Knowing Appeal Waiver Bars Revocation Appeal | LeCompte v. State (2026)

Lecompte v. State, 01-26-00593-CR, August 25, 2026.

On appeal from 482nd District Court, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

A defendant placed on deferred-adjudication community supervision cannot appeal the later adjudication of guilt if, at the revocation stage, he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his right to appeal in exchange for consideration from the State. In Lecompte, the First Court enforced an express waiver tied to the State’s recommendation of a two-year sentence and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction under Ex parte Broadway and Blanco.

Relevance to Family Law

Although Lecompte is a criminal revocation case, its practical relevance to Texas family-law litigators is significant because family cases routinely intersect with parallel criminal exposure, especially in divorce and SAPCR matters involving family violence allegations. When a party in a custody or divorce case resolves a criminal assault-family-violence matter through a negotiated waiver at a revocation or adjudication hearing, family-law counsel should assume that the resulting adjudication and sentence may become effectively final very quickly, with little or no realistic appellate off-ramp. That matters in conservatorship disputes, possession restrictions, protective-order strategy, firearm issues, credibility determinations, and disproportionality arguments in property division where one side’s criminal case may shape both the facts the family court hears and the settlement leverage available to the parties.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Christopher Kevenwa Lecompte had originally pleaded guilty to third-degree felony assault of a family or household member with a previous conviction. The trial court deferred adjudication and placed him on community supervision for two years. Later, the State moved to adjudicate guilt, alleging violations of supervision conditions.

At the revocation proceeding, Lecompte pleaded “true” to the alleged violations. The record reflected a separate written agreement at that stage: he stipulated to the violations, acknowledged the punishment range of two to twenty years, and accepted the State’s recommendation of two years’ confinement, with no fine or restitution. As part of that same agreement, he expressly waived his right to appeal. The written stipulation was signed by Lecompte, his lawyer, the prosecutor, and the trial judge, and Lecompte initialed each line.

After the trial court adjudicated guilt and imposed the recommended two-year sentence, Lecompte nevertheless filed a notice of appeal seeking a shorter sentence and referencing ineffective assistance of counsel and “not right mind,” but without identifying any preserved appellate basis. The court of appeals focused not on the merits of those assertions, but on whether it had jurisdiction in light of the express waiver.

Issues Decided

• Whether a defendant may appeal an adjudication of guilt following deferred-adjudication community supervision when, at the revocation hearing, he expressly waived his right to appeal in exchange for the State’s sentencing recommendation.
• Whether an appeal waiver executed at the adjudication/revocation stage is enforceable when the record shows the waiver was knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and supported by consideration.
• Whether such a waiver deprives the court of appeals of jurisdiction, requiring dismissal.

Rules Applied

The court distinguished between two related but different concepts. First, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2(a)(2) limits appeals in plea-bargain cases. But the court recognized, citing Hargesheimer v. State, that this rule does not itself restrict a defendant’s right to appeal from a later adjudication of guilt after deferred adjudication.

The dispositive rule instead came from ordinary waiver principles. The court relied principally on:

• Ex parte Broadway, 301 S.W.3d 694, 697–99 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009), for the rule that a defendant may validly waive the right to appeal if the waiver is knowing, intelligent, voluntary, and supported by consideration.
• Blanco v. State, 18 S.W.3d 218, 219–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), recognizing enforceability of appeal waivers under those circumstances.
• Hargesheimer v. State, 182 S.W.3d 906, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006), clarifying that Rule 25.2(a)(2) does not by itself foreclose appeals from adjudications following deferred adjudication.
• Intermediate appellate decisions enforcing similar revocation-stage waivers, including Mendez v. State, 558 S.W.3d 823, 824 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.), as well as unpublished First and Fifth Court authorities.

The court also noted the trial-court certification indicating this was a plea-bargain case and that the defendant had no right of appeal, but the opinion makes clear that the more important point was the express waiver in the revocation paperwork itself.

Application

The First Court treated this as a straightforward waiver case rather than a disputed plea-bargain-jurisdiction case. It first acknowledged that an adjudication of guilt after deferred adjudication is not automatically insulated from appellate review by Rule 25.2(a)(2). That mattered because, absent more, Lecompte would not necessarily have been barred from attempting an appeal merely because the underlying matter involved a plea.

But the record contained more. The clerk’s record showed a separate revocation-stage agreement in which Lecompte admitted the violations, acknowledged the full punishment range, accepted the State’s recommendation of a two-year sentence, and expressly waived his right to appeal. The recommendation was not illusory consideration. It capped his exposure at the minimum end of a two-to-twenty-year range and matched the sentence ultimately imposed. The court also relied on the formality of the execution: signatures from the defendant, defense counsel, prosecutor, and judge, plus Lecompte’s initials on each line. That documentary record was enough to establish a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.

Once the court concluded the waiver was valid under Broadway and Blanco, the rest followed quickly. Because Lecompte had bargained away appellate review in exchange for a sentencing benefit and the trial court imposed the recommended sentence, the court of appeals held that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. His later generalized references to ineffective assistance and mental state in the notice of appeal did not overcome the waiver, particularly where no developed record or preserved issue undercut the validity of the waiver itself.

Holding

The court held that a defendant may not appeal from an adjudication of guilt after deferred-adjudication community supervision when, at the revocation or adjudication hearing, he knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waives the right to appeal in exchange for consideration from the State. The court enforced that waiver under ordinary waiver principles as articulated in Ex parte Broadway and Blanco.

The court further held that this kind of express, bargained-for waiver requires dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. Because Lecompte accepted the State’s recommended sentence and expressly waived appeal in a signed written stipulation reflecting his understanding of the punishment range and the terms of the agreement, the First Court dismissed the appeal.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, Lecompte is a reminder that the procedural choices made in a parallel criminal case can lock in facts and consequences that later dominate the family case. In assault-family-violence situations, a revocation-stage stipulation admitting violations, accepting a sentence recommendation, and waiving appeal may create a rapid and durable adjudication that affects temporary orders, final conservatorship rulings, supervised access, geographic restrictions, injunctions, and even property-division equities.

Several practical consequences follow.

• If your client is a respondent in a SAPCR or divorce and also faces a revocation or adjudication on a family-violence offense, coordinate early with criminal counsel. Do not assume there will be a meaningful appellate window to correct an unfavorable criminal outcome later.
• If the opposing party has executed a waiver like the one in Lecompte, evaluate the criminal judgment as functionally final for family-court planning purposes. That can affect whether to push for expedited temporary relief, modification, exclusive use of the residence, or limitations on possession.
• In settlement negotiations, recognize that a criminal defendant may trade appellate rights for a favorable sentencing recommendation. That bargain may be rational in the criminal case, but it can have collateral consequences in the family case by solidifying the adjudication and reducing uncertainty.
• For property cases, a final adjudication and confinement may influence reimbursement theories, waste claims, earning-capacity disputes, and arguments about who should manage marital liabilities during incarceration.
• For custody cases, the existence of a signed stipulation acknowledging violations and waiving appeal may become important impeachment material and may affect best-interest evidence, especially where family violence is already a central statutory factor.

The strategic lesson is not that every criminal waiver should be resisted; it is that family-law counsel must identify the downstream civil consequences before the waiver is signed. Once the waiver is enforceable, the chance to reshape the factual and procedural landscape may be gone.

Checklists

Parallel Criminal-Family Case Coordination

• Determine immediately whether any divorce, SAPCR, protective-order, or modification case overlaps with a pending criminal family-violence matter.
• Obtain charging documents, bond conditions, community-supervision terms, and any motion to adjudicate or revoke.
• Ask criminal counsel whether any proposed resolution includes:
• a stipulation of evidence,
• pleas of “true,”
• a sentencing recommendation,
• a waiver of appeal,
• a waiver of a court reporter’s record.
• Evaluate how a final adjudication may affect conservatorship, possession, firearm restrictions, credibility, and property issues.
• Build family-court deadlines around the possibility that the criminal judgment may become effectively final immediately.

Reviewing an Appeal Waiver Before It Is Signed

• Confirm the waiver is separate, express, and in writing.
• Verify that the client is advised of the full punishment range.
• Identify the exact consideration being offered by the State.
• Confirm that the negotiated recommendation is real and material, not merely nominal.
• Review whether the client is also waiving a reporter’s record, which may limit later challenges.
• Assess whether there is any factual basis to contest the waiver as unknowing, unintelligent, or involuntary.
• Consider whether any unresolved competency or mental-health issue could affect waiver validity.
• Preserve any concern on the record before execution of the agreement.

Using the Case for Offensive Family-Law Strategy

• If the opposing party has a valid waiver-backed adjudication, treat the criminal disposition as likely stable for near-term family-court purposes.
• Use the adjudication and sentencing record to support requests for:
• temporary conservatorship restrictions,
• supervised possession,
• exchange safeguards,
• exclusive occupancy,
• injunctions tied to safety concerns.
• Analyze whether the admissions in the criminal stipulation are usable for impeachment or credibility attacks.
• Incorporate incarceration and criminal history into child-support, access, and practical parenting proposals.
• Reassess settlement leverage once criminal appellate uncertainty is removed.

Avoiding the Downside for Your Client

• Do not let family counsel remain siloed from criminal counsel in family-violence cases.
• Do not assume a later appeal will remain available after deferred adjudication is revoked.
• Do not overlook the significance of boilerplate waiver language initialed line by line.
• Do not ignore trial-court certifications stating no right of appeal; investigate the underlying waiver documents.
• Do not rely on generalized post-judgment claims such as ineffective assistance or mental-state concerns without a developed record attacking the waiver itself.
• Do not wait until after sentencing to analyze collateral family-law consequences.

Citation

Lecompte v. State, No. 01-26-00593-CR, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 25, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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