Section 161.001(f) Reasonable Efforts Finding | In the Interest of M.A. Jr. and N.A. (2026)

In the Interest of M.A. Jr. and N.A., Children, 11-26-00054-CV, August 13, 2026.

On appeal from 326th District Court, Taylor County, Texas

Synopsis

Section 161.001(f) is not satisfied by a bare recital that the Department made reasonable efforts to return the children before trial. In In the Interest of M.A. Jr. and N.A., the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that the termination order itself must specifically state those reasonable efforts, and a conclusory finding requires reversal and remand for entry of a statutorily compliant order if the remainder of the termination judgment is otherwise supported.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a parental-rights termination case, its drafting and preservation lessons reach well beyond CPS litigation. For Texas family-law litigators handling SAPCRs, modifications, enforcement proceedings, and even divorce cases involving conservatorship restrictions, the opinion underscores a familiar but often outcome-determinative point: when a statute requires express findings with particularized content, a generic order will not do. The case is especially relevant where trial courts are asked to enter findings on safety plans, reunification efforts, family violence, supervised possession, geographic restrictions, or best-interest-driven limitations, because practitioners should expect appellate courts to distinguish between evidence that may support a result and an order that actually contains the findings the Legislature required.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department became involved in August 2024 after reports concerning the father’s drug use and the mother’s mental-health crisis. According to the opinion, the mother had attempted suicide the prior month and had told the father that she and the children were going to die. The parents had separated, and the children—M.A. Jr. and N.A.—were approximately eight and six years old at the time.

When the Department investigated, the father acknowledged concerns about the mother’s mental health, though he attempted to contextualize her statements. He also admitted using cocaine in July 2024. The mother confirmed that she had attempted suicide, continued to experience suicidal ideations, and used marihuana daily. Both parents refused to sign a safety plan, but the Department initially placed the children with the father based on his representation that he would prevent unsupervised contact between the children and the mother.

The mother later completed an inpatient mental-health program. The appeal, however, did not turn solely on the underlying endangerment and best-interest evidence. It also focused on a distinct statutory requirement under Family Code Section 161.001(f): before terminating rights under the relevant framework, the trial court’s order had to specifically state the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the children to the parent before the final hearing. The order apparently contained only a conclusory reasonable-efforts finding, prompting both parents to challenge the adequacy of the order’s wording in addition to challenging evidentiary sufficiency on several grounds.

Issues Decided

The Eleventh Court addressed the following issues:

• Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the endangerment findings under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), particularly as to the father.
• Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest finding under Section 161.001(b)(2).
• Whether the Department proved that it made reasonable efforts to return the children to each parent before the commencement of the final hearing.
• Whether Family Code Section 161.001(f) requires the termination order itself to specifically state the Department’s reasonable efforts.
• Whether a conclusory finding that reasonable efforts were made, without the specificity required by Section 161.001(f), could support the judgment.

Rules Applied

The court relied on the familiar constitutional and statutory framework governing termination cases. It began from the premise repeatedly emphasized by the Texas Supreme Court: termination is the civil equivalent of the death penalty, implicates fundamental constitutional rights, and therefore requires strict adherence to the clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.

The principal rules applied included:

• Family Code Section 161.001(b), requiring proof of at least one predicate ground and proof that termination is in the child’s best interest.
• Family Code Section 101.007, defining clear and convincing evidence.
• Family Code Section 161.001(f), requiring a finding regarding the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the child to the parent before the final hearing and, as this case holds, requiring the order to specifically state those efforts.
• Family Code Section 161.001(g), referenced in connection with the statutory scheme governing the required findings.
• The legal- and factual-sufficiency standards articulated in authorities including In re J.W., In re A.C., In re J.O.A., In re C.H., and In re J.F.C.
• Best-interest principles under Holley v. Adams and its progeny.
• Recent Texas Supreme Court termination cases reinforcing that the Department must clear a high bar, including In re R.J.G., In re D.T., In re K.N., In re H.S., and In re J.Z.A.

Most importantly for practitioners, the court treated Section 161.001(f) as imposing not merely an evidentiary burden but an order-content requirement. In other words, even if the record could support a reasonable-efforts determination, the statute still required the termination order to identify those efforts with specificity.

Application

The Eleventh Court separated two concepts that are often blurred in trial practice: whether the evidence supports a finding and whether the written order complies with the statute. That distinction drove the result.

On the merits of termination, the court reviewed the record under the heightened clear-and-convincing standard applicable to predicate grounds and best interest. The opinion’s discussion reflects the usual deference to the factfinder on credibility, while also recognizing that appellate review in termination cases is exacting and that the absence of evidence cannot be treated as clear and convincing proof.

But the more consequential appellate point concerned the form of the order. Both parents challenged the trial court’s reasonable-efforts finding, and they also challenged the order’s lack of specificity. The appellate court agreed that Section 161.001(f) required more than a rote statement that reasonable efforts had been made. The statute required the order to specifically state what efforts the Department undertook to return the children to the parent before the final hearing. Because the order contained only a conclusory recitation, it did not comply with the Legislature’s command.

The court did not treat that defect as immaterial surplusage. Instead, it held that the omission required appellate relief. At the same time, the remedy was tailored. Where the underlying termination judgment otherwise survived appellate review, the proper disposition was not necessarily rendition against termination, but reversal and remand for entry of a compliant order. That procedural nuance matters. The defect was in the order’s failure to contain the required statutory specificity, not necessarily in the entirety of the evidentiary basis for termination.

Holding

The court held that Family Code Section 161.001(f) requires a termination order to specifically state the Department’s reasonable efforts to return the children to the parent before the final hearing. A generic statement that reasonable efforts were made is insufficient because it does not satisfy the statutory command for specificity.

The court further held that when a termination order contains only a conclusory reasonable-efforts finding, the defect requires reversal and remand for entry of an order that complies with Section 161.001(f), assuming the remaining termination findings otherwise stand. The significance of the decision is that appellate compliance turns not only on the evidentiary record but also on whether the judgment recites the required findings in the manner the statute prescribes.

To the extent the parents challenged other predicate and best-interest findings, the court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part. The practical takeaway is that a party can lose the battle over sufficiency yet still obtain meaningful appellate relief based on a statutorily defective order.

Practical Application

For CPS trial lawyers, the opinion is a direct warning not to rely on boilerplate decrees. If termination is pursued under a statutory scheme requiring a reasonable-efforts finding, proposed judgments should include a separate, fact-specific section identifying the services offered, referrals made, placements attempted, visitation provided, safety planning undertaken, and any other reunification measures the Department contends satisfy Section 161.001(f). If that language is absent, the judgment is exposed on appeal even where the evidence is otherwise strong.

For counsel representing parents, this case creates a focused appellate issue that should be preserved and pursued independently from broader sufficiency complaints. Review the final order line by line. If the order merely says the Department made reasonable efforts, without stating what those efforts were, raise the defect in the trial court if possible and certainly on appeal. This is a pure order-compliance problem that can generate remand relief even when reversal on endangerment or best interest is unlikely.

The case also carries over into private family-law litigation. Whenever a statute calls for specific findings—family violence findings affecting possession, findings supporting restrictions on parental access, findings on relocation, or reimbursement and characterization findings in divorce—counsel should not assume that a court’s oral pronouncements or the evidentiary record will cure an underdeveloped written order. Appellate courts will enforce statutory drafting requirements as written.

Strategically, this case is also a reminder that appellate framing matters. A challenge to the “reasonable efforts finding” can be framed in at least two different ways: as a no-evidence or insufficient-evidence complaint, and as an order-defect complaint based on the statute’s specificity requirement. Those are related but distinct arguments, and the second may offer a cleaner route to relief.

Checklists

Drafting a Compliant Termination Order

• Identify the precise statutory basis requiring a reasonable-efforts finding.
• Include a separate paragraph or section specifically labeled as the Section 161.001(f) finding.
• State the Department’s actual reunification efforts with factual detail rather than conclusions.
• Describe services offered to each parent individually where the facts differ.
• Specify efforts made before the commencement of the final hearing.
• Confirm that the written order tracks the statute’s required content, not just its buzzwords.
• Avoid generic recitals such as “reasonable efforts were made” standing alone.

Preserving Error for Parent-Side Trial Counsel

• Review the proposed termination order before signing or entry.
• Object if the order contains only conclusory statutory findings.
• Request amended or additional findings that specifically state the Department’s reunification efforts.
• Make a record distinguishing an evidentiary challenge from an order-specificity challenge.
• If necessary, file a post-judgment motion drawing the court’s attention to Section 161.001(f)’s wording.
• Ensure the clerk’s record reflects the version of the order actually entered.

Building the Department’s Record and Order Language

• Present evidence of referrals, services, transportation help, visitation, safety planning, and caseworker outreach.
• Tie each effort to the goal of returning the children to the parent.
• Show timing—what occurred before the final hearing.
• Distinguish between services merely offered and services meaningfully explained or facilitated.
• Prepare proposed findings that summarize the efforts proven at trial.
• Confirm that the final order mirrors the proof rather than relying on form language.

Appellate Issue-Spotting in Family Cases Generally

• Check whether the governing statute requires express findings.
• Determine whether the statute requires specificity rather than a bare conclusion.
• Compare the language of the final order to the statutory text.
• Consider whether the defect affects validity, enforceability, or only appellate remand scope.
• Raise order-compliance arguments separately from sufficiency arguments.
• Ask whether a limited remand for corrected findings is the appropriate remedy.

Citation

In the Interest of M.A. Jr. and N.A., Children, No. 11-26-00054-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 13, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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