Khatib v. Qaddurah, 14-25-01051-CV, October 01, 2026.
On appeal from County Civil Court at Law No. 2, Harris County, Texas
Synopsis
A justice court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over a forcible-detainer action when deciding immediate possession requires first resolving a genuine title dispute, including whether a deed was procured through fraud or forgery. Because the county court at law’s de novo appellate jurisdiction is no broader than the justice court’s jurisdiction, it likewise cannot adjudicate possession under those circumstances.
Relevance to Family Law
This decision is particularly significant when a divorce decree awards a residence to one spouse, but a later deed allegedly transfers the property to a former spouse, family member, or third party. If the claimed right to possession depends entirely on whether that deed is valid, the dispute cannot be resolved through a justice-court eviction; counsel must pursue relief in a court with jurisdiction to determine title, potentially through claims for declaratory relief, cancellation of the deed, fraud, or trespass to try title.
The same jurisdictional analysis may arise when exclusive occupancy is connected to conservatorship orders, temporary orders, or post-divorce enforcement. A family court’s award of temporary possession or exclusive use is not necessarily an adjudication of fee title. Counsel therefore must identify the source of the asserted possessory right and select a procedural vehicle capable of resolving all necessary predicates to possession.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
Maha Qaddurah had been awarded a Katy residence in a divorce from Mohammad Yousef Khatib’s father. Khatib alleged that Qaddurah later conveyed the residence to him by deed in October 2024.
Qaddurah disputed that transfer. She alleged that Khatib and her former husband used a signature taken from another document and attached it to the deed, thereby transferring the residence without her knowledge or authorization. In December 2024, she filed a district-court action challenging the deed and recorded a lis pendens in the real-property records.
While that district-court action remained pending, Khatib filed a forcible-detainer case in justice court in May 2025. He alleged that Qaddurah occupied the property without a lease, paid no rent, and failed to vacate after he terminated her occupancy. His asserted right to possession rested on the October 2024 deed.
Qaddurah filed a plea to the jurisdiction. She argued that the justice court could not determine immediate possession without first deciding whether the deed had validly transferred title to Khatib. The justice court nevertheless rendered judgment for Khatib.
Qaddurah appealed to the county court at law for a de novo proceeding and renewed her jurisdictional plea. Both the associate judge and the presiding judge concluded that the forcible-detainer action had to be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues Decided
- Whether an allegation that a deed was procured through fraud or forgery raised a genuine title issue inseparable from the right to immediate possession.
- Whether Texas Government Code § 27.031(b) deprived the justice court of jurisdiction because possession could not be determined without adjudicating title.
- Whether the county court at law acquired broader jurisdiction over the dispute through the de novo appeal from justice court.
- Whether the distinction between a voidable deed obtained through fraud in the inducement and a void deed resulting from fraud in the factum or forgery permitted the eviction case to proceed.
Rules Applied
- Texas Property Code § 24.004 and Texas Government Code § 27.031(a)(2): A justice court in the precinct where the property is located generally has jurisdiction over a forcible-detainer action.
- Texas Government Code § 27.031(b): A justice court lacks jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate title to real property.
- Limited scope of forcible detainer: A forcible-detainer action is intended to provide a speedy, simple, and inexpensive determination of the right to immediate possession. It does not adjudicate ultimate title. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. v. Pham, 449 S.W.3d 230, 233–35 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).
- Title must be a prerequisite to possession: The existence of a separate title dispute does not automatically defeat eviction jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is absent only when resolving title is a necessary prerequisite to determining immediate possession. Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro, LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 435–36 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.).
- Affirmative defenses may establish a jurisdictional defect: Because of the special limits on justice-court jurisdiction, a plea to the jurisdiction may rely on a pleaded defense demonstrating that possession cannot be resolved apart from title. Yarbrough v. Household Finance Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d 277, 279–80 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).
- Derivative appellate jurisdiction: In a de novo appeal from justice court, the county court at law remains confined to the justice court’s jurisdictional limits. The county court does not acquire authority to adjudicate title merely because it otherwise possesses broader original jurisdiction. Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 708–09 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, no pet.); Goggins v. Leo, 849 S.W.2d 373, 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, no writ).
- Absence of an independent landlord-tenant relationship: Although a landlord-tenant relationship is not a jurisdictional prerequisite in every forcible-detainer case, its absence may indicate that the claimed right to possession depends exclusively on ownership. Yarbrough, 455 S.W.3d at 280.
- Familial ownership disputes: When competing family members claim possession based on disputed ownership, title and possession may be inseparable. Pina v. Pina, 371 S.W.3d 361, 365–66 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.); Geldard v. Watson, 214 S.W.3d 202, 208–09 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.).
- Effect of alleged fraud or forgery: A deed procured through fraud may be voidable, while a forged deed is void ab initio. Ford v. Exxon Mobil Chemical Co., 235 S.W.3d 615, 618 (Tex. 2007); Yarbrough, 455 S.W.3d at 282.
Application
Khatib contended that the deed should be presumed valid because Qaddurah acknowledged that the signature attached to it was hers. He characterized her allegations as fraud rendering the deed merely voidable, rather than forgery rendering it void from inception. On that theory, Khatib argued that the justice court could rely on the deed for the limited purpose of deciding possession without adjudicating ultimate title.
The Fourteenth Court rejected that approach. Qaddurah did not merely allege a collateral defect that could be addressed independently of possession. She alleged fraud in the factum: that she did not know she was executing a deed and that her signature from another document had been attached to the conveyance. Those allegations potentially rendered the deed void.
More importantly, the court held that the jurisdictional result did not depend on definitively classifying the alleged conduct as fraud in the inducement, fraud in the factum, or forgery. Under any characterization, Qaddurah challenged Khatib’s ownership, and Khatib’s asserted right to possession depended on that ownership.
There was no lease, tenancy-at-sufferance clause, or other landlord-tenant relationship supplying a possessory right that could be evaluated independently of title. The case instead presented a familial dispute over whether ownership had ever been transferred. The pending district-court action and lis pendens reinforced that title remained actively contested, although the existence of that separate suit was not, standing alone, the jurisdictional test.
Thus, the justice court could not award Khatib possession without necessarily accepting the deed as an effective transfer of ownership. That was an adjudication the justice court lacked statutory authority to make.
Holding
The Fourteenth Court held that Qaddurah raised a genuine issue of title so intertwined with possession that determining title was a prerequisite to deciding the right to immediate possession. Texas Government Code § 27.031(b) therefore deprived the justice court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the forcible-detainer action.
The court further held that the county court at law acquired no broader jurisdiction through the de novo appeal. Because its appellate jurisdiction was derivative of the justice court’s jurisdiction, it could not adjudicate title or decide possession when the justice court itself lacked authority to do so.
The court affirmed the dismissal without prejudice. The parties’ competing ownership and possession claims therefore had to be resolved in a court possessing jurisdiction to adjudicate title.
Practical Application
Family-law litigators should identify the legal source of possession before selecting an eviction remedy. A divorce decree awarding real property, a temporary order granting exclusive occupancy, a deed executed after divorce, and a landlord-tenant agreement each create materially different jurisdictional paths.
- Post-divorce deed disputes: If one former spouse alleges that a deed was forged, fraudulently obtained, materially altered, or executed without knowledge of its character, a justice court generally cannot determine possession when the claimant’s case rests solely on that deed.
- Enforcement of a divorce decree: If the decree awarded the property but a party refuses to surrender possession, counsel should evaluate the family court’s enforcement jurisdiction and the relief authorized by the decree before filing a forcible-detainer action.
- Later conveyances: A decree’s award of property does not eliminate disputes concerning a later deed. The court must determine whether the controversy concerns enforcement of the decree, the validity of a post-divorce conveyance, or both.
- Temporary exclusive occupancy: Orders governing which parent or spouse may occupy the residence during a divorce or SAPCR generally should be enforced through the court that issued them. Those orders may control temporary possession without finally determining title.
- Independent tenancy provisions: A forcible-detainer case may remain available if a lease, tenancy-at-sufferance provision, or other agreement creates a right to immediate possession that can be decided without resolving ownership. The instrument must provide a genuinely independent possessory basis.
- Parallel proceedings: Title and possession may be litigated separately when possession can be decided without determining title. But when the claimed right to possession rises or falls with disputed ownership, the justice-court proceeding must yield to an action in a court with title jurisdiction.
- Plea-to-the-jurisdiction practice: The responding party should connect the title dispute directly to the elements of possession. Merely pointing to a pending title case or recorded lis pendens is not enough; the jurisdictional showing should explain why the eviction court cannot decide possession without first determining ownership.
Checklists
Evaluate the Source of the Possessory Right
- Identify every deed, divorce decree, partition provision, temporary order, lease, occupancy agreement, and possession clause affecting the property.
- Determine whether the claimant can establish immediate possession without proving ownership.
- Confirm whether a landlord-tenant or tenancy-at-sufferance relationship exists.
- Examine whether the asserted tenancy arose before or after the disputed conveyance.
- Determine whether the divorce decree awarded title, exclusive use, temporary occupancy, or some combination of those rights.
- Review whether any later deed or transfer changed the ownership position established by the decree.
Assess Justice-Court Jurisdiction Before Filing
- Identify the precise fact the justice court must decide to award possession.
- Ask whether deciding that fact would require the court to determine the validity of a deed.
- Evaluate allegations of forgery, fraud in the factum, fraud in the inducement, lack of delivery, incapacity, or lack of authority.
- Determine whether an independent lease or contractual possession clause permits title and possession to be separated.
- Review Texas Government Code § 27.031(b) and the controlling appellate authorities for the county where the property is located.
- Do not assume that a facially valid deed necessarily supplies an independent basis for forcible detainer.
Prepare or Oppose a Plea to the Jurisdiction
- Plead the title issue with sufficient factual specificity.
- Explain why the title dispute is a prerequisite to deciding immediate possession.
- Attach or offer the relevant decree, deed, pleadings from the title action, lis pendens, and occupancy agreements.
- Clarify whether the challenged deed is alleged to be void or voidable.
- Address whether any landlord-tenant relationship exists independently of the disputed title.
- Request dismissal without prejudice when the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction.
- Preserve jurisdictional objections at both the justice-court and county-court levels.
Select the Proper Family-Law or District-Court Remedy
- Evaluate enforcement remedies available in the court that rendered the divorce decree.
- Determine whether the requested relief seeks enforcement, clarification, or an impermissible substantive modification of the property division.
- Consider declaratory relief concerning the parties’ rights under the decree and subsequent instruments.
- Plead cancellation or rescission of a disputed deed when supported by the governing law and facts.
- Evaluate whether trespass-to-try-title procedures are required.
- Seek appropriate temporary relief concerning occupancy, preservation of the property, taxes, insurance, and maintenance.
- Record a lis pendens only when the statutory requirements are satisfied.
Preserve the Appellate Record
- Obtain a ruling on the plea to the jurisdiction.
- Ensure that all instruments connecting title and possession are included in the clerk’s record.
- Make a record concerning the existence or absence of a landlord-tenant relationship.
- Identify the exact legal basis on which possession is claimed.
- Preserve arguments concerning both the justice court’s jurisdiction and the derivative jurisdiction of the county court at law.
- Distinguish a merely parallel title dispute from a title determination that is indispensable to possession.
Citation
Khatib v. Qaddurah, No. 14-25-01051-CV (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 1, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
Family Law Crossover
The crossover mechanism is Texas Government Code § 27.031(b), operating together with the derivative nature of a county court at law’s jurisdiction in a de novo eviction appeal. A justice court may determine immediate possession but may not adjudicate title. When the possessory claim depends on whether a disputed deed transferred ownership, title and possession become inseparable, and the justice court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. A de novo appeal does not cure that defect because the county court at law acquires only the jurisdiction the justice court could have exercised.
In a family-law matter, this rule may arise when a divorce decree awards a residence to one spouse and a later instrument purportedly conveys it to the former spouse, an adult child, a trust, or another person. It also may arise when the parties dispute whether an instrument was knowingly executed, validly delivered, forged, or procured through fraud. If there is no independent lease, tenancy-at-sufferance provision, or other possessory relationship, the party seeking possession ordinarily must obtain a title determination from a court with appropriate jurisdiction rather than rely on forcible detainer.
The procedural focus is not simply whether another lawsuit concerning title exists. The controlling inquiry is whether immediate possession can be decided independently of title. If it can, separate title and eviction proceedings may proceed. If it cannot, the title dispute must be resolved in a court authorized to adjudicate ownership before possession can be awarded on that basis.
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