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Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) Endangerment | In re N.A.M. (2026)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of N.A.M., N.A.M., and G.M.M., Children, 10-26-00148-CV, September 30, 2026.

On appeal from 474th District Court of McLennan County, Texas

Synopsis

Termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) is supported when clear and convincing evidence establishes a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of parental conduct that endangered a child’s physical or emotional well-being. The conduct need not be directed at the child or cause actual injury, but when the alleged endangerment rests on another person’s conduct, the Department generally must prove the parent knew of that conduct.

Relevance to Family Law

Although In re N.A.M. is a termination case, its treatment of endangerment has broader significance in divorce and SAPCR litigation involving conservatorship, possession, supervised access, geographic restrictions, and emergency temporary orders. Evidence that a parent physically abused another child in the household, disregarded credible sexual-abuse concerns, failed to obtain medical care, or continued to deny documented safety risks may bear directly on that parent’s protective capacity and the best-interest analysis.

Litigators should nevertheless distinguish a termination predicate from ordinary conservatorship standards. Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) requires clear and convincing evidence and addresses the permanent severance of parental rights. A divorce or custody court may impose protective conservatorship and possession orders under different statutory standards without finding that the evidence would support termination. The opinion has little direct effect on property division, except where the same evidence affects credibility, temporary exclusive use of the residence, reimbursement claims tied to misconduct, or the allocation of litigation expenses.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department filed its original petition in August 2024 concerning Mother’s seven-year-old twins, N.Ad.M. and N.Av.M., and four-month-old G.M.M. Two additional children, N.M. and A.M., lived in the same household and were the children of G.M., the acknowledged father of G.M.M.

The Department’s involvement intensified after N.M. fled the home and asked a neighbor to call 911. Responding officers observed extensive bruising on N.M.’s back, arms, legs, hands, face, and neck. A.M. also had extensive bruising on several parts of her body, with some injuries appearing to be in different stages of healing. Both children had additional scratches and cuts. Photographs documenting the injuries were admitted at trial.

N.M. reported that Mother had attempted to drown her in a sink and had beaten her. During forensic interviews, N.M. and A.M. said Mother struck them with a wooden back scratcher on separate dates. One of Mother’s twins described witnessing the beatings and the use of the back scratcher. The other twin was nonverbal and had Down syndrome, while the infant was too young to be interviewed.

Mother initially told investigators that N.M. had provoked her and that allegations involving the younger children had “set [Mother] off.” Mother acknowledged beating N.M. “longer than expected” because the child was moving. She later denied causing the injuries and asserted that N.M. and A.M. had injured themselves.

The investigation also produced allegations that G.M. had sexually abused N.M. and A.M. Mother admitted observing sexualized behavior and suspecting an inappropriate relationship involving G.M., but she did not report those concerns or otherwise take protective action. Nor did she obtain medical attention for the visibly injured children.

Although Mother completed services and maintained housing and employment during the case, Department witnesses remained concerned about her protective capacity. They described inconsistent accounts, continued denial of the children’s allegations, a lack of accountability, and an absence of meaningful behavioral change. Following a bench trial, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights after finding predicate grounds under § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (N), as well as termination being in the children’s best interest.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Texas Family Code § 161.001(b) requires the Department to prove by clear and convincing evidence both a statutory predicate ground and that termination is in the child’s best interest. Proof of a predicate violation does not eliminate the Department’s separate obligation to prove best interest.

Under § 161.001(b)(1)(E), a court may terminate parental rights when the parent “engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the child.” Endangerment means exposing a child to loss or injury or jeopardizing the child’s physical or emotional well-being. Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987).

Subsection (E) focuses on the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures to act. The evidence ordinarily must demonstrate a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct rather than an isolated act. The conduct need not be directed at the child, and the Department need not prove the child suffered an actual injury. The danger may be inferred from the parent’s misconduct itself, and courts may consider conduct occurring both before and after removal.

Scienter is not required when the predicate rests on the parent’s own endangering acts. When the relevant conduct was committed by another person, however, the Department generally must show that the parent knew of the other person’s endangering conduct. See T.D. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 683 S.W.3d 901, 913 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.).

Legal sufficiency is reviewed under In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264–68 (Tex. 2002), while factual sufficiency is governed by In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). In a bench trial, the trial judge is the sole judge of witness credibility and demeanor. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 346 (Tex. 2009).

Application

The court evaluated Mother’s conduct as a continuing pattern rather than treating each allegation in isolation. The evidence included extensive and documented injuries to two children living in the household, statements that Mother inflicted those injuries with a wooden object, and testimony from one of Mother’s own children that she witnessed the beatings. Mother’s initial admission that she struck N.M. “longer than expected,” followed by her denial that she caused the injuries, permitted the trial court to view her explanations as inconsistent and lacking credibility.

The fact that the most visibly injured children were not the children whose relationship with Mother was being terminated did not remove the evidence from the subsection (E) analysis. Violent conduct toward another child in the same household may demonstrate a course of conduct that endangers a parent’s own children, particularly when those children are present, vulnerable, or exposed to the resulting instability and risk.

Mother’s omissions reinforced the endangerment finding. Despite visible injuries, she did not seek medical treatment for N.M. or A.M. She also acknowledged circumstances suggesting an inappropriate sexual relationship involving G.M. but failed to report the suspicions or take protective action. Those failures were relevant to whether Mother could recognize danger and protect the children in her care.

The court also considered Mother’s conduct and attitude during the Department’s case. Completion of services, stable employment, and housing did not conclusively establish rehabilitation. Department witnesses testified that Mother continued to deny the children’s accounts, offered contradictory explanations, and failed to demonstrate improved protective capacity. Because the trial judge observed the witnesses and determined their credibility, the appellate court deferred appropriately to those determinations while applying the heightened sufficiency review required in termination cases.

As to G.M.’s alleged conduct, the court recognized the distinct knowledge requirement. Another person’s misconduct cannot ordinarily be attributed to a parent under subsection (E) without evidence that the parent knew of the danger. Here, Mother’s admitted suspicions, her observations of sexualized behavior, and her failure to report or respond to those concerns supplied evidence relevant to knowledge and knowing exposure.

Holding

The court held that § 161.001(b)(1)(E) permits termination when clear and convincing evidence establishes that a parent engaged in a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct endangering a child’s physical or emotional well-being. Neither conduct directed specifically at the child nor proof of actual injury is required.

The court further recognized that a parent’s abuse of other children in the household may support an endangerment finding concerning the parent’s own children. Mother’s alleged physical violence, failure to obtain medical care, inconsistent explanations, lack of accountability, and continued inability to demonstrate protective capacity could be considered together rather than as disconnected events.

Finally, when subsection (E) rests on another person’s endangering conduct, the Department generally must establish that the parent knew of that conduct. Evidence that Mother suspected inappropriate conduct by G.M., observed warning signs, and failed to report or address the danger was therefore significant to the knowing-exposure component of the analysis.

Practical Application

For Department’s counsel or an amicus attorney, In re N.A.M. supports presenting endangerment as a complete chronology. The persuasive force of the case did not arise from one category of proof alone. It came from the interaction of physical injuries, photographs, forensic statements, eyewitness testimony, Mother’s admissions, delayed medical care, unreported sexual-abuse concerns, inconsistent explanations, and lack of demonstrated behavioral change.

For a parent resisting termination, service-plan completion should not be treated as the endpoint of the defense. Counsel must connect each completed service to evidence of changed behavior, accountability, protective decision-making, and a realistic safety plan. Housing and employment address stability, but they do not necessarily rebut evidence of violence or an inability to recognize and respond to abuse.

In divorce and custody litigation, counsel may use analogous evidence to support temporary restraints, supervised possession, neutral exchanges, psychological evaluation, injunctions restricting contact with a third party, or appointment of a parent as sole managing conservator. The proponent should explain how misconduct toward another household member creates a present risk to the child at issue.

Counsel relying on a romantic partner’s or household member’s misconduct must develop the parent’s knowledge. Relevant proof may include prior disclosures, text messages, medical records, police reports, school communications, earlier Department referrals, observed injuries, admissions of suspicion, and efforts to minimize or conceal the conduct. Proof of the third party’s misconduct, standing alone, may not establish knowing exposure by the parent.

Checklists

Building a Subsection (E) Record

Proving Knowledge of Another Person’s Conduct

Defending the Accused Parent

Preparing a Custody or Divorce Case Involving Similar Evidence

Citation

In re N.A.M., No. 10-26-00148-CV, slip op. (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 30, 2026, mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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