Article 36.14 Bars Duplicative Acquittal Instructions | Hernandez v. State (2026)

Hernandez v. State, 11-24-00295-CR, November 05, 2026.

On appeal from 104th District Court, Taylor County, Texas

Synopsis

Article 36.14 does not require a trial court to submit a requested reasonable-doubt acquittal instruction when the charge already accurately states the State’s burden and directs the jury to acquit if that burden is not met. Because Hernandez’s proposed language was virtually identical to the instruction given, its refusal was neither error nor harmful.

Relevance to Family Law

Although Hernandez is a criminal appeal, it arises from an assault-family-violence prosecution and offers an important drafting and preservation lesson for Texas family-law litigators. Family-violence allegations frequently affect conservatorship, possession, protective orders, exclusive-use relief, and credibility determinations in divorce and SAPCR proceedings. A related criminal charge—and the instructions governing that charge—may materially affect the family case, particularly when counsel must assess the significance of a conviction, coordinate discovery, or advise a client about testimony that could implicate the Fifth Amendment.

The opinion also illustrates a broader trial principle: a court need not repeat a legal proposition merely because counsel proposes different or more emphatic wording. Article 36.14 governs criminal jury charges, not civil family-law submissions, but the strategic lesson carries over. Whether requesting a jury instruction, definition, predicate question, or limiting instruction in a divorce or custody trial, counsel should identify a substantive omission or defect—not simply offer language already adequately covered elsewhere.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The State charged Christian Emmanuel Hernandez with assault family violence enhanced by a prior conviction for the same offense, making the charged offense a third-degree felony under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(b)(2)(A). The complainant, A.S., was the sixteen-year-old son of Hernandez’s girlfriend and lived in the same household as Hernandez.

The evidence showed that an argument concerning a vehicle escalated into a physical confrontation. According to the State’s evidence, Hernandez—who was twenty-eight years old and approximately one hundred pounds heavier than A.S.—slammed A.S. into a bedroom wall and head-butted him. The jury convicted Hernandez and assessed punishment at eight years’ confinement and a $5,000 fine.

At the charge conference, Hernandez requested additional language at the end of the application paragraph. The charge already instructed the jury that it must find Hernandez not guilty if the State failed to prove one or more elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Hernandez nevertheless requested a second direction stating that, if the State proved every element, the jury should convict, “or if you have a reasonable doubt, thereof, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict ‘not guilty.’”

Hernandez argued that the additional language was necessary to emphasize the jury’s obligation to acquit if it had a reasonable doubt. The trial court refused the requested addition.

Issues Decided

This case note addresses the following charge issue decided by the Eleventh Court of Appeals:

• Whether Code of Criminal Procedure article 36.14 required the trial court to submit Hernandez’s requested reasonable-doubt acquittal language when the application paragraph already instructed the jury to acquit if the State failed to prove an element beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Whether refusal of the proposed language caused reversible harm when the requested instruction was substantially the same as the instruction actually given.

Hernandez raised additional appellate issues, but they are outside the jury-charge holding addressed here.

Rules Applied

Article 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure requires the trial court to deliver a written charge “setting forth the law applicable to the case.” The charge must accurately state the law, include the offense’s essential elements, and explain how the jury should apply the law to the facts.

Texas courts review alleged jury-charge error in two stages:

1. The appellate court first determines whether the charge contained actual legal error.
2. If error occurred, the court determines whether the applicable harm standard requires reversal.

The governing harm standard ordinarily depends on preservation. Preserved charge error is reviewed under the more favorable standard applicable to a timely objection or proper request, while unpreserved error requires a showing of egregious harm under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). See also Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Abdnor v. State, 871 S.W.2d 726, 731–32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

The decisive rule came from LeDuc v. State, 593 S.W.2d 678, 684 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979): when a refused instruction is substantially the same as, or is adequately covered by, the charge given, the refusal does not establish harm. The Eleventh Court also relied on Lopez v. State, 615 S.W.3d 238, 263 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, pet. ref’d), and Borrego v. State, No. 11-97-00080-CR, 1997 WL 33804169, at *1 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 20, 1997, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

The court rejected Hernandez’s reliance on Arroyo v. State. Hernandez cited the case as a Court of Criminal Appeals decision, but it was a Fourth Court of Appeals opinion later vacated by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Moreover, Arroyo concerned the reasonable-doubt definition formerly required by Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), which Paulson v. State, 28 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), subsequently overruled. The court therefore concluded that Arroyo, Geesa, and the related authority cited by Hernandez did not support his requested instruction.

Application

The Eleventh Court began with the charge as a whole rather than evaluating Hernandez’s proposed sentence in isolation. The application paragraph expressly told the jury that if the State failed to prove one or more of the enumerated elements beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury “must find the defendant ‘not guilty.’” That language correctly stated the State’s burden and the jury’s corresponding duty to acquit.

Hernandez’s proposed addition would have restated the same proposition immediately after the existing acquittal instruction. Although he characterized the additional language as “crucial” to emphasize the reasonable-doubt standard, the court found that it added no substantive protection or legal requirement. It merely repeated, in slightly different form, what the jury had already been told.

Because article 36.14 requires an accurate and complete statement of the applicable law—not repetitive emphasis of a party’s preferred formulation—the trial court had no duty to include the additional sentence. The court’s analysis stopped at the first stage of charge-error review: the charge was not erroneous.

The court nevertheless addressed harm as an additional basis for rejecting the complaint. Under LeDuc, refusing an instruction that is substantially the same as an instruction already given does not cause harm. The requested language was “virtually identical” to the immediately preceding sentence, so Hernandez could not establish that its omission affected the jury’s deliberations or deprived him of a legally required acquittal instruction.

Holding

Article 36.14 did not require submission of Hernandez’s requested language. The charge accurately stated the applicable reasonable-doubt standard and expressly directed the jury to return a not-guilty verdict if the State failed to prove any required element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The trial court therefore did not err by refusing the additional instruction. A party is not entitled to duplicative charge language merely because the requested wording places additional emphasis on a legal principle already correctly submitted.

The refusal also caused no harm. Because the proposed language was substantially the same as—and adequately covered by—the charge given, Hernandez could not obtain reversal under LeDuc. The Eleventh Court overruled his first issue and ultimately affirmed the judgment of conviction.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, Hernandez is most directly relevant when a divorce, SAPCR, modification, or protective-order matter overlaps with an assault-family-violence prosecution. Counsel should obtain and review the criminal charge, verdict form, and final judgment before asserting that a conviction necessarily resolved a particular factual issue. The jury’s actual instructions define what it was required to find, and those instructions may be more consequential than the parties’ closing arguments or preferred descriptions of the verdict.

In civil family-law jury trials, counsel should distinguish between a genuinely omitted legal proposition and a request that merely repeats language already appearing in the charge. A proposed instruction is more likely to warrant appellate relief when counsel can identify a substantive gap affecting the jury’s decision-making—not simply an alternative formulation of a correctly stated rule.

The same discipline applies to custody litigation involving family-violence findings. If a requested instruction or question is intended to support findings under Family Code sections 153.004, 153.005, or related provisions, counsel should connect the requested language to a specific statutory consequence. The request should explain what issue the existing charge fails to submit and why the omission matters to conservatorship, possession, access, or a statutory presumption.

In property litigation, counsel should similarly avoid redundant submissions concerning characterization, reimbursement, fraud on the community, or tracing. Redundancy can obscure the real appellate complaint and may invite a response that the charge already adequately covered the requested proposition. A focused request identifying the precise missing element, definition, or burden is more effective at trial and easier to defend on appeal.

Finally, Hernandez underscores the importance of current authority. The appellant relied on a vacated intermediate-court decision and cases subsequently overruled by the Court of Criminal Appeals. Family-law practitioners should verify the subsequent history of every charge authority, particularly older cases involving burdens of proof, presumptions, or mandatory definitions.

Checklists

Evaluating a Requested Jury Instruction

• Identify the statute, rule, or controlling precedent requiring the proposed instruction.
• Compare the requested language with the entire proposed charge, not merely one paragraph.
• Determine whether the charge already states the same legal proposition.
• Identify the precise substantive difference between the existing charge and the requested instruction.
• Explain how that difference affects the jury’s resolution of a disputed issue.
• Avoid requests that merely repeat or emphasize an instruction already given.
• Use language supported by current pattern charges or controlling authority when available.

Preserving a Charge Complaint

• Submit the requested instruction or question in writing.
• Obtain an express ruling on the request.
• State the specific legal basis for the request.
• Identify the portion of the proposed charge alleged to be incomplete or erroneous.
• Explain why the existing language does not adequately cover the requested proposition.
• Ensure that the request is made before the charge is read to the jury.
• Confirm that the written request, objections, proposed charge, and court’s ruling are included in the appellate record.
• Object separately to any related defect in the verdict form.

Handling Family-Violence Overlap

• Obtain the indictment or information from any related criminal proceeding.
• Secure the final criminal jury charge and verdict form.
• Compare the criminal offense elements with the issues presented in the family case.
• Determine whether the criminal disposition is final and whether an appeal remains pending.
• Assess whether the conviction or acquittal resolves any fact material to conservatorship, possession, or protective relief.
• Consider Fifth Amendment implications before examining a party about pending criminal allegations.
• Coordinate discovery and hearing schedules without compromising either proceeding.
• Avoid characterizing a criminal verdict more broadly than the submitted elements permit.

Vetting Authorities Before the Charge Conference

• Confirm that each case remains good law.
• Review subsequent appellate and petition history.
• Determine whether the opinion was vacated, withdrawn, superseded, or overruled.
• Verify the issuing court and use the correct citation.
• Distinguish binding authority from persuasive intermediate-court decisions.
• Check whether statutory amendments have displaced older charge authority.
• Bring copies of controlling authorities to the charge conference.
• Preserve excluded authorities and proposed language in the record when necessary.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Error

• Do not characterize repetitive language as legally mandatory without supporting authority.
• Do not rely on a vacated decision.
• Do not rely on a doctrine that a later controlling case has overruled.
• Do not focus solely on the preferred wording; explain the legal deficiency in the charge given.
• Do not assume preservation alone establishes reversible error.
• Address both stages of charge review: actual error and harm.
• Develop a record showing how the omitted language could have affected the verdict.

Citation

Hernandez v. State, No. 11-24-00295-CR, slip op. at 2–4 (Tex. App.—Eastland Nov. 5, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion in Hernandez v. State.

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