reversed and remanded the fee award.

Issues Decided

• Whether a former stepparent qualifies as “another relative of the child related within the fourth degree by consanguinity” under Texas Family Code Section 102.004(a)(1) by virtue of sharing a biological child with the children’s mother.
• Whether a biological relationship to one child creates consanguinity with that child’s half-siblings under Texas Government Code Section 573.022(a).
• Whether the trial court’s attorney’s-fee award could stand where the billing proof was redacted and subject to sufficiency challenges.

Rules Applied

The court’s standing analysis centered on these authorities:

• Texas Family Code Section 102.004(a)(1), which allows a grandparent or another relative within the fourth degree by consanguinity to file an original suit requesting managing conservatorship if satisfactory proof shows the requested order is necessary because the child’s present circumstances would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.
• Texas Government Code Section 573.022(a), which defines consanguinity as existing only when:
• one individual is a descendant of the other, or
• the individuals share a common ancestor.
• In re H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2018), for the proposition that standing to bring a SAPCR is statutory.
• 425 Soledad, Ltd. v. CRVI Riverwalk Hosp., LLC, 709 S.W.3d 551 (Tex. 2024), for de novo review of standing.
• Rodriguez v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Ind., 684 S.W.3d 789 (Tex. 2024) and Combs v. Health Care Servs. Corp., 401 S.W.3d 623 (Tex. 2013), rejecting expansion of statutory text under the “absurdity” doctrine absent truly exceptional circumstances.
• On fees, the court relied on Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469 (Tex. 2019), El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757 (Tex. 2012), and Yowell v. Granite Operating Co., 620 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. 2020) for the required proof of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees.

Application

The court treated the standing question as straightforward statutory construction. Although Section 102.004 does not itself expressly incorporate Chapter 573 of the Government Code, the parties agreed that the Government Code’s consanguinity framework controlled. From there, the court applied the statutory definition literally.

That textual approach ended the argument quickly. The older children were not Stepfather’s descendants. Stepfather also did not contend that he and the older children shared a common ancestor. The fact that Stepfather was the biological father of the children’s half-sibling did not alter that analysis. The court refused to treat sibling linkage as a substitute for the Legislature’s chosen test. In other words, consanguinity runs through descendant or common-ancestor status, not through relational proximity within a blended family.

Stepfather attempted to avoid the plain-text result by arguing that such a reading undermined the protective purposes of the Family Code and produced an absurd result, especially where a close family member may be available to protect children from significant impairment. The court was unpersuaded. Citing recent Supreme Court authority, it emphasized that courts do not rewrite statutes to improve policy outcomes and that the absurdity doctrine applies only in rare cases involving outcomes that are truly unthinkable or unfathomable. The court concluded that this case did not approach that threshold.

On attorney’s fees, however, the court took a different view. It noted that fee awards remain discretionary only within the boundaries of legally sufficient proof. Because the record involved redacted billing entries and the governing standard requires evidence of the specific services performed, by whom, when, for how long, and at what rate, the court held the fee award could not be affirmed on the existing showing and remanded that issue.

Holding

The court held that a former stepparent does not qualify as a “relative of the child related within the fourth degree by consanguinity” under Section 102.004(a)(1) unless the child is the stepparent’s descendant or the child and stepparent share a common ancestor within the meaning of Government Code Section 573.022(a). Because the stepchildren were neither Stepfather’s descendants nor persons sharing a common ancestor with him, he lacked standing to bring the SAPCR.

The court further held that a biological relationship to one child does not create consanguinity with that child’s half-siblings for standing purposes. The shared half-sibling did not provide a statutory bridge that transformed a former stepparent into a consanguineous relative of the older children.

Separately, the court reversed and remanded the attorney’s-fee award. Although Stepfather lost on standing, Mother’s fee proof still had to meet the evidentiary requirements imposed by Rohrmoos, El Apple, and Yowell, and the court concluded the fee issue required further proceedings.

Practical Application

For family litigators, the case is a warning against creative standing theories in blended-family disputes unless the statutory hook is solid. If your client is a former stepparent seeking conservatorship or access, do not assume that a shared biological child with the opposing parent creates standing as to the other children in the household. It does not under Section 102.004(a)(1), at least on this court’s reading of consanguinity.

The decision will be especially important in these settings:

• Post-divorce litigation involving stepchildren: Former stepparents who maintained a parental role may have strong equitable narratives, but equity does not supply standing where the statute does not.
• Emergency conservatorship filings: Even where counsel believes the children face significant impairment, Section 102.004 still requires a qualifying relative by consanguinity. The impairment showing does not cure a standing defect.
• Cases involving half-siblings in one household: Practitioners should resist arguing that blood relation to one child creates blood relation to the others. This opinion rejects that relational chain.
• Adoption and termination adjacencies: Where related proceedings are pending, standing in one matter should not be assumed from practical family dynamics in another.
• Fee requests after successful pleas to the jurisdiction: Prevailing on standing does not excuse inadequate fee evidence. Redacted invoices must still reveal enough detail to satisfy lodestar scrutiny.

Strategically, the case suggests two immediate litigation habits. First, test standing early and concretely. Second, if you represent the respondent, do not let a strong jurisdictional defense distract from the need to build a clean fee record.

Checklists

Evaluating Stepparent Standing Before Filing

• Identify the exact statutory basis for standing before drafting the SAPCR.
• Determine whether the child is the client’s descendant.
• Determine whether the client and child share a common ancestor.
• Do not rely on the client’s biological relationship to a half-sibling as a substitute for consanguinity with the child at issue.
• Confirm whether another standing pathway may exist under Sections 102.003 or 102.004.
• Analyze whether adoption, actual care-control-possession, or another statutory theory is available instead of consanguinity.
• Expect a plea to the jurisdiction if the theory depends on blended-family structure rather than statutory text.

Responding to a Plea to the Jurisdiction on Consanguinity

• Frame standing as a pure statutory question subject to de novo review.
• Walk the court through Government Code Section 573.022(a) element by element.
• Force the opposing party to identify either descendant status or a shared common ancestor.
• Emphasize that sibling relationships do not themselves create consanguinity between the adult and the child.
• Anticipate and rebut policy-based “absurdity” arguments with Rodriguez and Combs.
• Preserve a clear record on the exact standing theory asserted and rejected.

Pleading Around Blended-Family Facts Carefully

• Separate emotional-parenting facts from jurisdictional facts.
• Avoid pleading “relative within the fourth degree by consanguinity” unless the genealogical basis is demonstrable.
• If the client is a former stepparent, evaluate whether the case is better framed through intervention, existing orders, or another statutory vehicle, if available.
• Do not assume that close day-to-day caregiving substitutes for standing.
• Prepare the client early for the distinction between a compelling factual story and a legally sufficient jurisdictional basis.

Building a Defensible Attorney’s-Fee Record

• Offer billing records with enough detail to show the service performed, the timekeeper, the date or approximate date, the time spent, and the rate charged.
• Avoid over-redaction that prevents the court from evaluating reasonableness and necessity.
• Exclude duplicative, excessive, block-billed, or inadequately documented entries.
• Tie the work performed to the issues actually litigated, including the plea to the jurisdiction.
• Present testimony that tracks the Rohrmoos lodestar requirements.
• If confidentiality is a concern, consider targeted redactions rather than blanket obscuring of task descriptions.
• Preserve segregated proof for trial-level and appellate-level fees.

Representing Former Stepparents in High-Conflict Custody Disputes

• Audit all possible standing statutes before suit is filed.
• Investigate whether any parent-child relationship was formalized through adoption or prior orders.
• Consider whether intervention in an existing SAPCR is procedurally preferable to filing an original suit.
• Document the client’s expectations realistically regarding standing obstacles.
• If no statutory standing exists, avoid filing on an aggressive theory that depends on equitable expansion of the statute.
• If filing is warranted on another basis, narrow the pleadings to the strongest available jurisdictional theory.

Citation

In re H.E.C. and E.G.C., Children, No. 06-26-00011-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 25, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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