Penal Code § 25.07 Requires Knowledge of Extension | Layton v. State (2026)

Layton v. State, 13-24-00521-CR, October 08, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law of Bosque County, Texas

Synopsis

A conviction under Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a) requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew a protective order remained effective through an extension under Texas Family Code § 85.025. An extension order directing the clerk to serve the defendant does not establish that service occurred or create a presumption of notice; without other evidence of knowledge, the proper disposition is reversal and acquittal.

Relevance to Family Law

Protective orders frequently arise alongside divorce, conservatorship, possession, and modification proceedings, but Layton illustrates that obtaining an extension order is only part of the enforcement process. When continued protection depends on an extension entered while the respondent is incarcerated or absent, family-law counsel should ensure that notice, service, and proof of service are documented in the court’s file. A valid civil order does not, by itself, establish every element necessary for a later criminal prosecution under Penal Code § 25.07.

The decision also matters strategically in custody litigation. Alleged protective-order violations may affect temporary orders, conservatorship, possession restrictions, supervised access, and findings concerning family violence. Counsel relying on an alleged violation should distinguish among the existence of the order, its effective dates, the respondent’s knowledge, and the conduct constituting the alleged violation. Conversely, counsel defending against collateral use of an alleged violation should examine whether the record actually proves notice of any extension or modification.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

In October 2018, a trial court found that William Dewayne Layton had committed family violence against his former wife and that family violence was likely to occur in the future. The court issued a Chapter 85 protective order prohibiting Layton from, among other things, going to or near his former wife’s residence. Layton appeared personally and through counsel at the original protective-order hearing, and the original order stated that it would remain effective until October 10, 2020.

The original order did not warn Layton that its expiration date could be extended if he was incarcerated when it otherwise would have expired. Layton was incarcerated on an unrelated matter on October 10, 2020.

On February 10, 2021, the issuing court signed an order extending the protective order’s expiration date until May 29, 2023. The extension order found that Layton had been incarcerated on the original expiration date and that his anticipated release date was May 29, 2021. Unlike the original protective order, however, the extension order did not recite that Layton appeared at the extension hearing, received notice of the proceeding, or was served but failed to appear.

The extension order instead directed the clerk to issue a certified copy to the Tarrant County Correction Center “to be served” on Layton. The appellate record contained no return of service, mailing record, acknowledgment of receipt, jail-delivery record, or other evidence showing that this directive was carried out.

The State later charged Layton with intentionally and knowingly violating the protective order on July 5, 2022, by going to or near his former wife’s residence. The evidence established that he stopped at a gas station across the road from the residence and briefly spoke to his eldest son, who was standing in the front yard.

At trial, Layton’s former wife confirmed that he attended the original protective-order hearing but did not attend the extension hearing because he was incarcerated. When Layton, acting pro se, attempted to question her about whether he had received the extension order, the State objected on the theory that the questions constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the order. The trial court sustained the objection and indicated that the extension order itself established notice.

A jury convicted Layton, and the trial court sentenced him to six months in county jail. On appeal, Layton challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence, arguing that the State failed to prove he knew the protective order had been extended.

Issues Decided

• Whether knowledge that the protective order remained effective through an extension under Texas Family Code § 85.025 was an element of the charged Penal Code § 25.07 offense.

• Whether language directing the clerk to serve the extension order created a rebuttable presumption that the clerk completed service and that Layton received notice.

• Whether the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, permitted a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Layton knew the protective order remained in effect on the date of the alleged violation.

Rules Applied

Texas Penal Code § 25.07(a)(3)(A) makes it an offense for a person to knowingly or intentionally violate a qualifying protective order by going to or near the residence of a protected individual. Because the statute requires knowing or intentional conduct, the State must establish the defendant’s knowledge of the operative protective order.

Under Harvey v. State, 78 S.W.3d 368 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002), the culpable mental state required by § 25.07 includes some knowledge of the protective order. The State need not necessarily prove that the accused had actual knowledge of every provision, but it must show that the accused was provided the resources necessary to learn those provisions—such as a copy of the order or notice of the application and hearing.

Texas Family Code § 85.025(c) extends a protective order when the respondent is incarcerated on the date the order otherwise would expire. Depending on the circumstances, the extended expiration date may be tied to the respondent’s release from confinement.

The Family Code separately establishes notice and service requirements relevant to protective-order proceedings. Sections 85.006, 85.041, and 85.043 address service of the application, notice of hearing, delivery of the resulting order, and the circumstances in which an order binds a respondent who did not attend the hearing. Sections 87.001 through 87.003 govern motions to modify protective orders and provide for notice to the respondent.

For evidentiary sufficiency, the court applied the constitutional standard from Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), asking whether a rational factfinder could find every essential element beyond a reasonable doubt when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Under Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997), sufficiency is measured against the elements stated in a hypothetically correct jury charge.

Application

The court first rejected the State’s position that proof of Layton’s knowledge of the original 2018 order was sufficient. The alleged violation occurred in July 2022, well after the original order’s stated expiration date of October 10, 2020. To prove a knowing violation on the later date, the State had to establish that Layton knew the order remained operative through the extension.

Layton’s attendance at the original hearing established knowledge of the original protective order and its terms, including its stated expiration date. It did not establish knowledge of a later extension entered while he was incarcerated. That distinction was particularly important because the original order did not warn Layton that incarceration on the expiration date would extend the order’s duration.

The extension order likewise did not establish knowledge. It did not recite that Layton appeared, received notice, was served, or otherwise learned of the extension. It merely instructed the clerk to issue a certified copy to the correctional facility for service on Layton.

The court declined to treat that directive as proof that the clerk performed the required act. An order to accomplish service is not a recital that service was completed. Because the extension order did not state that Layton had been served, the presumption of regularity did not supply the missing proof of receipt or knowledge.

Nor did the State present independent evidence filling that gap. There was no return of service, certified-mail documentation, acknowledgment, jail correspondence, witness testimony, or admission showing that Layton received the extension order or otherwise knew that the protective order remained effective in July 2022. The record therefore established the extension’s existence, but not Layton’s knowledge of it.

Because knowledge of the operative extension was an essential element of the charged offense, the absence of evidence on that point was a failure of proof rather than a procedural defect that could be remedied through a new trial.

Holding

The court held that knowledge of the protective order’s extension was an element of the Penal Code § 25.07 offense under the facts charged. Proof that Layton knew about the original protective order did not establish that he knew the order remained effective after its stated expiration date.

The court further held that the extension order’s direction to the clerk to serve Layton did not create a rebuttable presumption that service occurred. A directive that an act be performed is not equivalent to a recital that the act was completed.

Finally, the court held that the evidence was legally insufficient because the State presented no other proof that Layton knew of the extension. The court reversed the conviction and rendered a judgment of acquittal. Having sustained the sufficiency challenge, it did not reach Layton’s separate argument that the jury charge erroneously omitted knowledge of the extension as an element.

Practical Application

For attorneys obtaining or extending protective orders, Layton underscores the need to treat service as a substantive litigation task rather than a ministerial afterthought. A signed extension order may preserve civil protections, but the file should also contain affirmative evidence showing when and how the respondent received notice.

When the respondent is incarcerated, counsel should identify the correct facility, inmate number, authorized recipient, and delivery procedure. A certified copy sent to a facility is not necessarily proof that it reached the inmate. The better record includes a return of service, signed acknowledgment, facility delivery log, certified-mail documentation, or testimony from a person with knowledge of delivery.

In divorce and custody litigation, attorneys should not characterize conduct as a knowing protective-order violation solely because an order appears in the clerk’s record. Before using the alleged violation to support temporary restraints, supervised possession, restricted access, or conservatorship relief, counsel should confirm the order’s operative dates and assemble evidence of the respondent’s knowledge.

For respondents, the decision provides a focused evidentiary framework. Counsel should separate challenges to the validity of the order from challenges to proof of a knowing violation. A respondent need not collaterally attack the extension order to argue that the proponent cannot prove notice or knowledge.

The same discipline should be applied to modifications. If the terms, protected locations, prohibited communications, or expiration date change, counsel should create a record connecting the respondent to the operative version. Reliance on knowledge of an earlier order may be insufficient when the alleged violation depends on a later modification.

Finally, counsel should draft proposed orders with evidentiary use in mind. If the respondent appeared, received notice, waived service, or was served in open court, the order should accurately recite that fact. A recital cannot replace compliance with applicable law, but a precise record can prevent later disputes about what occurred.

Checklists

Extending a Protective Order

• Confirm the statutory basis for extension under Texas Family Code § 85.025.
• Verify the original order’s exact expiration date.
• Obtain reliable documentation of the respondent’s incarceration and anticipated release date.
• Determine whether a motion to modify or other noticed proceeding is required.
• Serve the respondent with the motion and hearing notice through an authorized method.
• File proof of attempted or completed service before the hearing when required.
• Ensure the extension order states the new expiration date unambiguously.
• Include accurate recitals concerning appearance, notice, waiver, or service.
• Provide the respondent with a certified copy of the signed extension order.
• Preserve documentation establishing actual delivery or receipt.

Serving an Incarcerated Respondent

• Confirm the respondent’s current facility and inmate-identification information.
• Determine the facility’s procedure for legal service and certified mail.
• Use a process server or other method authorized by the applicable rules and statutes.
• Address the documents to the respondent, not merely to the correctional facility.
• Obtain a signed return, acknowledgment, mail receipt, or facility delivery record.
• Confirm that the documents delivered included the signed extension or modification order.
• File the proof of service promptly in the issuing court.
• Retain correspondence with facility personnel concerning delivery.
• Calendar a follow-up date to verify that service was completed.

Preparing for Enforcement

• Obtain certified copies of the original order and every extension or modification.
• Create a timeline showing each order’s effective and expiration dates.
• Identify which version of the order governed on the alleged violation date.
• Assemble proof that the respondent knew of that operative version.
• Identify witnesses who can authenticate service or delivery records.
• Preserve admissions, correspondence, text messages, or recorded calls demonstrating knowledge.
• Confirm that the alleged conduct violated an express term of the operative order.
• Distinguish the protected individual, residence, workplace, school, and other covered locations.
• Ensure pleadings and proposed jury questions address knowledge of the operative order.

Evaluating an Alleged Violation in a SAPCR or Divorce

• Determine whether the order was effective on the alleged violation date.
• Review the original order for warnings concerning statutory extensions.
• Examine the docket and clerk’s file for proof of service.
• Determine whether the respondent attended the relevant hearing.
• Identify any change between the original order and the operative extension or modification.
• Assess whether the available evidence proves knowledge rather than merely the order’s existence.
• Avoid presenting an arrest or accusation as equivalent to an adjudicated violation.
• Connect the underlying conduct—not merely the allegation—to the requested conservatorship or possession relief.
• Consider whether temporary safety measures are warranted independently of criminal liability.

Defending Against a Knowledge-Based Allegation

• Separate the validity of the order from proof that the client knew its operative terms.
• Compare the alleged violation date with the order’s stated expiration date.
• Request the complete service file, including returns, mail records, and facility logs.
• Investigate whether the client received notice of the extension hearing.
• Determine whether the client received a copy of the signed extension order.
• Examine whether the order merely directed service or affirmatively recited completed service.
• Challenge any attempt to use the presumption of regularity as a substitute for evidence.
• Preserve objections to restrictions on cross-examination concerning notice and receipt.
• Request jury instructions requiring knowledge of the operative extension or modification.
• Raise legal sufficiency when the proponent offers no evidence of knowledge.

Citation

Layton v. State, No. 13-24-00521-CR (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Oct. 8, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

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