CROSSOVER: “Final” Is Not Final: Unresolved Claims Defeat Appellate Jurisdiction Despite a Mother Hubbard Clause

Strong Builders, LLC v. CO3 Holdings, LLC, 08-25-00094-CV, September 23, 2026.

On appeal from 346th District Court, El Paso County, Texas

Synopsis

A summary judgment labeled “final” and stating that it “addresses all parties and claims” was not final because it did not clearly state that it disposed of all claims, and the summary-judgment motion omitted several pleaded causes of action. The Mother Hubbard clause did not cure that defect, and without a signed severance order, the Eighth Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Relevance to Family Law

The finality problem in Strong Builders can arise whenever a Texas family-law case includes multiple requests for affirmative relief, multiple parties, or joined claims. A summary judgment may resolve a characterization dispute, reimbursement claim, fraud claim, third-party ownership claim, or enforcement theory while leaving another pleaded claim unresolved. Similarly, an order may resolve conservatorship and possession but omit child support, attorney’s fees, property division, or a pending intervention. Labeling the order “final,” adding a Mother Hubbard clause, or reciting that it “addresses” all claims will not necessarily establish appellate jurisdiction.

Family-law litigators must therefore distinguish between an order that resolves the principal dispute and a judgment that legally disposes of every pending claim and party. If fewer than all claims are adjudicated, counsel must obtain an appropriate signed severance order, secure another authorized basis for interlocutory review, or complete the disposition of the remaining claims before filing a conventional appeal.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

CO3 Holdings, LLC contracted with Strong Builders, LLC to construct an apartment complex in El Paso. CO3 alleged defective and untimely construction, fraudulent draw requests, failure to pay subcontractors, and the filing of a fraudulent lien. Its original petition asserted claims including breach of contract, filing a fraudulent lien affidavit, fraud, conspiracy, participation in and aiding and abetting fraud, and imposition of a constructive trust. Strong Builders and its president, Alejandro “Alex” Rodriguez Castro, asserted counterclaims for breach of contract and violation of Texas Property Code § 28.002.

CO3 later amended its petition to add additional defendants and causes of action. Among other matters, the amended pleadings asserted conversion, money had and received, unjust enrichment, and assumpsit. CO3 also alleged theories under which the defendants could be held vicariously liable.

CO3 filed a traditional summary-judgment motion addressing breach of contract, the allegedly invalid lien affidavit, and fraud, together with its vicarious-liability theories. It did not move for summary judgment on all causes of action appearing in its live petition. CO3 separately sought no-evidence summary judgment on the counterclaims.

The trial court initially granted summary judgment against all defendants except Alex. CO3 moved to sever the adjudicated claims, but the trial court never signed a severance order. The court later granted summary judgment against Alex and incorporated the summary judgments into a document designated as a final judgment.

That judgment identified breach of contract, invalid lien affidavit, fraud, sham to perpetuate a fraud, alter ego, and respondeat superior. It also stated: “All other relief requested by the parties not already disposed is hereby DENIED. This is a final judgment and addresses all parties and claims.” The defendants appealed.

Issues Decided

• Whether the judgment clearly and unequivocally expressed an intent to dispose of every claim and party under Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp.
• Whether the statement that the judgment was “final” and “addresses all parties and claims” supplied the required finality language.
• Whether the Mother Hubbard clause denying all other requested relief disposed of causes of action omitted from the summary-judgment motion.
• Whether the record showed that every pending claim and party had actually been disposed of.
• Whether the appellate court had jurisdiction when the motion addressed only some causes of action and the trial court did not sign the requested severance order.

Rules Applied

Under Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001), an appellate court generally has jurisdiction only over a final judgment unless a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal. In a case resolved without a conventional trial on the merits, a judgment is final if it either actually disposes of every pending claim and party or clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of the entire case.

Matter of Guardianship of Jones, 629 S.W.3d 921 (Tex. 2021) (per curiam), applies that finality framework to summary judgments. A summary judgment is not ordinarily appealable unless it disposes of all claims and all parties.

Under Patel v. Nations Renovations, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 151 (Tex. 2023), the court first examines the judgment’s language. If the judgment clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties, that language controls the finality inquiry. If the language is not sufficiently clear, the court examines the record to determine whether the judgment actually disposed of the entire case.

A Mother Hubbard clause—such as a statement that all relief not otherwise granted is denied—does not necessarily dispose of unaddressed claims in the summary-judgment context. As Lehmann explains, such language may mean only that relief requested in the summary-judgment motion, but not granted, is denied.

The court also relied on Agar Corp. v. Electro Circuits International, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136 (Tex. 2019), in recognizing that sham to perpetuate a fraud, alter ego, and respondeat superior are vicarious-liability theories rather than independent causes of action.

Application

The court began with the language of the judgment. Although the document called itself a “final judgment,” Lehmann establishes that use of the word “final” alone is insufficient. The order must unequivocally communicate that it disposes of the entire case.

The judgment stated that it “addresses all parties and claims.” The court treated “addresses” as materially different from “disposes of.” The phrase did not clearly state that all claims had been adjudicated, dismissed, or otherwise resolved. The judgment therefore lacked the kind of unequivocal disposition language that would end the finality inquiry based solely on its text.

The Mother Hubbard clause did not fill that gap. In the summary-judgment context, the statement that all other relief was denied could refer only to relief requested through the summary-judgment motions. It did not necessarily adjudicate causes of action that CO3 had pleaded but never presented as grounds for summary judgment.

Because the judgment’s language was not unequivocal, the court examined the record. That review confirmed that CO3 had moved for traditional summary judgment on only three causes of action: breach of contract, fraudulent or invalid lien affidavit, and fraud. The references to sham to perpetuate a fraud, alter ego, and respondeat superior did not enlarge the scope of the motion because those were theories of vicarious liability, not separate causes of action.

Other pleaded claims remained unresolved. Although CO3 had requested a severance of the adjudicated claims, the trial court did not sign a severance order. Thus, the partial adjudication was not transformed into a final judgment in a separate severed cause.

Holding

The court held that the judgment did not clearly and unequivocally dispose of the entire case. Its statement that it was “final” and “addresses all parties and claims” was not equivalent to an express statement that it finally disposed of all claims and parties.

The court further held that the Mother Hubbard clause did not dispose of causes of action omitted from the summary-judgment motion. In this procedural context, the clause could be read as denying only relief requested in the motion but not otherwise granted.

After examining the record, the court concluded that pleaded causes of action remained pending. Because no severance order had been signed and no statutory basis for an interlocutory appeal applied, the summary judgment remained interlocutory. The court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Practical Application

The decision has several direct applications in Texas family-law litigation:

• Partial summary judgments in divorce proceedings: A court may summarily determine whether an asset is separate or community property while leaving reimbursement, fraud-on-the-community, tracing, valuation, or third-party ownership claims pending. Unless the remaining matters are disposed of or the adjudicated claim is properly severed, the ruling ordinarily is not final merely because it is labeled a final judgment.

• Combined divorce and SAPCR proceedings: An order resolving the divorce and property division may remain interlocutory if pleaded conservatorship, possession, child-support, or attorney’s-fee issues are unresolved. Conversely, resolution of the SAPCR issues does not necessarily make the order final when property or other divorce claims remain pending.

• Enforcement and modification litigation: When a party pleads multiple grounds for enforcement, modification, declaratory relief, or monetary recovery, an order addressing only selected grounds may not support a conventional appeal. Counsel should identify which matters constitute claims for affirmative relief and which are merely alternative legal theories.

• Third-party property disputes: Divorce litigation may include intervenors, business entities, trustees, relatives, or other parties claiming an interest in disputed property. A judgment disposing of the spouses’ claims but not the intervention or third-party claim may remain interlocutory.

• Attorney’s fees: An unresolved claim for attorney’s fees can affect finality when fees are sought as independent affirmative relief rather than merely as an element of recoverable costs. The pleadings, motion, and judgment should state expressly how the fee request is resolved.

• Temporary orders: Counsel should not attempt to create appellate jurisdiction merely by calling a temporary family-law order “final.” Temporary orders generally remain governed by the statutory procedures applicable to those orders, including any available mandamus remedy, rather than by labels inserted into the order.

• Severance practice: If the trial court intends an adjudicated claim to become immediately appealable, counsel should obtain a signed severance order that identifies the severed claims and parties, assigns or directs creation of a separate cause, and coordinates the severance with entry of judgment. Filing a severance motion is not enough.

• Drafting finality language: If a judgment is intended to end the entire case, use the established formulation: “This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable.” That language should be used deliberately because it can make a judgment final even when the judgment erroneously grants relief beyond the motion or fails to address a claim expressly.

• Appellate deadlines: Do not assume that a defective attempt at finality can safely be ignored. When language arguably expresses finality, counsel should evaluate the notice-of-appeal and post-judgment deadlines immediately while also seeking clarification or correction in the trial court.

Checklists

Before Moving for Summary Judgment

• Identify the live pleading for every party.
• Create a claim-by-claim chart showing each cause of action, counterclaim, crossclaim, intervention, and request for affirmative relief.
• Separate independent causes of action from remedies and theories of liability.
• Determine whether the motion seeks a complete judgment or only a partial summary judgment.
• Address every element of every claim intended for adjudication.
• Confirm whether any party has been nonsuited, dismissed, defaulted, or severed by a signed order.
• Identify any unresolved requests for attorney’s fees or other monetary relief.
• Decide whether omitted claims will be tried, nonsuited, dismissed, settled, or severed.

Before Submitting a Proposed Final Judgment

• Compare the proposed judgment against the live pleadings.
• Confirm that every claim and every party is expressly disposed of.
• Use “disposes of,” not merely “addresses,” when stating the judgment’s intended effect.
• If the judgment is intended to be final, consider the formulation: “This judgment finally disposes of all parties and all claims and is appealable.”
• Do not rely solely on “all relief not granted is denied.”
• State the disposition of claims not granted, including whether they are denied, dismissed, or nonsuited.
• Confirm that liability theories are not mistakenly treated as independent causes of action.
• Resolve pending interventions and third-party claims.
• Address attorney’s fees, costs, interest, and other requested relief.
• Verify that any contemplated severance order has actually been signed.

When Seeking Severance

• Identify the precise claims and parties to be severed.
• Confirm that the severed claim could constitute an independently asserted cause of action.
• Explain why the severed claim is sufficiently distinct from the claims remaining in the original cause.
• Submit a written severance order rather than relying on an oral ruling.
• Ensure the order directs creation of a separate cause or otherwise clearly accomplishes the severance.
• Confirm the clerk has implemented the severance.
• Determine which judgment belongs in the severed cause.
• Recalculate appellate deadlines from the operative orders in the proper cause.

Before Filing a Notice of Appeal

• Determine whether the order followed a conventional trial on the merits or was rendered through summary judgment, default, dismissal, or another procedure.
• Read the decretal language, not merely the order’s title.
• Confirm whether the order says it “finally disposes of all parties and all claims.”
• If the language is equivocal, examine the complete record for unresolved claims or parties.
• Check for pending counterclaims, interventions, third-party claims, fee claims, and sanctions requests.
• Verify that all nonsuits, dismissals, and severances appear in signed written orders.
• Determine whether a statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal.
• Consider whether mandamus, rather than direct appeal, is the appropriate vehicle.
• Calendar appellate deadlines conservatively if finality is reasonably arguable.
• Seek clarification or a corrected judgment before appellate deadlines expire.

Family-Law Finality Audit

• Confirm that the marital status has been adjudicated.
• Confirm that the entire marital estate has been divided or otherwise disposed of.
• Determine whether characterization, tracing, reimbursement, or economic-contribution-type issues remain pending.
• Confirm disposition of all fraud, breach-of-fiduciary-duty, constructive-trust, or third-party property claims.
• Verify that conservatorship, possession, child support, medical support, and dental support have been resolved when pleaded.
• Review all interventions involving children or property.
• Determine whether modification and enforcement claims have both been resolved when joined.
• Confirm disposition of all attorney’s-fee claims.
• Distinguish unresolved claims from matters over which the court retains continuing jurisdiction.
• Ensure the decree’s finality language matches the intended procedural result.

Citation

Strong Builders, LLC v. CO3 Holdings, LLC, No. 08-25-00094-CV, __ S.W.3d __ (Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 23, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion.

Family Law Crossover

Strong Builders applies the final-judgment framework governing cases resolved without a conventional trial on the merits. The mechanism is a two-step inquiry: the appellate court first asks whether the order clearly and unequivocally states that it finally disposes of all claims and parties; if it does not, the court examines the record to determine whether every pending claim and party was actually disposed of. A general Mother Hubbard clause does not necessarily adjudicate claims omitted from a summary-judgment motion.

In a family-law matter, the rule can arise when a summary judgment resolves only part of a divorce, SAPCR, enforcement, modification, or third-party property dispute. For example, an order may determine the characterization of a business interest but leave reimbursement and fraud claims pending, or it may resolve conservatorship while leaving support or attorney’s fees unresolved. Unless the remaining matters are disposed of, a statute authorizes interlocutory review, or the adjudicated claims are placed into a separate action through a signed severance order, the ruling remains interlocutory and a conventional appeal is subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction.

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