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CROSSOVER: No Record, No Reversal: Texas Temporary-Injunction Appeals Presume the Family-Court Evidence Supports the Order

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Roel Guerra v. Maria Fabiola Guerra and Elma Guerra Chavez, 07-26-00364-CV, September 29, 2026.

On appeal from 229th District Court, Starr County, Texas

Synopsis

An appellant challenging a temporary injunction entered after an evidentiary hearing must provide the reporter’s record necessary to evaluate the challenge. When that record is absent, the appellate court presumes the evidence supports the injunction and the trial court’s findings, foreclosing reversal on complaints that depend on the omitted proceedings.

Relevance to Family Law

Temporary orders in divorce, conservatorship, possession, support, and marital-property cases are frequently entered after contested evidentiary hearings. Although many family-law temporary orders are not subject to interlocutory appeal—and therefore ordinarily must be challenged, if at all, by mandamus—the same record principle applies whenever appellate review turns on the evidence presented below: counsel must secure and file the complete hearing record or expect presumptions favoring the trial court’s ruling.

The issue is especially important when a family-law order contains injunctive relief concerning property transfers, business operations, trust distributions, account access, communications, or conduct affecting a child. If the injunction is independently appealable under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(4), the appellant cannot rely on the clerk’s record alone to attack evidentiary sufficiency, necessity, irreparable injury, or the trial court’s factual findings.

Family Law Crossover

The crossover rule is procedural: when a trial court grants a temporary injunction after considering testimony and exhibits, an appellant must bring forward the reporter’s record from that hearing. Without it, the court of appeals presumes the omitted evidence supports the injunction and its findings. That presumption can dispose of the appeal even when the appellant presents substantial briefing on the merits.

In a family-law matter, the rule may arise when a court restrains the transfer of community assets, limits access to a closely held business, preserves trust or partnership property, prohibits dissipation of funds, or enters other injunctive relief during a divorce or related fiduciary dispute. Practitioners must first determine whether the challenged ruling is an appealable temporary injunction under § 51.014(a)(4), a nonappealable temporary order under the Family Code, or an order reviewable only through mandamus. If an appellate remedy is available and the challenge depends on the evidentiary hearing, the record must accompany the proceeding.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying litigation arose from a dispute among siblings concerning family entities and a trust created under their father’s will. Nicasio and Benita Guerra had formed a family limited partnership, NB Guerra, Ltd., and a separate cattle company. After Nicasio’s death, his will created a residuary trust, with Benita serving as trustee and Roel Guerra designated as successor trustee.

Following Benita’s death, Maria Fabiola Guerra sued Roel to compel a trust accounting. The district court entered an order compelling the accounting and later awarded attorney’s fees. Maria subsequently amended her pleadings to seek additional relief, including appointment of a receiver, winding up the family limited partnership, and a temporary injunction. The trial court entered both a temporary-injunction order and an order appointing a person to carry out the partnership’s winding up.

The temporary-injunction order recited that the trial court had conducted an evidentiary hearing over several dates and had considered pleadings, affidavits, exhibits, testimony, and counsel’s arguments. On appeal, however, Roel did not provide the reporter’s record from those proceedings. Correspondence from the court reporter showed that the master and exhibit volumes remained unpaid, and the transferor court had warned that it would consider only issues not requiring a reporter’s record.

Roel also argued that the earlier accounting and fee orders were final judgments that caused the district court’s plenary power to expire. Alternatively, he contended that the Starr County Court at Law had exclusive jurisdiction because related partnership and cattle-company interests appeared in Benita’s pending probate proceeding.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Application

The court first addressed the incomplete appellate record. The temporary-injunction order affirmatively showed that the trial court had received testimony, affidavits, exhibits, and other evidence during a hearing conducted over multiple dates. The appellant nevertheless failed to pay for and file the corresponding reporter’s record and exhibit volumes.

That omission prevented meaningful review of any contention dependent on what evidence the parties introduced or whether that evidence supported the injunction. Applying Spiegel and Marshall, the court presumed that the omitted evidence was sufficient to support the temporary injunction and the trial court’s findings. The appellant therefore could not obtain reversal of the injunction based on an evidentiary challenge.

The court then rejected the contention that the accounting and attorney’s-fee orders had become final judgments. Neither order contained clear finality language, and neither disposed of all pending claims and parties. The partnership-winding-up order was likewise interlocutory because it anticipated a future plan and required additional court orders before assets could be liquidated or transferred. Rather than ending a discrete proceeding, the order set the stage for further judicial action.

Because the earlier orders were not final, the district court had not lost plenary power. The premise underlying the appellant’s void-order argument therefore failed. The court also observed that a trial court retains authority to enforce its judgments even after plenary power otherwise expires.

Finally, the court held that the pending probate proceeding did not divest the district court of jurisdiction. Nicasio’s probate estate had closed in 2000, and the trust at issue was nontestamentary as to Benita and therefore outside her probate estate. The district court independently possessed jurisdiction over the trust proceeding, receivership request, and partnership-winding-up claims.

Holding

The court held that the appellant could not successfully challenge the temporary injunction without the reporter’s record from the evidentiary hearing. Because no record of the testimony and exhibits was presented, the court presumed that the evidence supported the injunction and its findings.

The court further held that the accounting order, attorney’s-fee order, and partnership-winding-up order were not final judgments. They lacked finality language, did not dispose of all pending claims, and, in the case of the winding-up order, contemplated additional proceedings. The district court therefore retained plenary power.

The court also held that the Starr County Court at Law did not have exclusive jurisdiction over the trust dispute. The relevant prior probate estate had closed, and the trust was a nonprobate asset as to the estate that remained pending.

Finally, the court held that the district court had jurisdiction over the trust, receivership, and partnership-winding-up proceedings. It affirmed the trial court’s orders.

Practical Application

The immediate appellate lesson is straightforward: order the reporter’s record before attempting to challenge a temporary injunction entered after an evidentiary hearing. A clerk’s record containing the pleadings and signed order does not permit review of whether the testimony and exhibits established a probable right to recovery, probable injury, imminent harm, or another fact-dependent element.

Family-law litigators should also distinguish among different categories of temporary relief. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 51.014(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from a qualifying temporary injunction, but Family Code provisions may prohibit interlocutory appeals from temporary orders in divorce or SAPCR proceedings. For example, temporary orders under Texas Family Code § 105.001 generally are not subject to interlocutory appeal. In those circumstances, mandamus may be the only potential avenue for immediate review, and an adequate record remains essential.

The distinction between legal and evidentiary complaints also matters. Some facial defects may be demonstrable from the order and clerk’s record, such as the absence of required specificity or a trial setting. But counsel should not assume that characterizing an issue as “legal” eliminates the need for the hearing transcript. If resolution requires the appellate court to know what evidence was admitted, what objections were made, or how an issue was presented, the reporter’s record is indispensable.

The opinion also reinforces the importance of a disciplined finality analysis. An accounting order, fee award, receivership ruling, or property-preservation order does not become final merely because it conclusively decides an immediate dispute. Counsel must determine whether the order actually disposes of all claims and parties, clearly states that it is final, or qualifies for interlocutory review under a statute.

In family-wealth disputes, probate jurisdiction should not be assumed merely because an asset appears on an estate inventory. Counsel should analyze ownership, the nature of the trust, whether the asset is probate or nonprobate property, whether the relevant estate remains open, and whether a separate statute assigns jurisdiction to the district court.

Checklists

Perfecting Review of a Temporary Injunction

Building a Record for Appeal or Mandamus

Evaluating Family-Law Temporary Relief

Analyzing Finality and Plenary Power

Assessing Probate, Trust, and Marital-Property Jurisdiction

Citation

Guerra v. Guerra, No. 07-26-00364-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Sept. 29, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion

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