Bill of Review Limitations Bar Attack on Divorce Decree | Von Bielka (2026)

Milan Paul Hlavina Von Bielka v. Hanna Kotlanova Hlavina Von Bielka, 14-25-00207-CV, August 13, 2026.

On appeal from 257th District Court, Harris County, Texas

Synopsis

A party cannot use a bill of review filed more than four years after a default divorce decree to unwind the divorce and property division unless he proves the decree is void. In Von Bielka, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that valid substituted service defeated the personal-jurisdiction attack, and proof satisfying Texas Family Code sections 6.301 and 6.308 defeated the subject-matter-jurisdiction attack, so limitations barred the challenge to the marital-status and property provisions.

Relevance to Family Law

This case matters directly to Texas family-law litigators handling default divorces, post-divorce enforcement, and late attacks on decrees. It reinforces two practical points: first, residency and service records built at the front end of the divorce can become dispositive years later; second, once four years pass, a challenger must prove the decree is truly void—not merely erroneous, unfair, or based on disputed facts—to reopen the divorce itself or the property division. For practitioners, Von Bielka is a useful appellate reminder that voidness arguments remain narrow even in emotionally charged cross-border family cases.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Hanna filed for divorce in Harris County in July 2015. Personal service on Milan was unsuccessful, so she sought substituted service. The process server submitted an affidavit describing multiple attempts at service at 5702 Bishops Glen Court in Houston, including an encounter with a male occupant who stated that Milan was aware of the papers. The trial court authorized substituted service by posting the citation and petition on the front door, and a default divorce decree was signed on October 28, 2015.

More than seven years later, in January 2023, Milan filed a bill of review seeking to set aside the 2015 decree. He argued that he was never properly served because he did not live at the service address, that Texas lacked jurisdiction to grant the divorce because neither party met the residency prerequisites, and that limitations did not apply because the decree was void. He also asserted extrinsic fraud and lack of knowledge of the suit until 2022.

The evidence at the bill-of-review trial showed a complicated transnational marriage. The parties had lived in Texas for years, their son was born in Texas, and they owned a home in Spring. Milan contended that both spouses were living in the Czech Republic during the relevant period. Hanna, however, testified that although she traveled frequently to the Czech Republic and their son stayed there for extended periods, she continued to live and work in Texas during the relevant timeframe. Tax returns for 2013 and 2014 listed the Bishops Glen address. Hanna also testified that she hand-delivered a copy of the divorce decree to Milan in November 2015 and later evidence showed Milan received a 2018 child-support communication tied to the same cause number.

The trial court partially granted relief only as to the child-related provisions, declaring those provisions void. No party challenged that portion on appeal. The trial court otherwise denied the bill of review, finding that Hanna satisfied the Texas residency requirements, substituted service on Milan was valid, Milan had notice of the decree, Milan waited more than four years to attack it, and he failed to establish the elements necessary for bill-of-review relief.

Issues Decided

The court decided the following issues:

• Whether the 2015 default divorce decree was void for lack of personal jurisdiction because substituted service was allegedly defective.
• Whether the decree was void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because the statutory Texas divorce residency requirements were allegedly not met.
• Whether a bill of review filed more than four years after the decree could be used to challenge the marital-status and property-division portions of the decree.
• Whether, absent a void judgment, limitations barred Milan’s attack on the decree.

Rules Applied

The court applied the familiar Texas bill-of-review framework, including the principle that a bill of review is generally subject to a four-year limitations period. The key exception is for a void judgment: if the challenged judgment is void, limitations do not bar the attack. If the judgment is merely voidable, however, ordinary timeliness rules apply.

The court’s reasoning tracks these authorities and statutes:

• Caldwell v. Barnes, 154 S.W.3d 93 (Tex. 2004), for the proposition that a bill of review challenging a judgment for lack of service can avoid ordinary bill-of-review proof requirements if the petitioner establishes nonservice, because a judgment rendered without proper service is void.
• Texas Family Code § 6.301, which sets the general residency prerequisites for maintaining a divorce in Texas.
• Texas Family Code § 6.308, which addresses periods of absence and preserves Texas residency in certain circumstances despite travel or temporary absence from the state or county.

The court also relied on the broader distinction between jurisdictional defects that render a judgment void and factual or legal errors that render a judgment only voidable. That distinction drove the limitations analysis.

Application

The appellate court treated Milan’s threshold strategy exactly as it should be treated in a late-filed bill of review: if he could prove the 2015 decree was void, limitations would not matter; if he could not, the case was over on timeliness.

On service, the court deferred to the trial court’s fact findings supporting substituted service. The process server documented repeated unsuccessful attempts at the Bishops Glen address, and the trial court had authorized substituted service there. In the bill-of-review proceeding, the trial court credited Hanna’s evidence and found Milan not credible. That credibility determination mattered. The appellate court accepted the trial court’s resolution of the factual dispute and concluded that valid substituted service supported personal jurisdiction. Once the court rejected Milan’s service challenge, his voidness argument based on lack of personal jurisdiction failed.

On residency, the court again focused on the evidence supporting the trial court’s findings rather than on the existence of conflicting proof. Milan had evidence suggesting significant Czech Republic ties, including school attendance records for the child and filings in Czech proceedings. But Hanna testified that she continued to reside and work in Houston during the relevant period and traveled back and forth. The trial court found that she had resided in Harris County for the requisite 90 days and had been domiciled in Texas for the requisite six months when the divorce was filed. With those findings supported by the record, and with section 6.308 recognizing that certain absences do not destroy residency, the court rejected the subject-matter-jurisdiction attack.

That left limitations. Because the appellate court agreed that the decree was not void as to the divorce and property provisions, the ordinary four-year limitations period governed the bill of review. Milan did not file until 2023, more than seven years after the 2015 decree. The trial court also found that he had notice of the decree in November 2015 and at least additional notice tied to enforcement in 2018, yet still did nothing. Under those facts, the limitations bar was straightforward. The late attack on the marital-status and property-division portions of the decree could not proceed.

Holding

The court held that Milan’s bill of review was barred as to the marital-status and property-division portions of the 2015 default divorce decree because he filed it more than four years after the judgment and failed to prove the decree was void. Without a void judgment, the ordinary limitations period applied and defeated the attack.

The court further held that the trial court did not err in finding substituted service valid. Because the record supported the substituted-service order and the trial court’s related findings, the default decree was not void for lack of personal jurisdiction.

The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the Family Code residency requirements satisfied. The evidence supported findings that Hanna had the requisite Texas domicile and Harris County residence under sections 6.301 and 6.308, so the decree was not void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction over the divorce.

Accordingly, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s order denying bill-of-review relief except for the unchallenged portion declaring the child-related provisions void.

Practical Application

For family lawyers, Von Bielka is a record-building case. If you represent the petitioner in a default divorce, do not treat service and residency as perfunctory boxes to check. A detailed motion for substituted service, a competent process-server affidavit, and clean evidence of domicile and county residence may be what saves the decree years later when the respondent reappears and claims the judgment is void.

For lawyers representing the challenger, this case is a warning that “void” is not a label you can simply attach to an old decree to escape limitations. If more than four years have passed, the attack must be built around a genuine jurisdictional defect supported by hard proof. Credibility matters, documentary consistency matters, and trial-level fact findings will matter enormously on appeal.

The case also has implications for international and multi-jurisdictional marriages. Frequent travel, foreign court proceedings, dual living arrangements, and children residing abroad do not necessarily defeat Texas divorce residency. Section 6.308 can preserve residency despite temporary absences, so counsel should analyze domicile and residence with precision rather than assuming foreign presence negates Texas jurisdiction.

In property litigation, Von Bielka is especially significant because many late challenges are driven by dissatisfaction with the asset division rather than true jurisdictional defects. The opinion makes clear that once the decree is no longer voidable through direct review and the four-year bill-of-review window has closed, property division provisions are generally insulated from collateral attack absent voidness.

Practitioners should also note the strategic separation between child-related provisions and the rest of the decree. Here, the child provisions were declared void, yet the divorce and property provisions remained intact. That procedural reality is important in cases involving UCCJEA defects, support jurisdiction problems, or child-related notice issues: partial invalidity does not necessarily reopen the entire decree.

Checklists

Default Divorce Record Preservation

• Plead residency facts with specificity, not formulaic language alone.
• Obtain client testimony or affidavit establishing six-month Texas domicile and 90-day county residence.
• If there are extended absences, develop evidence showing why section 6.308 preserves residency.
• Preserve documents reflecting Texas ties during the relevant period, including tax returns, leases, utility records, payroll records, and travel history.
• If service becomes contested, make sure the clerk’s record clearly contains the motion for substituted service, supporting affidavit, and signed order.

Substituted Service Foundation

• Document multiple unsuccessful service attempts with dates, times, and observations.
• Identify why the address used is the defendant’s usual place of abode or another place where service is likely to provide notice.
• Include any statements by occupants or neighbors tying the defendant to the address.
• Draft the proposed substituted-service order with precise authorized methods.
• Ensure proof of completed substituted service is filed and conforms to the order.

Evaluating a Late Bill of Review Attack

• Determine the decree date immediately and calculate the four-year limitations deadline.
• Separate voidness theories from mere error-correction arguments.
• Analyze personal jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, and due-process notice independently.
• Gather admissible documentary proof before filing; unsupported assertions of nonservice or nonresidency rarely suffice.
• Assess whether the client had later notice of the decree or enforcement activity, which may further weaken equitable arguments.

Defending an Old Divorce Decree

• Lead with limitations if the bill of review is filed outside four years.
• Force the challenger to identify a true voidness theory.
• Use trial-level findings of credibility aggressively.
• Introduce later notice evidence, including decree delivery, enforcement communications, OAG records, and payment histories.
• Emphasize the difference between a void judgment and a merely erroneous one.

Handling Cross-Border Residency Disputes

• Build a timeline showing physical presence, domicile intent, employment, housing, and travel.
• Collect foreign-court filings and compare them carefully against Texas residency positions.
• Be prepared to explain dual-country living arrangements without conceding abandonment of Texas domicile.
• Use section 6.308 affirmatively where absences were temporary or compatible with continuing Texas residence.
• Anticipate impeachment from immigration, tax, school, and custody records.

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Party’s Mistakes

• Do not wait years to investigate a default decree once you learn of it.
• Do not assume a decree is void simply because service was substituted rather than personal.
• Do not rely on broad allegations of fraud without evidence of extrinsic fraud that actually prevented a defense.
• Do not overlook records showing notice after judgment, including support or enforcement correspondence.
• Do not ignore the appellate deference given to trial-court fact findings and credibility determinations.

Citation

Milan Paul Hlavina Von Bielka v. Hanna Kotlanova Hlavina Von Bielka, No. 14-25-00207-CV, memorandum opinion (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 13, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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