Groundless Protective Order Sanctions | Kamel v. Zacharko (2026)

Shereef Kamel v. Lindsay Zacharko, 05-25-00799-CV, August 11, 2026.

On appeal from 493rd District Court, Collin County, Texas

Synopsis

Texas trial courts may award attorney’s fees as sanctions when a protective-order application is groundless and brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment. And in a civil case, if the court’s oral comments differ from the written sanctions order, the written order controls.

Relevance to Family Law

This decision matters well beyond standalone protective-order cases. In divorce, SAPCR, and post-judgment enforcement practice, protective-order filings and family-violence allegations often operate alongside custody disputes, possession conflicts, relocation fights, and strategic litigation conduct. Kamel v. Zacharko reinforces that a litigant who weaponizes a protective-order application as leverage risks fee-based sanctions, while the prevailing party should focus on building a record that the application was not merely unsuccessful, but groundless and filed in bad faith or for harassment. The case also gives family lawyers a useful appellate rule: in civil family litigation, the written order—not an imprecise oral pronouncement—will ordinarily govern.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties’ dating relationship ended, and the appellee, Lindsay Zacharko, obtained a protective order against Shereef Kamel. Four days later, Kamel filed his own application for a protective order against Zacharko.

A sitting judge from another district court heard Kamel’s application. According to the Dallas Court of Appeals, Kamel was evasive in response to questioning from both opposing counsel and the court. The trial court denied the application after finding his testimony not credible and the evidence insufficient.

Zacharko then sought sanctions, contending Kamel’s protective-order application was groundless, brought in bad faith, and filed solely for harassment. After a sanctions hearing, the trial court found good cause to sanction Kamel and awarded Zacharko $3,150 in attorney’s fees. Kamel appealed both the denial of the protective order and the sanctions order, asserting multiple due-process, bias, and sanctions-related complaints.

Issues Decided

The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed and decided these issues:

• Whether the denial of a standalone protective-order application and the related sanctions order were final and appealable
• Whether Kamel preserved a due-process complaint that the trial court prevented him from completing an objection
• Whether the sanctions order was improper because the written grounds for sanctions allegedly differed from the court’s oral pronouncement
• Whether a judge who did not preside over the underlying protective-order hearing could later impose sanctions
• Whether the trial court’s alleged hostility and courtroom comments rose to the level of a due-process violation or judicial bias
• Whether sanctions were improperly imposed based on Kamel’s filing of federal lawsuits

Rules Applied

The court relied on a straightforward but important set of appellate and sanctions principles:

• A standalone protective-order proceeding becomes final and appealable when the order disposes of all parties and issues. Tex. Fam. Code § 81.009; Roper v. Jolliffe, 493 S.W.3d 624, 633 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2015).
• Post-judgment monetary sanctions are appealable when reduced to judgment and enforceable. In re Daugherty, No. 05-18-00290-CV, 2018 WL 3031658, at 4 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 19, 2018); Arndt v. Farris*, 633 S.W.2d 497, 500 n.5 (Tex. 1982).
• Error preservation requires a timely, specific objection and a ruling or refusal to rule. Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a).
• Rule 13 authorizes sanctions when a pleading is groundless and brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment.
• In civil cases, the written judgment or order controls over inconsistent oral pronouncements. Thomas v. Martinez, 217 S.W.3d 680, 684 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. stricken); In re JDN Real Estate–McKinney, L.P., 211 S.W.3d 907, 914 n.3 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, orig. proceeding).
• A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration, even if stern or impatient, generally do not establish judicial bias. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555–56 (1994); In re M.H., No. 05-22-00017-CV, 2022 WL 3135919, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 5, 2022, no pet.).
• A district judge operating within a rotating or centralized docket system is not disqualified from ruling on a sanctions motion merely because another judge presided over earlier hearings. Palau v. Sanchez, No. 03-08-00136-CV, 2010 WL 4595705 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10, 2010, pet. denied).

Application

The appellate court first disposed of any jurisdictional uncertainty by treating the denial of Kamel’s standalone protective-order application as a final, appealable order. It likewise treated the sanctions award as appealable because it had been reduced to a monetary judgment.

On the due-process complaint, the court took a strict preservation approach. Kamel began to object at the outset of the hearing, but after the trial court interrupted and overruled what it assumed was an objection to a visiting district judge, Kamel did not restate or clarify the basis for the objection. On appeal, he argued only that the substance of the objection was now “forever lost.” That was fatal. Without a specific objection in the record or even an articulated appellate theory identifying what objection he intended to make, the court had nothing to review.

On sanctions, Kamel argued the written order did not match the trial court’s oral comments, which referenced federal lawsuits as part of the broader litigation context. The court rejected the premise. First, it explained that Kamel misread Chrysler Corp. v. Blackmon; that case did not require findings on the record for this kind of fee sanction. Second, and more importantly, the court applied the settled civil rule that the written order controls over oral pronouncements. Because the written sanctions order expressly found that Kamel’s protective-order application was groundless, brought in bad faith, and brought solely for harassment, the order stood on proper Rule 13 grounds regardless of any less precise oral comments during the hearing.

The court also rejected Kamel’s argument that the sanctions judge could not rule because she had not presided over the underlying protective-order hearing. Relying on Palau, the court found no authority for the proposition that a district judge in a rotating docket system lacks authority to rule on a sanctions motion simply because another judge heard earlier evidence. Practically speaking, the sanctions court was entitled to evaluate the record before it and rule on the motion.

Finally, the court addressed Kamel’s bias and hostility arguments. The complained-of conduct included comments suggesting Kamel had not met his burden, admonitions about interrupting the court and making faces, and accusations that the judge had effectively pre-judged the case. The court treated these as ordinary courtroom administration and case management, not the kind of deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that makes fair judgment impossible. The appellate court emphasized that sternness, impatience, and critical remarks are not enough.

Holding

The court held that the denial of Kamel’s standalone protective-order application and the subsequent monetary sanctions order were both final and appealable. That threshold point is significant for family-law appellate practice because it confirms that a protective-order case filed independently of a divorce or SAPCR can produce an immediately appealable final judgment.

The court further held that Kamel failed to preserve his complaint that the trial court prevented him from completing an objection. Because the record did not contain a specific objection and Kamel could not identify on appeal what objection he intended to make, no reversible error was shown.

The court also held that the sanctions order was valid. A trial court may award attorney’s fees as sanctions where a protective-order application is groundless and brought in bad faith or for harassment, and the written sanctions order controls over any arguably inconsistent oral pronouncement. That holding is the case’s principal takeaway.

The court additionally held that a judge who did not preside over the underlying evidentiary hearing may still impose sanctions in a district-court docket system. Absence from the earlier hearing did not strip the court of authority to rule on the sanctions motion.

Finally, the court held that the trial court’s allegedly hostile comments did not rise to the level of a due-process violation or disqualifying judicial bias. The judgment and sanctions order were affirmed.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, the obvious use case is the retaliatory protective-order filing. When one party obtains a protective order—or even secures temporary family-violence findings in a divorce or SAPCR—and the opposing party responds with a thin, reactive counter-application, Kamel provides a path to sanctions if the response is demonstrably groundless and harassment-driven. The key is to prove more than mere failure of proof. The record should show timing, lack of corroboration, internal inconsistency, evasive testimony, and contextual indicators that the filing was designed to create leverage, contact, expense, or reputational harm rather than to obtain legitimate protection.

The case is also useful in custody litigation. In modification suits and emergency motions, family-violence allegations can affect conservatorship, possession, supervised access, geographic restriction, and firearms issues. If a litigant uses a protective-order application to influence possession or gain tactical advantage without evidentiary support, counsel for the respondent should consider a sanctions motion tied carefully to Rule 13-type findings: groundlessness, bad faith, or harassment. Conversely, if you represent the applicant, Kamel is a reminder to vet the claim rigorously, gather corroborating proof, and ensure the application is not simply a litigation echo of allegations already rejected elsewhere.

The written-order point is just as practical. Family lawyers often overread oral comments from the bench, especially after contentious hearings. Kamel underscores that appellate focus belongs on the signed written order. If the court’s oral comments are sloppy, expansive, or suggest reliance on an impermissible rationale, obtain clarification before signing if possible—but on appeal, the written order will usually control in a civil case. That means the prevailing party should draft the order with precision, and the losing party should attack the actual written findings, not just the hearing transcript.

The opinion also offers a procedural warning about preservation. If the court cuts off an objection, counsel should make every reasonable effort to restate the objection, request permission to make a bill, or otherwise preserve the complaint. An undeveloped grievance about being interrupted is rarely enough.

Checklists

Building a Sanctions Record After a Groundless Protective-Order Filing

• Establish the chronology, especially if the challenged application followed closely after an adverse ruling against the applicant
• Identify the absence of corroborating evidence, including texts, calls, police reports, medical records, witness testimony, or digital evidence
• Develop testimony showing internal inconsistency, evasiveness, or implausibility in the applicant’s allegations
• Tie the filing to objective indicia of bad faith or harassment, not just weak proof
• Offer evidence of litigation context showing tactical motive, such as parallel custody, divorce, or enforcement disputes
• Prove reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees with competent testimony and billing support
• Request express findings that the application was groundless and brought in bad faith or for the purpose of harassment

Defending Against a Sanctions Motion in Family Violence Litigation

• Show a factual basis existed at the time of filing, even if the claim was ultimately unsuccessful
• Document pre-filing investigation, client interviews, witness outreach, and review of available electronic evidence
• Separate legitimate safety concerns from related divorce or custody disputes
• Present corroborating circumstances, even where direct evidence is limited
• Emphasize that lack of credibility findings alone does not automatically equal bad faith
• Object to any sanctions theory not grounded in the pleadings, motion, or evidence
• Ensure the sanctions hearing record reflects your substantive response to bad-faith and harassment allegations

Preserving Error When the Court Interrupts or Limits Objections

• State the legal basis for the objection as specifically and concisely as possible
• If interrupted, respectfully ask to complete the objection for the record
• Request a ruling
• If the court refuses to allow the objection, note the refusal on the record
• Ask to make an offer of proof or bill of exception if needed
• After the hearing, consider a written motion to clarify or preserve the complaint
• On appeal, identify exactly what objection was prevented and why the limitation caused harm

Drafting and Attacking Written Sanctions Orders

• Draft the written order to track the permissible sanctions ground precisely
• Include the operative findings: groundless, bad faith, and/or purpose of harassment
• Avoid vague references to collateral litigation unless those matters are expressly relevant and supported
• If you oppose the order, compare the proposed written findings to the actual motion, evidence, and arguments
• Do not rely exclusively on stray oral comments from the bench
• If necessary, move to modify, correct, or reform the order before appellate deadlines run
• Frame appellate issues around the signed order because that order will usually control

Evaluating Retaliatory Protective-Order Risk in Divorce and SAPCR Cases

• Assess whether the application follows immediately after an adverse family-violence, temporary-orders, or possession ruling
• Examine whether the allegations materially mirror findings already made against the applicant
• Review whether the applicant seeks an evidentiary remedy or a tactical litigation advantage
• Investigate whether the filing increases prohibited contact rather than reduces danger
• Counsel the client about sanctions exposure before filing a reactive application
• Consider whether another procedural vehicle better addresses the client’s complaint
• Build a clean evidentiary file before invoking emergency or protective relief

Citation

Kamel v. Zacharko, No. 05-25-00799-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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