Plenary Power Bars Late New Trial Order | In re Medina (2026)

In re Enriqueta Medina, 14-26-00691-CV, August 04, 2026.

On appeal from 257th District Court of Harris County

Synopsis

A Texas trial court cannot grant a motion for new trial after plenary power has expired under Rule 329b(d), and an order doing so is void. In In re Medina, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that the clerk’s failure to send default-judgment notice under Rule 239a does not indefinitely extend plenary power; at most, Rule 306a(4) provides a limited timing extension, after which mandamus is available to vacate the void order.

Relevance to Family Law

This decision matters directly in divorce and SAPCR litigation because default decrees, post-judgment attacks, and notice disputes are routine in family practice. When a respondent later claims lack of notice of a final divorce decree or default order, Medina confirms that the court’s ability to grant a new trial remains constrained by Rule 329b(d), subject only to the limited Rule 306a framework; once plenary power expires, the proper fight shifts to appellate deadlines, restricted remedies, or bill-of-review practice—not to an out-of-time new-trial order. For family lawyers handling default divorces, property divisions, and post-decree enforcement, the case is a sharp reminder that jurisdictional timelines control even where equities appear sympathetic.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying case was a divorce filed in Harris County in August 2022. The husband was personally served in October 2022 and did not dispute service. The matter was reset multiple times, apparently due in part to the wife’s cognitive issues and a related guardianship proceeding. After the guardianship was dismissed, the trial court signed a final divorce decree on September 30, 2024.

No timely post-judgment motion extending plenary power was filed. That meant the trial court’s plenary power expired thirty days later, on October 30, 2024, under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d). More than four months after that deadline, on March 6, 2025, the husband filed a motion for new trial, asserting that although he had been served, he never received notice of the final decree. More than a year after the motion was filed, on March 30, 2026, the trial court granted the motion for new trial. The docket sheet reflected the trial court’s concern that the husband had not been notified that the guardianship had been dismissed and had not received notice of the judgment.

The wife sought mandamus relief, arguing that the March 30, 2026 order was void because the trial court no longer had plenary power when it granted the new trial.

Issues Decided

• Whether a trial court may grant a motion for new trial after plenary power has expired under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d).
• Whether the clerk’s failure to provide notice of a default judgment under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239a extends the trial court’s plenary power beyond the limited extension recognized by Rule 306a(4).
• Whether mandamus is the proper remedy to compel vacatur of an order granting new trial after plenary power has expired.

Rules Applied

The court relied primarily on these authorities:

• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 329b(d): absent a timely extending motion, the trial court has plenary power for thirty days after the judgment is signed.
• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 239a: after a default judgment, the clerk shall mail written notice to the party against whom the judgment was rendered.
• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(4): when a party does not receive notice or acquire actual knowledge of the judgment within twenty days after signing, certain post-judgment deadlines may begin later, but only within the rule’s limited framework.
• In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 35 S.W.3d 602, 605 (Tex. 2000): a trial court abuses its discretion by signing an order after plenary power expires, and a relator challenging a void order need not show an inadequate appellate remedy.
• In re Brookshire Grocery Co., 250 S.W.3d 66, 72 (Tex. 2008): an order granting a new trial after plenary power has expired is void.
• John v. State, 826 S.W.2d 138, 139–40 (Tex. 1992): Rule 239a’s notice requirement is directory rather than mandatory; failure to send notice does not affect the judgment’s finality except through the limited relief recognized in Rule 306a, and may support a bill of review in an appropriate case.
• In re Martinez, 478 S.W.3d 123, 128 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, orig. proceeding): mandamus is appropriate when a family-law order is signed after plenary power has lapsed.

Application

The Fourteenth Court treated the case as a straightforward plenary-power problem. The final divorce decree was signed on September 30, 2024. Because no timely motion for new trial or other extending post-judgment motion was filed, the court’s plenary power expired on October 30, 2024. That timing issue was dispositive.

The husband’s later argument—that he never received notice of the decree and therefore should receive a new trial—did not revive jurisdiction. The appellate court acknowledged Rule 239a’s requirement that the clerk mail notice after a default judgment, but emphasized that Texas Supreme Court precedent treats that requirement as directory rather than jurisdictional. In other words, a clerk’s omission does not keep the judgment from becoming final and does not preserve plenary power indefinitely.

The only possible timing consequence of a lack of notice is the limited extension mechanism in Rule 306a(4). But the opinion makes clear that this was not a case in which Rule 306a validly preserved the trial court’s authority to act. By the time the motion for new trial was filed in March 2025—and certainly by the time it was granted in March 2026—the limited Rule 306a window had long since passed. Once that window closed, the lack of clerk notice could no longer affect finality. At that point, the trial court had no authority to grant a new trial, regardless of the perceived fairness concerns reflected in the docket sheet.

Because the order was void, mandamus was the correct remedy. The relator did not need to prove the absence of an adequate appellate remedy; voidness itself justified mandamus relief.

Holding

The court held that the March 30, 2026 order granting a new trial was void because it was signed after the trial court’s plenary power expired under Rule 329b(d). The trial court therefore abused its discretion by entering the order.

The court further held that the clerk’s failure to send notice under Rule 239a did not extend plenary power beyond the limited extension available under Rule 306a(4). Rule 239a does not alter the judgment’s finality on its own, and once the Rule 306a period has lapsed, lack of notice cannot support an out-of-time new-trial order.

Finally, the court held that mandamus was proper to compel vacatur of the void order. It conditionally granted relief and directed the trial court to vacate the new-trial order.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, Medina is a timeline case masquerading as a notice case. The practical lesson is that when a divorce decree is signed—especially a default decree—you must immediately analyze plenary-power deadlines, Rule 306a deadlines, appellate deadlines, and the possible need for restricted appeal or bill-of-review relief. Courts are often tempted to “fix” perceived notice problems in domestic-relations matters because the underlying equities can be compelling, particularly where property division, conservatorship consequences, or enforcement exposure are substantial. Medina is a reminder that sympathy does not create jurisdiction.

In default divorce practice, counsel for the petitioner should treat notice and record preservation with the same seriousness as service. Although failure to provide Rule 239a notice will not keep the judgment open indefinitely, it may generate costly collateral litigation and create a platform for Rule 306a motions or bill-of-review claims. For respondents seeking relief, the case underscores that speed matters. If your client truly lacked notice, the remedy is not an amorphous “late” motion for new trial filed whenever the judgment is discovered. You must develop the evidentiary record required by Rule 306a immediately, and if that path is no longer available, evaluate restricted appeal or bill of review rather than inviting the trial court to sign a void order.

The case also has real force in post-decree enforcement and property litigation. If one side obtains an order reopening a final decree after plenary power has expired, the opposing party should evaluate mandamus promptly. In family cases, allowing a void new-trial order to sit can destabilize property transfers, QDRO practice, enforcement strategy, and settlement posture.

Checklists

Protecting a Default Divorce Decree

• Calendar the Rule 329b plenary-power expiration date the day the decree is signed.
• Confirm whether any timely post-judgment motion has been filed that would extend plenary power.
• Ensure the clerk’s Rule 239a notice obligations are satisfied in default cases.
• Preserve proof of mailing, notice, and any communication reflecting the respondent’s actual knowledge of the judgment.
• Maintain a clean record showing valid service, prove-up, and finality.
• If the trial court later grants relief after plenary power expires, evaluate mandamus immediately.

Responding When Your Client Claims No Notice of Judgment

• Determine the exact date your client first received actual notice or acquired actual knowledge of the judgment.
• Analyze whether Rule 306a(4) is still available and calendar the resulting deadlines.
• Prepare competent evidence proving the date of notice or actual knowledge.
• Do not assume Rule 239a noncompliance alone revives plenary power.
• If Rule 306a relief is unavailable, assess restricted appeal and bill-of-review options without delay.
• Avoid requesting a new-trial order that the court has no jurisdiction to sign.

Challenging a Void Post-Judgment Order

• Confirm the original judgment-signing date and all relevant post-judgment filings.
• Calculate the plenary-power expiration date under Rule 329b.
• Compare that date to the date of the challenged order.
• Cite In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co. and In re Brookshire Grocery Co. for the proposition that orders signed after plenary power expires are void.
• Emphasize that no showing of inadequate appellate remedy is required when the challenged order is void.
• Seek mandamus relief promptly to prevent downstream proceedings under a void order.

Building the Record on Notice Disputes

• Obtain the clerk’s record concerning issuance or mailing of Rule 239a notice.
• Gather affidavits or testimony establishing whether and when notice was received.
• Distinguish between lack of clerk notice and lack of actual knowledge.
• Tie all arguments to the Rule 306a framework rather than broad equitable pleas.
• If pursuing bill-of-review relief, develop the separate elements required for that remedy.
• Be prepared to explain why the requested relief is jurisdictionally available.

Citation

In re Enriqueta Medina, No. 14-26-00691-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 4, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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