In re Trumble, 06-26-00087-CV, October 09, 2026.
On appeal from County Court at Law (trial court)
Synopsis
A divorce decree’s requirement that a former spouse pay health-insurance premiums, when imposed as part of an agreed property division rather than statutory spousal maintenance, creates a debt that cannot be enforced through contempt and confinement. The Sixth Court of Appeals held the health-insurance contempt provision void under Texas Family Code Section 9.012 and Article I, Section 18 of the Texas Constitution and conditionally granted mandamus relief in part.
Relevance to Family Law
In re Trumble reinforces a critical distinction in post-divorce enforcement practice: an obligation’s placement in a decree does not determine whether contempt is available. Courts must examine the obligation’s substantive character. A contractual obligation arising from a Chapter 7 property division or voluntary support agreement may be enforceable through judgment, execution, attachment, or other lawful collection remedies, but it does not become contempt-enforceable merely because the agreement was incorporated into a divorce decree.
The decision has particular significance for decrees requiring payment of a former spouse’s insurance premiums, installment payments, debts, reimbursements, or other financial obligations that do not qualify as statutory spousal maintenance or child support. Litigators seeking enforcement should plead remedies appropriate to debt collection and property enforcement rather than request incarceration. Conversely, a party facing contempt should determine at the outset whether the alleged violation concerns a legal support duty, delivery of specific property, or merely payment of a debt.
Although the opinion arose from property-division enforcement rather than custody litigation, the distinction matters in cases involving both property and child-related obligations. Child support and qualifying medical support arise from legal duties and are governed by different enforcement provisions. Counsel should avoid treating a former spouse’s contractual health-insurance benefit as though it were child medical support or court-ordered spousal maintenance.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
Donald Allen Trumble and Tammi Wynette Trumble divorced in 2015 under an agreed final decree. Among other obligations, the decree required Donald to pay health-insurance coverage for Tammi for fifteen years. It also required installment payments relating to Tammi’s interest in the community estate, payments into her retirement account, and maintenance of a life-insurance policy naming her as beneficiary.
In 2025, Tammi filed a petition for contempt and enforcement. She alleged that Donald had failed to make the community-estate and retirement payments, allowed the life-insurance policy to lapse, and failed to pay her health-insurance premiums.
The trial court awarded Tammi $80,000.00 in unpaid community-estate installments and $24,000.00 in unpaid retirement-account payments. It also found Donald in contempt for failing to maintain the life-insurance policy and pay the health-insurance premiums. The court imposed 180 days’ confinement, subject to Donald’s ability to purge the contempt by reinstating the life-insurance coverage and paying $3,000.00 in health-insurance arrearages. The sentence was suspended and probated for fifty-one months, conditioned in part on payment of the arrearages and continued monthly payment of Tammi’s health insurance.
Donald moved to vacate or modify the contempt judgment. He argued that the health-insurance obligation was a debt that could not constitutionally be enforced by confinement. He also contended that reinstatement of the former life-insurance policy was impossible. The trial court later clarified that its order required Donald to obtain substitute or replacement coverage, not necessarily to revive the identical cancelled policy. The trial court nevertheless concluded that it lacked plenary jurisdiction to vacate or modify the contempt judgment.
Donald sought mandamus relief in the Sixth Court of Appeals.
Issues Decided
- Whether the decree’s requirement that Donald pay Tammi’s health-insurance premiums was a debt obligation that could not be enforced through contempt and confinement.
- Whether directing Donald to obtain a substitute or replacement life-insurance policy improperly modified the parties’ final divorce decree.
- Whether the trial court incorrectly refused to exercise jurisdiction over Donald’s motion to vacate or modify the contempt order based on the expiration of plenary power.
Rules Applied
- Texas Family Code Section 9.001(a): A party affected by a divorce decree dividing property may seek enforcement in the court that rendered the decree.
- Texas Family Code Section 9.012: A court may use contempt to enforce delivery of specific property or an award of a right to future property. It generally may not use contempt to enforce a lump-sum or installment monetary award in the nature of debt, subject to the statute’s specified exceptions.
- Article I, Section 18 of the Texas Constitution: “No person shall ever be imprisoned for debt.”
- In re Henry, 154 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. 2005): Although courts may enforce debt-payment orders through processes such as execution or attachment, an order confining a person for failing to pay a debt is void.
- Dalton v. Dalton, 551 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. 2018): A decree incorporating a voluntary support obligation that does not qualify as statutory spousal maintenance creates a contractual debt rather than a court-ordered support obligation enforceable by contempt.
- In re Green, 221 S.W.3d 645 (Tex. 2007): Contractual support obligations that do not qualify as statutory maintenance are enforceable as contracts rather than through contempt.
- Ex parte Hall, 854 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1993): Failure to comply with an order to pay a debt is not contempt punishable by imprisonment.
- In re Durnin, 619 S.W.3d 250 (Tex. 2021): Mandamus requires a clear abuse of discretion and the absence of an adequate appellate remedy.
Application
The court began with the character of the health-insurance obligation. The decree required Donald to continue paying for health insurance covering Tammi for fifteen years. Tammi acknowledged that the obligation was not statutory spousal maintenance, but argued that it constituted a “performance obligation” rather than a debt.
The court rejected that characterization. Under Dalton and In re Green, incorporating a voluntary support agreement into a decree does not transform the contractual obligation into statutory maintenance. Because the obligation arose under the Chapter 7 property-division framework and did not qualify as spousal maintenance, it was a debt.
That classification controlled the permissible enforcement remedy. Section 9.012 prohibits enforcement by contempt of a monetary award in the nature of debt except in specified circumstances, and the Texas Constitution independently prohibits imprisonment for debt. The trial court could employ lawful collection and enforcement procedures, but it could not condition Donald’s liberty on payment of the $3,000.00 in health-insurance arrearages or his continued payment of the premiums. The contempt provision based on those payments was therefore void.
The life-insurance issue presented a different question. Donald argued that requiring a new or substitute policy expanded the decree because the decree contemplated maintenance of the policy existing at the time of divorce. The appellate court treated the trial court’s later order as a clarification of the enforcement remedy rather than a substantive modification. Requiring replacement coverage after Donald allowed the original policy to lapse effectuated the existing insurance requirement; it did not alter the underlying decree.
Finally, the trial court declined to consider vacating or modifying the contempt judgment because it believed its plenary jurisdiction had expired. The appellate court concluded that the trial court failed to exercise its continuing authority over the contempt order. Expiration of ordinary plenary power did not prevent the court from addressing the challenged contempt ruling.
Holding
The health-insurance obligation was a contractual debt arising from the agreed divorce decree, not statutory spousal maintenance. Because Article I, Section 18 prohibits imprisonment for debt and Section 9.012 restricts contempt enforcement of debt obligations arising from property division, the provision holding Donald in contempt and subjecting him to confinement for nonpayment of the health-insurance premiums was void.
The trial court did not impermissibly modify the divorce decree by clarifying that Donald could comply with the life-insurance requirement through a substitute or replacement policy. The clarification implemented the decree’s existing insurance obligation after the original policy had been cancelled.
The trial court also erred by concluding that expiration of its plenary power deprived it of jurisdiction to consider Donald’s challenge to the contempt judgment. The Sixth Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief in part, including relief directed to the void health-insurance contempt provision and the trial court’s failure to exercise jurisdiction over the motion concerning the contempt order.
Practical Application
When enforcing an agreed decree, counsel should classify each obligation before selecting remedies. Labels such as “performance obligation,” “support,” or “indemnity” will not control if the substance of the provision requires one former spouse to pay money under a property settlement or voluntary support agreement. If the obligation is debt, request a money judgment and appropriate collection remedies—not confinement.
Drafting counsel should also separate obligations according to their legal source. Statutory spousal maintenance, contractual alimony, child support, medical support for a child, property equalization payments, and a contractual obligation to pay a former spouse’s health-insurance premiums are not interchangeable. The decree should identify the authority for the obligation, its duration, the conditions terminating it, and the remedies available upon default.
For respondents facing contempt, the threshold inquiry should be whether the order is enforceable by contempt at all. If incarceration is premised on nonpayment of a debt, the resulting confinement provision may be void. Because contempt orders generally are not reviewable by direct appeal, counsel should evaluate mandamus or habeas relief, depending on whether the client is confined.
The life-insurance ruling also supports careful drafting. A decree should not merely direct a party to “maintain” an existing policy. It should address lapse, cancellation, replacement coverage, insurability, premium allocation, proof of coverage, beneficiary designations, policy amount, and alternative security. Express replacement-policy language reduces later disputes over whether enforcement constitutes an impermissible modification.
Checklists
Classify the Obligation Before Seeking Contempt
- Determine whether the obligation arises from property division, statutory spousal maintenance, child support, medical support, or a contractual support agreement.
- Identify whether the decree requires payment of money, delivery of specific property, or transfer of a matured right to future property.
- Confirm whether the monetary obligation falls within either exception stated in Texas Family Code Section 9.012(b).
- Examine the substance of the obligation rather than relying on the decree’s label.
- Determine whether contempt and confinement would amount to imprisonment for debt.
- Plead alternative remedies if the obligation is not contempt-enforceable.
Draft an Enforcement Petition
- Quote the operative decree language verbatim.
- Plead each alleged violation separately and with sufficient specificity.
- Identify the legal character of each obligation.
- Segregate contempt-enforceable violations from contractual or debt-based claims.
- Request a money judgment for unpaid debt obligations when authorized.
- Request execution, attachment, turnover, or other lawful collection remedies when appropriate.
- Avoid requesting incarceration as a remedy for nonpayment of a property-division debt.
- Include attorney’s fees and costs under the applicable statutory or contractual authority.
Defend Against Improper Contempt
- Obtain the complete decree, enforcement motion, contempt order, and reporter’s record.
- Determine whether the obligation qualifies as statutory maintenance or instead constitutes contractual support.
- Raise Texas Family Code Section 9.012 and Article I, Section 18 expressly.
- Challenge any confinement or suspended commitment conditioned on payment of debt.
- Distinguish a legal duty of support from a contractual payment obligation.
- Preserve objections to ambiguity, impossibility, lack of notice, and insufficient proof.
- Consider mandamus when the client is not confined and habeas corpus when the client is restrained.
- Ask the trial court to vacate any void portion of the contempt order.
Draft Insurance Provisions in Divorce Decrees
- State whether the insurance requirement is part of property division, contractual support, statutory maintenance, or child support.
- Specify the person to be insured and the intended beneficiary.
- State the required coverage amount and duration.
- Address whether substitute or replacement coverage is permitted.
- Define acceptable proof of coverage and deadlines for producing it.
- Allocate responsibility for premiums, deductibles, and uncovered expenses.
- Address lapse, cancellation, uninsurability, and material premium increases.
- State available remedies without purporting to authorize unconstitutional confinement for debt.
Prepare the Appellate Record
- Include the final divorce decree and any incorporated agreement.
- Include the enforcement motion, response, and special exceptions.
- Include the contempt judgment and any commitment or suspension order.
- Include motions to vacate, modify, or clarify.
- Include orders addressing jurisdiction or plenary power.
- Provide the reporter’s record from the enforcement and post-judgment hearings.
- Identify precisely which contempt provisions are void and which provisions are challenged on other grounds.
- Explain why direct appeal is unavailable or inadequate.
Citation
In re Trumble, No. 06-26-00087-CV (Tex. App.—Texarkana Oct. 9, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
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