CROSSOVER: Mandamus Can Undo an Unsupported New-Trial Order After a Family-Law Jury Verdict

In Re W. Murray Thompson Construction Co., Inc., 13-26-00215-CV, November 02, 2026.

On appeal from 93rd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas

Synopsis

A trial court may not displace a jury verdict under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 without stating legally valid, sufficiently specific reasons that are supported by the record. When the articulated grounds fail merits-based review, mandamus may require the trial court to vacate the new-trial order and reinstate the judgment rendered on the verdict.

Relevance to Family Law

The new-trial and mandamus principles applied in this construction case extend directly to Texas divorce and SAPCR jury trials. If a trial court grants a new trial after a jury resolves disputed issues involving conservatorship, a child’s primary residence, geographic restrictions, property characterization, valuation, reimbursement, fraud, or tracing, the order must identify a legally appropriate and record-supported basis for setting aside the verdict.

The decision is particularly significant because an order granting a new trial ordinarily is interlocutory and cannot be remedied through an immediate appeal. A family-law litigant facing another trial may therefore seek mandamus review under the framework established by In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas and In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. The analysis remains issue-specific: practitioners must also account for which family-law jury findings are binding and which matters remain committed to the trial court’s discretion.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying litigation arose from a fatal construction accident during renovations at Sullivan Elementary School. San Benito Consolidated Independent School District hired W. Murray Thompson Construction Co., Inc. as the general contractor, and Thompson retained E&J Masonry, Inc. as a subcontractor. E&J employee Ruben Villegas sustained fatal injuries when a telehandler rolled over while operating on an inclined portion of the project.

The case first went to a jury in 2011. That jury allocated responsibility among Thompson, E&J, and Villegas and awarded damages. The trial court granted a new trial based on the jury’s failure to award disfigurement damages. The litigation remained pending for years before a second jury trial occurred in 2025.

At the second trial, the charge asked whether Thompson exercised or retained control over telehandler access and jobsite safety beyond a general right to stop work, inspect progress, or receive reports. The jury answered no. The jury also rejected premises-liability negligence against Thompson while finding that E&J and Villegas were negligent. The trial court signed a take-nothing judgment on November 14, 2025.

The plaintiffs moved for a new trial, asserting legal insufficiency, factual insufficiency, and cumulative error. The trial court granted the motion. Its order principally relied on the prime construction contract and testimony from Thompson’s owner and project superintendent. The court concluded that Thompson retained contractual control as a matter of law and that the jury’s control and negligence findings were unsupported or against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence.

Thompson sought mandamus relief. It argued that the stated grounds did not survive the merits-based review required for an order that sets aside a jury verdict. The Thirteenth Court of Appeals agreed and conditionally granted mandamus relief.

Issues Decided

• Whether a new-trial order under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 must state specific, legally appropriate reasons for disregarding a jury verdict.

• Whether an appellate court may examine the merits of the reasons stated in the new-trial order rather than limiting review to the order’s facial specificity.

• Whether the contract provisions and trial evidence supported the stated conclusion that Thompson retained contractual control as a matter of law.

• Whether the record supported the order’s legal- and factual-insufficiency grounds concerning control and negligence.

• Whether Thompson lacked an adequate appellate remedy and was therefore entitled to mandamus directing vacatur of the new-trial order and reinstatement of the take-nothing judgment.

Rules Applied

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 320 authorizes a trial court to grant a new trial “for good cause” on motion of a party or on the court’s own motion. That authority is discretionary, but it is not insulated from appellate scrutiny when used to set aside a jury verdict.

Under In re Columbia Medical Center of Las Colinas, 290 S.W.3d 204 (Tex. 2009), a trial court granting a new trial after a jury verdict must identify reasons that are both legally appropriate and sufficiently specific to permit meaningful appellate review. A conclusory recitation that the verdict is “against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence,” without an adequate explanation tied to the record, does not satisfy that obligation.

Under In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 407 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. 2013), appellate review does not end once the new-trial order states facially specific reasons. The reviewing court may conduct a merits-based examination to determine whether the stated reasons are supported by the record. A trial court cannot avoid review merely by drafting a detailed order if the record does not substantiate the order’s conclusions.

Mandamus is available when the trial court clearly abuses its discretion and the relator lacks an adequate remedy by appeal. An unsupported order requiring a party to retry a case after obtaining a jury verdict and judgment may satisfy the inadequate-remedy requirement because an ordinary appeal after a second trial does not adequately restore the benefit of the original verdict and judgment.

Application

The new-trial order was detailed. It quoted provisions of the prime contract assigning Thompson responsibility for supervising the work and maintaining safety precautions, and it cited testimony from Thompson’s owner and superintendent. Specificity, however, was only the beginning of the inquiry. Under Toyota, the appellate court was required to test the order’s articulated reasons against the governing law and the actual trial record.

The trial court first treated the prime contract as establishing retained control as a matter of law. The court of appeals examined that premise rather than accepting the trial court’s contractual characterization at face value. It concluded that the stated contractual-control ground did not withstand merits-based review. The provisions invoked in the order did not support setting aside the verdict on the theory articulated by the trial court.

The trial court also relied on legal- and factual-insufficiency grounds concerning retained or exercised control and the jury’s rejection of negligence. The appellate court compared those grounds to the record and determined that they did not justify nullifying the verdict. A trial court’s authority to assess the evidence on a motion for new trial does not dispense with the requirement that its stated reasons accurately reflect and be supported by the record.

Because the order’s articulated grounds failed substantive review, the court of appeals concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by granting another trial. The existing take-nothing judgment could not be effectively protected through an ordinary appeal after the parties incurred the time and expense of retrying the case.

Holding

A Rule 320 order setting aside a jury verdict must provide legally appropriate and sufficiently specific reasons for granting a new trial. The reasons must permit meaningful review under Columbia rather than merely recite generalized sufficiency standards.

Even a facially detailed new-trial order is subject to merits-based mandamus review under Toyota. The appellate court may review the trial record and determine whether the stated reasons actually support the decision to disregard the verdict.

The contractual-control and evidentiary-insufficiency grounds identified in this order did not withstand that review. The court therefore held that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a new trial.

Because an appeal after another trial would not provide an adequate remedy, mandamus relief was available. The court conditionally granted the petition, requiring the trial court to vacate the new-trial order and reinstate the take-nothing judgment.

Practical Application

Texas family-law litigators should treat a motion for new trial following a jury verdict as potential mandamus litigation. The response should do more than argue that the verdict was reasonable. It should address each proposed new-trial ground under the Columbia and Toyota framework and build a record showing why the asserted reason is legally invalid, insufficiently specific, or unsupported by the evidence.

In a SAPCR jury trial, counsel should identify whether the challenged finding falls within the categories for which the Family Code makes the jury’s verdict binding. Those categories can include the appointment of a sole managing conservator, appointment of joint managing conservators, designation of the conservator with the exclusive right to determine the child’s primary residence, and certain geographic restrictions. The precise scope of the jury’s authority matters when evaluating whether the trial court had a legally appropriate basis to disturb the verdict.

In a divorce involving disputed property, the distinction between the jury’s fact findings and the court’s ultimate discretionary responsibilities is equally important. A jury may decide predicate disputes concerning characterization, value, tracing, fraud, or reimbursement, while the court retains responsibility for rendering a just-and-right division. A new-trial order should therefore be tested against the particular legal role of each challenged finding rather than discussed generically as an objection to the overall result.

Counsel opposing a new trial should submit proposed findings or a proposed order that separates every asserted ground. If the court grants a new trial, counsel should obtain a signed order stating the exact legal and evidentiary reasons. An oral explanation, docket notation, or broad statement that the verdict is contrary to the evidence may not provide an adequate basis for review.

If mandamus becomes necessary, move promptly. Assemble the complete charge, verdict, judgment, motion for new trial, response, signed order, relevant exhibits, and the portions of the reporter’s record bearing on each stated ground. Consider requesting temporary relief under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.10 to prevent retrial proceedings while the court of appeals evaluates the petition.

The opinion should not be read as making every new-trial order reviewable or erroneous. The critical inquiry is whether an order setting aside a jury verdict states a recognized legal ground with enough specificity for review and whether that ground is supported by the governing law and record.

Checklists

Opposing a Motion for New Trial

• Identify each asserted ground separately, including legal insufficiency, factual insufficiency, charge error, evidentiary error, juror issues, and cumulative error.
• Explain whether each challenged jury finding was material to the judgment.
• In a family-law case, identify whether the finding was binding, advisory, or related to an issue committed to the trial court’s discretion.
• Cite the evidence supporting the verdict, with precise references to the reporter’s record and exhibits.
• Address preservation, harm, and rendition-versus-remand consequences.
• Apply Columbia and Toyota expressly rather than relying only on general abuse-of-discretion principles.
• Submit a proposed order denying the motion or, alternatively, an order requiring separate and specific rulings on each ground.
• Ensure that the hearing and the court’s reasons are reported.

Evaluating the New-Trial Order

• Confirm that the order is signed and entered within the trial court’s plenary power.
• Determine whether the order states legally recognized reasons for granting a new trial.
• Test whether each reason is specific enough to permit meaningful appellate review.
• Compare every factual assertion in the order to the trial record.
• Determine whether the order relies on evidence that was excluded, never admitted, or taken out of context.
• Analyze whether the order applies the correct substantive burden of proof.
• Distinguish legal-insufficiency reasoning from factual-insufficiency reasoning.
• Evaluate whether the stated error affected a controlling jury finding or the judgment.
• Confirm whether the order addresses the family-law limits on the court’s authority to disregard particular jury findings.

Preparing a Mandamus Record

• Include the live pleadings relevant to the issues tried.
• Include the final jury charge and complete verdict.
• Include the judgment rendered on the verdict.
• Include the motion for new trial, response, replies, and supporting exhibits.
• Include the signed new-trial order.
• Include a certified or properly authenticated reporter’s record of the relevant trial testimony and new-trial hearing.
• Include all exhibits cited by the new-trial order.
• Provide pinpoint record citations for each challenged reason.
• Explain why the order constitutes a clear abuse of discretion.
• Explain why an appeal after retrial would not provide an adequate remedy.
• Comply with the certification, appendix, and record requirements of Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 52.3 and 52.7.
• Consider requesting a stay of trial-court proceedings under Rule 52.10.

Protecting a Family-Law Jury Verdict

• Identify the statutory or common-law effect of every jury finding before trial.
• Draft the charge so that controlling issues are separated and clearly conditioned.
• Object to immaterial, duplicative, or conflicting questions before submission.
• Secure rulings on all charge objections and requests.
• Review the verdict for conflicts before the jury is discharged.
• Move promptly for judgment on the verdict.
• Tie the proposed judgment to the jury’s binding findings while preserving the trial court’s discretion over matters committed to the court.
• Respond to any motion for new trial with issue-specific record citations.
• Preserve the distinction between disagreement with the result and a legally valid basis for setting aside the verdict.

Citation

In re W. Murray Thompson Construction Co., Inc., No. 13-26-00215-CV (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Nov. 2, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion

Family Law Crossover

The crossover mechanism is merits-based mandamus review of an order granting a new trial after a jury verdict. Rule 320 gives the trial court authority to grant a new trial for good cause, but Columbia requires the court to state specific and legally appropriate reasons, and Toyota permits the appellate court to examine whether those reasons are supported by the record. If the reasons fail that review and ordinary appeal is inadequate, mandamus may compel vacatur of the new-trial order and reinstatement of the judgment.

In a Texas family-law matter, the mechanism can arise after a jury verdict in a divorce or SAPCR. For example, the trial court might grant a new trial concerning a conservatorship finding, a geographic restriction, property characterization, valuation, tracing, reimbursement, or another contested fact issue. The mandamus analysis would examine the legal effect of the particular jury finding, the reason stated in the new-trial order, and the evidence relevant to that reason. The appellate court does not merely ask whether the order contains enough detail; it may determine whether the stated basis is legally sound and supported by the record.

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