Interpreting Contractual Provisions in Divorce Decrees via Declaratory Judgment Actions

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Johnson, 10-23-00358-CV, January 29, 2026.

On appeal from the County Court at Law of Bosque County

Synopsis

The Tenth Court of Appeals held that a declaratory judgment action brought under the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA) is a proper procedural vehicle to interpret or determine the validity of contractual property division provisions incorporated into a final divorce decree. The court reversed the trial court’s dismissal, concluding that such an action seeks to construe the legal rights of the parties rather than asserting an impermissible collateral attack on the finality of the judgment.

Relevance to Family Law

For family law practitioners, this case clarifies the jurisdictional boundary between the enforcement of a decree and the interpretation of its underlying contractual agreements. When a decree incorporates a settlement agreement and stipulates its enforceability as a contract, the UDJA offers a robust mechanism for litigating the “construction and validity” of specific provisions—such as rights of first refusal or purchase options—without being barred by the collateral attack doctrine. This is particularly relevant when the dispute centers on whether a party has waived a contractual right or whether a specific term remains legally enforceable years after the decree is signed.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Brittany and Clint Lannen divorced in 2014. Their final decree of divorce incorporated an agreement reached through an informal settlement process, which the parties stipulated was “enforceable as a contract.” The decree’s property division granted Brittany certain real property but provided Clint with a “right to purchase” the 69.5-acre tract before it could be offered to third parties. This right included specific pricing: $1,500 per acre for a 52-acre portion and market value for the remainder, as determined by an agreed-upon realtor. In 2023, Brittany filed a petition for declaratory judgment under the UDJA, seeking a declaration that Clint’s right to purchase was either invalid or had been waived. Clint filed special exceptions and a motion to dismiss, arguing that Brittany’s suit was an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment and that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The trial court agreed, dismissing the suit with prejudice.

Issues Decided

The primary issue was whether a declaratory judgment action seeking to construe or determine the validity of property division provisions in a divorce decree—specifically those based on a merged settlement agreement—constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on a final judgment.

Rules Applied

The Court applied the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act (UDJA), specifically Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 37.004(a), which allows any person interested under a written contract to have the court determine questions of construction or validity. The court also relied on the principle that when a final divorce decree incorporates a property settlement agreement, the agreement is interpreted under the general law of contracts. Regarding jurisdiction, the court applied a de novo standard of review to the trial court’s ruling on Clint’s motion to dismiss (treated as a plea to the jurisdiction), construing the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff. Finally, the court analyzed the “collateral attack” doctrine, which generally prohibits the side-stepping of a final judgment in a separate proceeding unless that judgment is void.

Application

The court began its analysis by examining the nature of Brittany’s pleadings. Brittany did not ask the trial court to vacate the 2014 decree or alter the division of property; rather, she sought a declaration regarding the current validity and construction of the “right to purchase” language. Because the decree explicitly stated that the parties’ agreement was “enforceable as a contract,” the court reasoned that the UDJA was an appropriate tool to resolve the dispute. The court rejected the argument that interpreting the contract was an attack on the judgment. Instead, it determined that Brittany was seeking to define the rights, status, and legal relations created by that contract. By dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, the trial court failed to distinguish between a challenge to a judgment’s existence (a collateral attack) and a request to interpret its contractual terms (a declaratory action).

Holding

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred in dismissing the suit because a petition for declaratory judgment is a valid method for parties to seek construction of contractual language found within a final divorce decree. The court determined that the UDJA specifically authorizes courts to determine questions of construction and validity for parties interested under a contract.

Furthermore, the court held that Brittany’s lawsuit did not constitute an impermissible collateral attack. Because the petition sought to define the scope of the rights created by the decree’s incorporated agreement—specifically whether those rights had been waived or remained valid—it did not seek to undermine the finality of the original judgment but rather sought to interpret it in light of current circumstances.

Practical Application

This opinion reinforces the strategy of drafting divorce decrees that explicitly “merge” settlement agreements and state they are “enforceable as contracts.” By doing so, practitioners open the door to the UDJA for future disputes, which may offer broader discovery and attorney’s fee provisions than standard clarification or enforcement motions under the Family Code. When faced with a motion to dismiss based on “collateral attack” in this context, practitioners should emphasize that they are not seeking to change the decree’s terms but are instead asking the court to exercise its statutory power to interpret a contract.

Checklists

Evaluating the Viability of a UDJA Action Post-Decree

• Review the original decree for “merger” language or stipulations that the agreement is “enforceable as a contract.”
• Identify whether the dispute involves “construction” (what the words mean) or “validity” (whether the provision is still legal or has been waived).
• Ensure the requested relief does not attempt to re-divide property, which would trigger a legitimate collateral attack objection.
• Confirm that the issue is not a “clerical error” more appropriate for a judgment nunc pro tunc.

Avoiding Dismissal for Collateral Attack

• Draft the petition to focus on “declarations of rights” rather than “vacating” or “modifying” the 2014 order.
• Cite In re Marriage of Lannen to establish that the UDJA is the proper vehicle for interpreting contractual language in a decree.
• Be prepared to argue that the suit is a “direct” request for interpretation, not an “indirect” attempt to avoid the judgment’s binding effect.

Citation

In re Marriage of Lannen, No. 10-23-00358-CV, 2026 WL ______ (Tex. App.—Waco Jan. 29, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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