Family Code § 161.001(D),(E) Endangerment Sufficiency | In the Interest of K.K. (2026)

In the Interest of K.K., a Child, 10-26-00078-CV, August 13, 2026.

On appeal from 474th District Court of McLennan County, Texas

Synopsis

The Tenth Court of Appeals held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). The court rejected Mother’s attempt to shift responsibility to third parties, emphasizing that endangerment can be established through a parent’s own acts, omissions, and choices in exposing a child to domestic violence, intoxication, instability, and unsafe living arrangements, even if others also contributed to the danger.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a termination case, its reach is broader for Texas family-law litigators. The opinion reinforces a recurring theme that permeates SAPCR litigation, modification suits, emergency custody practice, and even divorce cases involving conservatorship: a parent cannot insulate herself from adverse conservatorship consequences by arguing that the dangerous conditions were created by a partner, relatives, or housemates if the evidence shows she knowingly kept the child in that environment or failed to act. In practice, this reasoning matters well beyond Chapter 161. The same evidentiary themes—domestic violence exposure, substance abuse, unstable housing, untreated mental-health issues, and repeated tolerance of dangerous third parties—regularly drive temporary-orders strategy, supervised-access requests, geographic restrictions, and sole-managing-conservatorship claims.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The case arose after Mother and K.K. relocated from Kansas to Waco in December 2024. Mother offered several explanations for the move, including escaping Father’s violence, concerns about both parents’ drinking, and Father’s associations with unsafe people. On arrival, Mother and the child stayed at her brother’s apartment. Almost immediately, police were called to the residence because of a chaotic disturbance involving intoxicated adults, aggression, and arguing.

The responding officer testified that Mother was reported to be screaming belligerently and acting aggressively toward others in the apartment. Mother also made a call reporting violent behavior involving another person in the residence. When the officer arrived, Mother was in the parking lot, significantly intoxicated, and resisted safer options for the child, including assistance in arranging shelter or an alternative placement while she sobered up. Instead, Mother wanted to walk to a hotel with K.K. on a cold night while neither was dressed appropriately for the weather.

Inside the apartment, the officer observed K.K. initially on a bed with an intoxicated adult male amid a chaotic scene. The officer also noted that K.K. sought comfort from Mother’s sister, not Mother, when Mother was yelling. Mother was arrested for public intoxication, and the child was temporarily left with Mother’s sister after the officer concluded the sister, unlike Mother, was not showing visible signs of intoxication. The Department was then contacted.

The Department investigator testified that, the next day, Mother admitted a significant history of substance abuse, including methamphetamine, marijuana, and heroin, and admitted drinking an entire bottle of vodka the night before. She acknowledged having an alcohol problem, described escalating alcohol consumption, and did not yet have a treatment plan. Mother also lacked a concrete housing plan despite the volatility in the apartment. The investigator observed another intoxicated and aggressive adult male in the residence during the follow-up visit. Mother disclosed mental-health issues including anxiety, depression, and self-harm history. After efforts to create a safety plan and discuss alternatives, the Department removed K.K.

Mother’s appellate argument focused on causation and comparative blame. She contended that the domestic violence in Kansas was attributable to Father as the aggressor and that the disturbances in Waco were created by her brother and other residents, not by her. She also argued that her efforts to address substance-abuse problems should have been weighed more heavily.

Issues Decided

• Whether clear and convincing evidence supported termination of Mother’s parental rights under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) for knowingly placing or allowing the child to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.
• Whether clear and convincing evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) for engaging in conduct, or knowingly placing the child with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.
• Whether the evidence remained sufficient when Mother argued that the dangerous conditions were created primarily by Father, her brother, or other third parties rather than by her own conduct.

Rules Applied

The court applied the familiar clear-and-convincing sufficiency framework governing termination cases, relying on In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002), for legal sufficiency and In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17 (Tex. 2002), for factual sufficiency. It also reiterated that in a bench trial the trial court remains the sole judge of witness credibility and demeanor, citing In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2009).

On the substantive termination grounds, the court relied on Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Under subsection (D), the inquiry focuses on the child’s environment and whether the surroundings created a potential for danger of which the parent was aware but disregarded. Under subsection (E), the focus is on the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, and failures to act, that directly result in endangerment.

The opinion draws heavily from Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. 1987), for several core propositions:

• “Endanger” means to expose the child to loss or injury or to jeopardize the child’s well-being.
• The conduct need not be directed at the child.
• The child need not suffer actual injury.
• Endangerment may be inferred from parental misconduct itself.

The court also cited authority recognizing that:

• A parent’s conduct within the home can itself create an endangering environment. In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.).
• Courts may consider conduct both before and after the child’s birth, and under subsection (E), both before and after removal. In re K.A.S., 131 S.W.3d 215 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2004, pet. denied); In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).
• Scienter is not required for a parent’s own acts to constitute endangerment under subsection (E). In re L.S., No. 10-22-00119-CV, 2022 WL 3655395 (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 24, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).
• When the endangering actor is someone other than the appealing parent, the parent generally must have known of the other person’s endangering conduct. T.D. v. Tex. Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 683 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.—Austin 2024, no pet.).

Application

The court treated the subsection (D) and (E) analyses as interrelated, which is often where these cases are won or lost. Mother’s appellate position attempted to separate her personal culpability from the danger surrounding the child. The court declined to accept that framing. Instead, it looked at the cumulative pattern of Mother’s choices: leaving one domestic-violence setting only to place the child in another unstable and violent environment, becoming severely intoxicated while responsible for the child, lacking a realistic safety plan, remaining in a residence populated by intoxicated and aggressive adults, and presenting no stable alternative living arrangement.

That narrative was important. The court did not require proof that Mother personally initiated every violent or chaotic event. Nor did it require proof that K.K. was physically injured. The decisive point was Mother’s knowledge and tolerance of danger. She admittedly left Kansas because of violence and substance-abuse concerns, yet almost immediately placed the child in another environment marked by intoxication, aggression, police involvement, and instability. That sequence allowed the factfinder to infer both awareness of danger and disregard of it.

The officer’s testimony also supplied more than just a snapshot of bad judgment. It showed Mother was intoxicated to the point that law enforcement attempted to help her arrange safer temporary options for the child, and Mother instead proposed taking the child out on foot in cold conditions without proper clothing. That fact pattern goes directly to both surroundings and conduct. Likewise, the Department investigator’s testimony regarding Mother’s admissions—her substance-abuse history, escalating alcohol use, lack of a treatment plan, lack of stable housing, and mental-health concerns—gave the trial court a basis to view the danger not as an isolated incident but as part of a broader endangering course of conduct.

In rejecting Mother’s “others caused the danger” argument, the court effectively underscored a practical appellate principle: when the record shows the parent knowingly exposed the child to dangerous people or surroundings, responsibility does not evaporate merely because the parent was not the sole source of the risk. In a subsection (D) or (E) case, a parent’s failure to protect can be as consequential as affirmative misconduct.

Holding

The court held that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The evidence permitted the trial court to conclude that Mother knowingly allowed K.K. to remain in endangering conditions and surroundings, including domestic-violence exposure, intoxication-fueled conflict, and unstable living arrangements populated by aggressive adults.

The court also held that clear and convincing evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Mother’s own conduct—including severe intoxication while caring for the child, her admitted substance-abuse history, her failure to secure stable and safe housing, and her tolerance of volatile environments—supported a finding that she engaged in conduct, or knowingly placed K.K. with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered the child’s physical or emotional well-being.

As to Mother’s central appellate theory, the court rejected the argument that the evidence failed because the dangerous conditions were created by Father, her brother, or other residents. The court’s reasoning makes clear that endangerment under subsections (D) and (E) turns not only on who started the danger, but also on whether the parent knowingly exposed the child to it or failed to remove the child from it when able.

Practical Application

For trial lawyers, this case is a reminder that endangerment cases are built through pattern evidence, not merely through a single dramatic event. If you represent the Department, an amicus, or the conservator seeking restrictive relief, the opinion provides a roadmap for framing evidence around parental knowledge, repeated exposure, and failed protective decision-making. It is not enough to show a chaotic household; you want the record to establish that the parent understood the danger and nevertheless maintained the child there or cycled the child into equivalent instability elsewhere.

For parents’ counsel, the decision is a warning against overreliance on a “bad boyfriend/bad relative” defense. That argument can help only if the record also shows immediate protective action, credible alternative housing, sustained separation from the dangerous actor, sobriety, and a coherent safety plan. Without those facts, blame-shifting tends to reinforce the Department’s theory that the parent knowingly tolerated risk.

In custody litigation outside the termination context, the same logic can support temporary restraining orders, temporary sole managing conservatorship, supervised possession, or restrictions on unrelated adults in the home. When one parent repeatedly exposes a child to domestic disturbances, substance abuse, or unstable cohabitants, the issue is not limited to moral optics; it becomes a concrete conservatorship and possession issue grounded in safety and judgment.

From an appellate perspective, this opinion also underscores the importance of attacking or defending the record at the right level of specificity. General claims that the parent “eventually left” or “was not the aggressor” will rarely defeat sufficiency if the record still contains admissions, officer testimony, and investigator observations showing ongoing exposure and lack of protective alternatives. Trial counsel should therefore develop a chronology: what the parent knew, when the parent knew it, what safe alternatives existed, and why the parent did or did not use them.

Checklists

Building a § 161.001(D) Endangering-Environment Record

• Establish the physical setting where the child lived or stayed.
• Identify all adults present in the home and their roles.
• Develop evidence of intoxication, violence, threats, police calls, or criminal conduct in the residence.
• Prove the parent’s knowledge of those conditions through admissions, texts, prior reports, or witness testimony.
• Show the child’s exposure to the environment, even if no physical injury occurred.
• Document whether the parent had safe alternatives and failed to use them.
• Tie unstable housing to specific safety risks, not just poverty or inconvenience.

Building a § 161.001(E) Endangering-Conduct Record

• Focus on the parent’s acts, omissions, and failures to act.
• Use admissions regarding substance abuse, untreated mental-health concerns, or repeated unsafe relationships.
• Present evidence of conduct before and after removal when relevant.
• Show how the parent’s conduct impaired judgment or caregiving capacity.
• Develop evidence that the parent knowingly placed the child with dangerous third parties.
• Emphasize repeated conduct or a continuing course of behavior rather than a single isolated lapse.
• Make clear that actual injury to the child is not required.

Responding to the “Others Caused the Danger” Defense

• Pin down when the parent first became aware of the other person’s dangerous conduct.
• Show the parent nevertheless remained, returned, or placed the child back into the environment.
• Compare the alleged protective step with what happened next.
• Test whether the parent had realistic exit options, relatives, shelters, or community resources available.
• Highlight any inconsistencies between the parent’s stated fear and actual choices.
• Demonstrate that the parent’s own intoxication, instability, or dependency prevented effective protection of the child.

Representing the Parent: How to Avoid a Sufficiency Disaster

• Create a documented timeline of separation from violent or unsafe persons.
• Secure immediate safe housing and preserve proof of it.
• Obtain and introduce evidence of sobriety efforts: treatment intake, testing, counseling attendance, sponsor contact, and discharge summaries.
• Present corroborated safety planning, not just promises.
• Show sustained compliance, not last-minute efforts.
• Put on evidence explaining how prior dangerous conditions ended and why they will not recur.
• Avoid minimizing police involvement, intoxication events, or the presence of unsafe adults.

Trial Preservation and Appellate Framing

• Request explicit findings where the record contains multiple possible endangerment theories.
• Build a chronology linking each dangerous event to the parent’s knowledge and choices.
• Distinguish mere association from knowing exposure.
• Frame the case around clear-and-convincing proof, not preponderance-style generalities.
• On appeal, address both legal and factual sufficiency with record-specific detail.
• Do not ignore adverse admissions; contextualize them with objective evidence of change.
• In cases involving third-party danger, confront the knowledge element directly.

Citation

In the Interest of K.K., a Child, No. 10-26-00078-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___ (Tex. App.—Waco Aug. 13, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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