Family Code Section 9.003 Is Nonjurisdictional | Williams v. Nunnally-Williams (2026)

Williams v. Nunnally-Williams, 04-25-00505-CV, August 12, 2026.

On appeal from 37th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas Family Code section 9.003(a) is not jurisdictional. In Williams v. Nunnally-Williams, the Fourth Court of Appeals held that a timeliness challenge under section 9.003(a) must be asserted as a limitations defense, not by plea to the jurisdiction, because the statute contains no clear statement tying the trial court’s adjudicatory power to timely filing.

The opinion is also a procedural warning: even if a litigant repackages the mislabeled plea as a summary-judgment motion under Rule 71, the movant still must conclusively prove the elements of the limitations defense. Williams did not do that, so the judgment was affirmed.

Relevance to Family Law

This case matters directly to Texas post-divorce property enforcement practice. Family-law litigators routinely see section 9.003 cited reflexively in enforcement disputes involving retirement benefits, omitted transfers, constructive-trust theories, and post-decree possession of awarded assets. Williams clarifies that section 9.003 is not a subject-matter-jurisdiction weapon that can be raised at any time and used to force dismissal through a plea to the jurisdiction; it is an affirmative defense that must be properly pleaded and proved.

That distinction has practical consequences across divorce and property litigation. It affects how respondents frame dispositive motions, how petitioners respond, what must be developed in the evidentiary record, and what error is preserved for appeal. While the opinion does not involve custody, its reasoning reinforces a broader appellate trend in Texas family law: statutory deadlines will not be treated as jurisdictional absent a clear legislative statement.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The divorce decree signed in 2017 awarded the former wife a defined portion of the former husband’s military-related retirement benefits, specifically $8,470.57 from his Uniformed Services Thrift Savings Plan, together with gains and losses. In 2023, the trial court signed a retirement benefits order recognizing that right. Shortly after, the wife learned from the TSP administrator that although she was entitled to $9,459.26 of the vested account balance, only $512.87 was actually transferred to her, apparently because the husband had already withdrawn most of the funds.

In 2024, more than seven years after the divorce decree, the wife filed an enforcement action asserting constructive trust and breach of fiduciary duty. She alleged that the husband had received funds that were awarded to her in the decree and held them subject to a constructive trust under Family Code section 9.011(b), and that his failure to turn over those funds breached fiduciary obligations arising from the decree and the property division.

The husband did not plead limitations as an affirmative defense in his answer. Instead, he filed a plea to the jurisdiction arguing that the suit was barred by the two-year period in Family Code section 9.003(a). The trial court denied that plea. The parties later agreed to a judgment for $9,393.10 in the wife’s favor while preserving the husband’s right to appeal the denial of his plea to the jurisdiction.

Issues Decided

• Whether Texas Family Code section 9.003(a) creates a jurisdictional bar to a post-divorce enforcement suit filed more than two years after the divorce decree.
• Whether a limitations challenge under section 9.003(a) may properly be raised by plea to the jurisdiction.
• Whether, even if the mislabeled plea is treated as a motion for summary judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 71, the husband conclusively proved the limitations defense.

Rules Applied

The court relied on a familiar but increasingly important jurisdiction/limitations distinction in Texas law.

• Subject-matter jurisdiction concerns a court’s constitutional or statutory power to decide a case. In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022).
• Limitations ordinarily does not implicate subject-matter jurisdiction in ordinary litigation. Tex. State Univ. v. Tanner, 689 S.W.3d 292, 302 (Tex. 2024).
• Texas courts apply a clear-statement rule before treating a statutory requirement as jurisdictional. Absent clear legislative language, courts do not infer that noncompliance strips adjudicatory power. See Tex. Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc. v. Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist., 694 S.W.3d 752, 759 (Tex. 2024); In re K.N., No. 24-0881, 2026 WL 1614378, at *5 (Tex. June 5, 2026).
• Limitations is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by the defendant. Woods v. William M. Mercer, Inc., 769 S.W.2d 515, 517 (Tex. 1988).
• A mislabeled pleading may be treated according to its substance if justice requires. TEX. R. CIV. P. 71.
• Affirmative defenses raised through summary judgment must be conclusively established as a matter of law. Nowak v. DAS Inv. Corp., 110 S.W.3d 677, 680–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, no pet.).
• Defenses such as res judicata or limitations are generally not proper subjects of pleas to the jurisdiction and instead should be raised by summary judgment or proven at trial. See Villarreal v. Ramirez, 685 S.W.3d 868, 884 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2024, no pet.).

The statutory provision at issue was Family Code section 9.003(a), which imposes a two-year limitations period for certain suits to enforce the division of tangible personal property in existence at the time of the decree. The court also noted the wife’s constructive-trust theory under Family Code section 9.011(b).

Application

The court began by rejecting the husband’s framing of section 9.003(a) as a jurisdictional limitation on the trial court’s power. That move is the opinion’s core. The panel emphasized that subject-matter jurisdiction is about adjudicatory authority, not ordinary defenses to liability. Because section 9.003 contains no clear statement making timely filing a condition of the court’s power to act, the statute could not be treated as jurisdictional. In other words, filing outside the two-year period, even if true, would not deprive the district court of power over the controversy.

From there, the court addressed procedure. Because the husband chose a plea to the jurisdiction rather than pleading and proving limitations as an affirmative defense, he used the wrong procedural vehicle. The court invoked Rule 71 and treated the mislabeled plea as though it were a summary-judgment motion. But that did not help him. Recharacterization cures labeling problems, not proof problems.

On the merits of the asserted defense, the husband failed to conclusively establish that section 9.003(a) actually governed the wife’s claims. The court focused on the statutory text: section 9.003(a) applies to enforcement actions involving tangible personal property in existence at the time of the divorce decree. The husband did not conclusively prove that the wife’s suit, centered on withdrawn TSP funds and framed as constructive trust and breach of fiduciary duty, fit that statutory category. Nor did he establish that section 9.003(a) applied to the fiduciary-duty claim at all. Without conclusive proof on those points, the limitations defense failed even under summary-judgment standards.

The opinion also contains a preservation subtext that practitioners should not miss. The court noted that denial of a summary-judgment motion is generally not reviewable on appeal and does not ordinarily preserve the issues raised in the motion. Although the panel went on to address the argument assuming preservation, that portion of the analysis underscores the strategic cost of mislabeling an affirmative defense as jurisdictional.

Holding

The court held that Texas Family Code section 9.003(a) is a limitations statute, not a jurisdictional bar. Because the statute contains no clear language making timely filing a condition of the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, the district court retained authority to adjudicate the wife’s enforcement claims despite the husband’s timeliness challenge.

The court further held that a challenge based on section 9.003(a) must be raised as an affirmative defense, ordinarily through summary judgment or at trial, rather than by plea to the jurisdiction. The husband’s use of a plea to the jurisdiction was procedurally improper.

Finally, even treating the husband’s plea as a summary-judgment motion under Rule 71, the court held that he failed to conclusively prove the defense. He did not establish that the wife’s claims fell within section 9.003(a)’s scope or that the statute barred her breach-of-fiduciary-duty theory. The judgment for the wife was therefore affirmed.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, Williams should change how you litigate post-decree enforcement defenses. If you represent a respondent, do not assume section 9.003 can be deployed as a threshold jurisdictional attack. Plead limitations in the answer. Then build a record and decide whether the issue should be presented by traditional summary judgment, by trial amendment, or at the merits hearing. The label matters, but the proof matters more.

The case is especially important in retirement-benefit and tracing disputes. Many enforcement actions are not clean “divide and deliver a piece of personal property” cases. They may involve withdrawn funds, proceeds, appreciation, constructive trust, fiduciary-duty theories, or turnover-style relief. Williams signals that counsel must analyze which Family Code enforcement provision truly applies and whether a particular limitations period reaches every pleaded theory.

For petitioners, Williams offers a response roadmap. When the other side files a plea to the jurisdiction citing section 9.003, the immediate answer is that the argument confuses limitations with subject-matter jurisdiction. But do not stop there. Attack the defense on scope: ask whether the property is even the kind covered by section 9.003(a), whether the asset existed in the relevant form at the time of the decree, and whether alternative claims such as constructive trust, clarification, fiduciary duty, or money judgment fall outside the defense as framed.

In negotiated resolutions, the case also matters for appellate preservation. Parties sometimes stipulate to a final judgment while preserving a challenge to a denied plea to the jurisdiction. That strategy is attractive only if the issue is truly jurisdictional. If it is actually a mislabeled summary-judgment issue, the appellate path is much less favorable. Williams is a reminder to protect the record before final judgment, not after.

Checklists

Responding to a Post-Decree Enforcement Petition

• Plead limitations as an affirmative defense in the answer.
• Identify the specific Family Code enforcement statute you contend applies.
• Analyze whether the claim concerns tangible personal property, retirement benefits, proceeds, or a constructive-trust theory.
• Evaluate whether the petitioner has pleaded claims that may fall outside section 9.003(a).
• Decide early whether the defense should be raised by traditional summary judgment or tried on the merits.
• Develop admissible evidence establishing the decree date, the character of the property, and the dates triggering accrual.

Avoiding the Plea-to-the-Jurisdiction Trap

• Do not use a plea to the jurisdiction for an ordinary limitations defense absent a true jurisdictional statute.
• Check the statute for a clear statement conditioning the court’s power on timely filing.
• Distinguish governmental-jurisdiction cases from ordinary family-law litigation.
• Assume Texas appellate courts will apply the modern clear-statement rule.
• Remember that recharacterization under Rule 71 may not salvage preservation or proof defects.

Proving a Section 9.003 Defense

• Put the divorce decree and any subsequent enforcement or retirement orders into evidence.
• Establish that the property at issue falls within the statutory category covered by section 9.003(a).
• Prove the asset was in existence at the time of the decree if the statute requires that fact.
• Address each pleaded cause of action separately rather than assuming one limitations argument defeats all theories.
• Negate alternative characterizations such as constructive trust, proceeds, breach of fiduciary duty, or independent tort.
• Seek conclusive proof, not inferential argument by counsel.

Drafting and Prosecuting Enforcement Claims

• Plead multiple viable enforcement theories when the facts support them.
• Consider constructive trust allegations where a former spouse received or dissipated awarded property.
• Specify whether the claim seeks enforcement of the decree, recovery of proceeds, or damages for post-decree misconduct.
• Anticipate limitations defenses and plead facts showing why the cited statute does not apply.
• Tie the requested relief to the decree language and any QDRO or retirement benefits order.
• Build a record showing what happened to the asset after the decree and after any implementing order.

Preserving Error for Appeal

• Raise affirmative defenses through the proper procedural vehicle.
• If filing summary judgment, include competent summary-judgment evidence on every required element.
• Do not rely on argument alone at a non-evidentiary hearing.
• Preserve alternative arguments in the answer, dispositive motions, and at trial.
• Be cautious about agreed judgments designed to preserve appellate complaints tied to non-jurisdictional rulings.
• Confirm whether the ruling you seek to challenge is one that is actually reviewable on appeal.

Citation

Williams v. Nunnally-Williams, No. 04-25-00505-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 12, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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