In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children, 10-26-00086-CV, July 30, 2026.
On appeal from County Court at Law No. 1 of Johnson County, Texas
Synopsis
A parent who does not challenge the termination of her parental rights lacks standing to appeal the trial court’s appointment of the Department of Family and Protective Services as managing conservator under Family Code section 153.131. Once termination stands, section 161.206(b) divests the parent of all legal rights and duties, and the DFPS conservatorship appointment is treated as a consequence of that termination rather than a separately appealable parental-presumption dispute.
Relevance to Family Law
This is a family-law procedural trap with broad significance beyond CPS appeals. For Texas litigators handling SAPCRs, divorces involving prior DFPS history, modification suits, and termination cases, In re B.L.H. reinforces that standing and remedy are sequence-dependent: if a client’s parental rights are terminated and that termination is left unchallenged, the client cannot salvage appellate relevance by attacking conservatorship alone through the parental presumption in section 153.131(a). Strategically, the case underscores that conservatorship arguments tied to parental status must rise or fall with the termination challenge itself; once parental status is extinguished, so is the litigant’s ability to invoke the statutory preference afforded to parents.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights to one child and Mother’s parental rights to all four children after a bench trial in a Johnson County CPS case. On appeal, Mother did not challenge the termination findings or the decree terminating her parental rights. Instead, she appealed only the portion of the order appointing the Department of Family and Protective Services as managing conservator, arguing that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to overcome the parental presumption in Family Code section 153.131(a).
The termination order itself included the customary finding associated with conservatorship—that appointment of a parent as managing conservator would not be in the children’s best interest because it would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development. But because Mother left the termination ruling intact, the appellate court confronted a threshold problem: whether a person whose parental rights have been terminated may still invoke a statutory presumption that applies to a “parent.”
Father’s appeal proceeded separately under Anders v. California. His counsel filed an Anders brief asserting there were no nonfrivolous appellate issues, and the court independently reviewed the record, agreed the appeal was frivolous, affirmed, and denied counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.
Issues Decided
- Whether a parent who does not challenge termination of parental rights has standing to appeal the appointment of DFPS as managing conservator under Family Code section 153.131(a).
- Whether the parental presumption in Family Code section 153.131(a) remains available after an unchallenged termination order divests the parent of legal rights and duties under Family Code section 161.206(b).
- Whether Father’s appeal presented any nonfrivolous grounds for reversal under the Anders framework applicable in parental-rights termination appeals.
Rules Applied
The court relied principally on the following authorities:
- Texas Family Code section 153.131(a): a parent should be appointed managing conservator unless such appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development.
- Texas Family Code section 161.206(b): an order terminating the parent-child relationship divests the parent and child of all legal rights and duties with respect to each other, except as otherwise provided by law.
- In re J.D.G., 570 S.W.3d 839, 856 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. denied): when parental-rights termination is affirmed, the appointment of DFPS as sole managing conservator may be treated as a consequence of termination, and the terminated parent lacks standing to challenge conservatorship.
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967): governs appointed counsel’s withdrawal procedure when counsel concludes an appeal is frivolous.
- In re A.S., 653 S.W.3d 298 (Tex. App.—Waco 2022, no pet.): recognizes Anders procedures in this context.
- In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016): appointed counsel in termination cases remains obligated through proceedings in the Texas Supreme Court unless relieved.
Application
The court’s analysis of Mother’s issue was short but consequential. Mother attempted to isolate conservatorship from termination by arguing only that DFPS failed to overcome the parental presumption in section 153.131(a). The problem, in the court’s view, was that section 153.131(a) presupposes the litigant is still a legal parent with cognizable rights to assert. Because Mother did not attack the termination ruling, the appellate court treated that ruling as controlling and operative for purposes of standing.
From there, the court moved to section 161.206(b), which provides that termination divests the parent of legal rights and duties as to the child. Citing In re J.D.G., the court reasoned that once the termination order stands, the Department’s appointment as managing conservator is not an independent controversy the terminated parent may continue to litigate. It is instead a legal consequence of the termination judgment. Put differently, Mother’s conservatorship complaint depended on a parental status that the unchallenged judgment had already extinguished.
That reasoning also clarifies why the court did not reach Mother’s legal- and factual-sufficiency complaints on the conservatorship finding. The court resolved the matter at the threshold, holding she lacked standing to invoke the parental presumption at all after termination became final for appellate purposes.
As to Father, the court followed the standard Anders review process, examined the full record, agreed there were no arguable grounds for reversal, and affirmed the termination order. Consistent with In re P.M., however, it denied counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature because appointed counsel’s duties extend through a potential petition for review.
Holding
The court held that Mother lacked standing to challenge the appointment of DFPS as managing conservator because she did not challenge the termination of her parental rights. Once the termination order remained in place, section 161.206(b) divested her of all legal rights and duties regarding the children, including any ability to invoke the parental presumption in section 153.131(a). The conservatorship appointment was treated as a consequence of termination.
The court also held that Father’s appeal was frivolous under Anders. After independently reviewing the record, the court affirmed the termination of Father’s parental rights and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature, preserving counsel’s continuing obligation through potential Texas Supreme Court proceedings.
Practical Application
For appellate counsel, the key lesson is simple: in a termination appeal, conservatorship cannot usually be severed from parental status if the appellant wants to rely on section 153.131(a). If your client’s complaint is that DFPS should not have been appointed managing conservator because the parental presumption was not rebutted, then you must evaluate—and usually challenge—the termination judgment itself. A stand-alone attack on conservatorship after conceding termination is likely dead on arrival.
For trial lawyers, In re B.L.H. sharpens issue-preservation strategy at the judgment-drafting and notice-of-appeal stage. If there is any realistic appellate path for a parent, counsel should assess whether to challenge both termination and conservatorship, rather than framing the appeal as conservatorship-only. Once the termination ruling is left untouched, the client’s appellate posture may collapse for lack of standing before the court ever reaches evidentiary sufficiency.
The case also has relevance in non-CPS family litigation. In custody modifications, divorces with parallel SAPCR issues, and guardianship-adjacent disputes involving terminated rights, attorneys should be careful not to invoke statutory presumptions that depend on existing legal parenthood when that status has already been adjudicated away. The opinion is a reminder that status-based arguments require status-based standing.
Practitioners should also note the procedural point on Anders practice. Court-appointed appellate counsel in termination cases should not assume affirmance ends the representation. Under In re P.M., counsel’s responsibilities ordinarily continue through the petition-for-review stage unless the court relieves counsel.
Checklists
Preserving Appellate Standing in Termination Cases
- Determine at the outset whether the client intends to challenge the termination ruling itself.
- Analyze whether the conservatorship issue depends on the client retaining legal status as a parent.
- Avoid filing an appeal that attacks only DFPS conservatorship if the underlying termination order will go unchallenged.
- Tie any parental-presumption argument under section 153.131(a) to an active challenge to termination when appropriate.
- Confirm that the notice of appeal and appellate briefing align with the actual relief needed to preserve standing.
Briefing Conservatorship Issues After Termination
- Assess whether the conservatorship complaint is truly independent of the termination judgment.
- Research whether existing authority treats the complained-of conservatorship ruling as a consequence of termination.
- Address section 161.206(b) directly if attempting to maintain a post-termination conservatorship argument.
- Distinguish In re J.D.G. only if there is a credible legal basis to argue the parent retains a cognizable interest.
- Do not rely on section 153.131(a) without first establishing the client still qualifies as a legal parent for that purpose.
Trial-Level Planning for CPS Cases
- Request findings and ensure the final order clearly states the statutory grounds and best-interest findings.
- Counsel the client early about the appellate consequences of not challenging termination.
- Evaluate alternative appellate points that do not depend on continued parental status, if any exist.
- Coordinate trial and appellate strategy before deadlines run, especially in accelerated termination appeals.
- Make a clear record if conservatorship is being contested independently for a legally distinct reason.
Anders Practice in Termination Appeals
- Ensure the Anders brief contains a professional evaluation of the record and applicable law.
- Serve the client with the brief and provide access to the appellate record.
- Advise the client of the right to file a pro se response.
- Remember that affirmance does not automatically terminate appointed counsel’s duties.
- Continue representation through potential Texas Supreme Court proceedings unless relieved under In re P.M.
Citation
In the Interest of B.L.H., M.L.H.-C., P.M.S.S., D.R.D.S., Children, No. 10-26-00086-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Waco July 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
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