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Section 154.127 Requires Child-Support Step-Down | Hernandez v. Frithiof (2025)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Hernandez v. Frithiof, 03-23-00787-CV, September 30, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law No. 2 of Williamson County

Synopsis

Texas Family Code section 154.127 requires a support order covering multiple children to reduce child support—and corresponding medical support—when the obligation for an older child terminates. A trial court abuses its discretion by maintaining the two-child rate after the older child reaches majority, although the appellate court may modify the judgment when the record establishes the correct step-down amounts.

Relevance to Family Law

Hernandez v. Frithiof is a drafting and rendition case with direct consequences for SAPCRs, divorces involving minor children, and post-divorce modifications. When support is ordered for children with different emancipation dates, counsel should ensure that the proposed order states the amount due during each successive period rather than leaving the obligor liable at the original, multi-child rate until the youngest child emancipates.

The opinion also carries an important attorney’s-fee lesson. Failure to object at trial can waive a complaint that fees were not segregated between enforcement and modification claims, but legal- and factual-sufficiency challenges remain available after a bench trial. Fee claimants should therefore present evidence satisfying the lodestar requirements even when billing records are admitted without objection.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Patricio Hernandez and Amber Frithiof were the parents of two children, one born in 2006 and the other in 2007. Their parenting and support arrangements had been governed by several SAPCR orders. Under temporary orders entered in 2020, Frithiof became sole managing conservator, Hernandez was prohibited from contacting the children, and Hernandez was ordered to pay $1,750 per month in child support.

By the time of the 2023 modification proceedings, Hernandez had been convicted of sexually assaulting his stepdaughter and sentenced to twenty-eight years in prison. He had stopped paying child support in December 2022. His counsel represented that he had lost his employment income and could no longer provide health insurance through his former employer, although the evidence also showed that he was paying $600 per month in support for another child.

The principal contested issue at the modification hearing was support. The trial court applied the child-support guidelines and ordered Hernandez to pay $1,750 per month for the full twenty-two-month period remaining before the younger child’s emancipation. It converted that obligation into a $38,500 lump-sum award. The court similarly ordered $26,400 in lump-sum medical and dental support based on the unreduced two-child amount for the entire period.

The problem was that the older child would reach majority after the first nine months. The order did not reduce child or medical support for the remaining thirteen months, during which only the younger child would remain eligible for support.

The trial court also awarded $12,500 in child-support arrearages, $15,000 in unreimbursed medical and dental expenses, $20,000 in attorney’s fees enforceable as child support, and $35,000 in attorney’s fees enforceable as a civil judgment. Findings entered after an appellate abatement listed corrected support totals of $33,950 in child support and $18,600 in medical support, but the underlying judgment had not incorporated those reductions.

Issues Decided

The Third Court of Appeals addressed whether:

Rules Applied

Texas Family Code section 154.127 requires an order for the support of more than one child to provide for a reduction or termination of support as each child’s eligibility ends. The order must establish the amount payable during each period in which the number of children entitled to support changes.

Consistent with Newberry v. Bohn-Newberry, 146 S.W.3d 233, 237 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.), a trial court abuses its discretion by requiring an obligor to continue paying support attributable to a child after the support obligation for that child has terminated.

Attorney’s fees are generally calculated under the lodestar method: reasonable hours worked multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Under Rohrmoos Venture v. UTSW DVA Healthcare, LLP, 578 S.W.3d 469, 498, 501–02 (Tex. 2019), sufficient proof ordinarily includes evidence of:

  1. The particular services performed;
  2. The person who performed those services;
  3. Approximately when the services were performed;
  4. The reasonable amount of time required; and
  5. The reasonable hourly rate for each person performing the services.

Billing records are not invariably required, but they are strongly encouraged when the requested fees are contested.

An objection that a fee claimant failed to segregate recoverable from nonrecoverable fees generally must be made in the trial court. See Green International, Inc. v. Solis, 951 S.W.2d 384, 389–90 (Tex. 1997). That preservation rule applies in a bench trial.

By contrast, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 33.1(d) permits legal- and factual-sufficiency complaints arising from a nonjury trial to be raised for the first time on appeal. Admission of a fee exhibit without objection does not concede that the evidence is sufficient to establish reasonable and necessary fees.

Finally, although an attorney’s statements ordinarily must be under oath to constitute evidence, unsworn statements may be treated as testimony when the circumstances place the opposing party on notice that testimony is being offered and the opposing party does not object. See Banda v. Garcia, 955 S.W.2d 270, 272 (Tex. 1997); In re Wallingford, 64 S.W.3d 22, 24–25 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, orig. proceeding).

Application

The trial court calculated support using the correct two-child amount but applied that amount for too long. The older child remained eligible for support for only nine months of the twenty-two-month period. Child support was therefore properly calculated at $1,750 per month for those nine months, producing a subtotal of $15,750. For the remaining thirteen months, the obligation had to decrease to the one-child amount of $1,400 per month, producing a subtotal of $18,200. The correct aggregate child-support award was $33,950—not $38,500.

The same error affected medical support. The two-child medical-support obligation of $1,200 per month applied for nine months, totaling $10,800. After the older child reached majority, medical support decreased to $600 per month for the remaining thirteen months, totaling $7,800. The correct aggregate medical-support award was therefore $18,600—not $26,400.

Frithiof agreed that the judgment failed to provide the required reductions and filed a motion for remittitur using those calculations. The corrected figures also matched the trial court’s later findings of fact and conclusions of law. Because the necessary amounts were established and undisputed, the court of appeals could modify the judgment rather than remand solely to recalculate support.

The attorney’s-fee issues required a different preservation analysis. Hernandez did not timely object that Frithiof had failed to segregate fees attributable to enforcement from those attributable to modification. He therefore could not obtain reversal merely on a segregation theory.

That waiver did not foreclose his challenge to the sufficiency of the fee evidence. Because the case was tried to the court, Hernandez could raise legal- and factual-sufficiency complaints for the first time on appeal. Nor did his agreement to the admissibility of the fee exhibit concede that the requested fees were reasonable, necessary, or recoverable.

The appellate court treated Frithiof’s counsel’s courtroom presentation as testimony despite the absence of a formal oath. The trial court had expressly invited testimony, counsel stated that he could establish the matter through his own testimony, and he concluded by stating that he “pass[ed]” himself. Hernandez’s attorney declined cross-examination and did not object that counsel was unsworn. Nevertheless, the fee award remained subject to the evidentiary requirements governing reasonable and necessary fees, and the court reversed the attorney’s-fee award and remanded that issue for further proceedings.

Holding

The trial court abused its discretion by requiring Hernandez to pay child support at the two-child rate after the older child reached majority. Section 154.127 required the obligation to step down from $1,750 to $1,400 per month for the final thirteen months. The court of appeals modified the lump-sum child-support award to $33,950.

The trial court likewise erred by continuing medical support at the two-child rate for the entire period. The obligation had to decrease from $1,200 to $600 per month after the older child’s majority. The appellate court modified the lump-sum medical-support award to $18,600.

Hernandez waived his failure-to-segregate complaint because he did not present that objection in the trial court. The fact that the matter was tried without a jury did not excuse the absence of a timely segregation objection.

Hernandez did not waive his challenge to the legal and factual sufficiency of the attorney’s-fee evidence. The court reversed the attorney’s-fee award and remanded for further proceedings concerning fees.

Practical Application

For multiple-child support orders, the safest practice is to include a separate paragraph for each support period. Each paragraph should identify the triggering event, the children remaining eligible for support, the monthly amount due, and the date on which the new amount begins. A generic statement that support continues until the youngest child turns eighteen is not a substitute for the reductions required by section 154.127.

The same discipline should be applied to medical and dental support. If the amount is tied to the number of covered children or the cost of coverage, the judgment should state the reduced amount payable after each child’s eligibility terminates. Counsel should not assume that a child-support step-down automatically corrects a separately stated medical-support obligation.

When a court converts future monthly obligations into a lump sum, verify every period independently. Calculate the number of months before and after each emancipation event, multiply each period by the applicable rate, and confirm that the aggregate figure in the decretal language matches the underlying calculations.

In enforcement and modification proceedings tried together, fee segregation should be addressed before or during trial. The fee claimant should identify which services relate to enforcement, modification, conservatorship, discovery, sanctions, or other claims and should explain any work that is so intertwined that segregation is not required. The opposing party should object expressly if the evidence does not segregate recoverable from nonrecoverable work.

Finally, do not confuse admissibility with sufficiency. A billing statement may be admitted without objection and still fail to prove reasonable and necessary fees under Rohrmoos. The proponent should connect the records to competent testimony concerning the work performed, time spent, rates charged, personnel involved, and necessity of the services.

Checklists

Drafting a Multiple-Child Support Order

Calculating Lump-Sum Future Support

Addressing Medical and Dental Support

Proving Attorney’s Fees

Preserving Challenges to Attorney’s Fees

Reviewing the Final Judgment

Citation

Hernandez v. Frithiof, No. 03-23-00787-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Sept. 30, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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