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CROSSOVER: Rule 107(e) Return of Service: Federal Perjury Language Still Supports Default Judgment

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Juan Fidel Lopez Antonio v. PNC Bank National Association, 12-26-00090-CV, July 31, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law, Van Zandt County, Texas

Synopsis

A private process server’s return was not defective merely because its unsworn declaration cited 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and stated it was made under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States. The Twelfth Court held that Rule 107(e) requires the essential return information and an attestation under penalty of perjury in substantially the prescribed form, not an express reference to Texas law.

Relevance to Family Law

This ruling matters in Texas family litigation because default judgments remain common in divorce, SAPCR, modification, enforcement, and property-division proceedings when a respondent fails to answer. When service is attacked on restricted appeal, practitioners often see hyper-technical challenges to the return itself; this case confirms that Rule 107(e) strict compliance does not mean a private server’s declaration becomes void simply because it tracks federal unsworn-declaration language rather than expressly invoking Texas law, so long as the return otherwise supplies the rule’s essential elements and shows service with reasonable certainty.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

PNC Bank sued Juan Fidel Lopez Antonio over an unpaid credit-card account. Service was effected by a private process server, who filed a return stating his name, date of birth, address, process server identification number, and certification expiration date. The return also stated: “Per U.S. Code § 1746, I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States of America that the foregoing is true and correct,” identified Van Zandt County, Texas as the place of execution, gave the execution date, and bore the server’s signature.

After Antonio did not answer, the trial court signed a default judgment. Antonio then brought a restricted appeal, arguing error was apparent on the face of the record because the return of service did not strictly comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107(e). His argument focused narrowly on the jurat language: the declaration referenced federal law and federal perjury language rather than Texas law.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court worked from familiar default-judgment principles and then narrowed its analysis to Rule 107(e).

Application

The Twelfth Court approached the dispute as a narrow Rule 107(e) question, not as a broader inquiry into whether any variation from the rule’s sample language is fatal. Antonio’s attack depended on the premise that “strict compliance” required the declaration to invoke Texas law specifically. The court rejected that premise.

The return contained the functional components that matter under Rule 107(e): the process server identified himself, gave personal identifying information, stated where and when the declaration was executed, signed the return, and expressly declared the truth of the return under penalty of perjury. In the court’s view, those features accomplished the core purpose of the rule. The operative feature was the perjury-backed attestation, not the choice between federal and state statutory language.

The court found the analogy to Section 132.001 persuasive because that statute, like Rule 107(e), requires substantial conformity rather than verbatim replication. Relying on United Rentals, the court reasoned that neither the statute nor Rule 107(e) expressly requires the declarant to say he is acting under Texas law. Because the return still exposed the declarant to perjury consequences and otherwise contained the essential identifying and execution details, the federal reference was not a substantive defect.

The opinion is also notable for what it did not do. It did not relax strict-compliance review for default judgments generally. Rather, it recognized that “strict compliance” under a rule using “substantially the following form” is satisfied when the return includes the rule’s essential elements and shows service with reasonable certainty. The federal citation did not negate those elements.

Holding

The court held that the return of service substantially complied with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 107(e) even though the declaration cited 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and stated it was made under penalty of perjury under the laws of the United States. Rule 107(e) does not require an express reference to Texas law, and a federal-law attestation does not invalidate a return that otherwise includes the required information.

The court further held that, because the return contained the process server’s identifying information, execution details, signature, and an attestation under penalty of perjury, there was no defect apparent on the face of the record. Accordingly, the restricted appeal failed, and the default judgment was affirmed.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, this opinion is best read as a service-of-process resilience case. If you are taking a default in a divorce, modification, enforcement, termination, or SAPCR proceeding, the opinion gives support against a later restricted-appeal challenge premised solely on the process server’s use of federal unsworn-declaration language. That is especially useful where private servers use standardized statewide or multijurisdictional forms that cite 28 U.S.C. § 1746.

That said, the case should not be misread as permission to be casual with returns. Family-law defaults are still vulnerable to direct attack, and courts will continue to scrutinize the face of the record for defects in citation, service, and return. The safest practice remains to ensure complete compliance with Rule 107, including the manner of service authorized, the date and manner of delivery, the person served, and the filing of the return for the required period before default is taken.

In property cases within divorce, this opinion may matter where one spouse defaults and later attacks the decree, claiming defective service because the process server used a non-Texas declaration format. In SAPCR and modification litigation, it may also blunt arguments that the return is void merely because the declaration references federal law. But if the return omits core information—such as who was served, when service occurred, or the server’s signature—this case will not save the judgment. The lesson is that courts distinguish between essential omissions and nonfatal variations in declaration wording.

Practitioners defending a default should cite this case alongside Spanton and United Rentals to frame the issue correctly: Rule 107(e) demands the substance of a perjury-backed declaration in substantially the prescribed form, not talismanic reference to Texas law. Practitioners attacking service, meanwhile, should focus on true Rule 107 defects rather than merely stylistic variations in the jurat.

Checklists

Pre-Default Service Review

Reviewing a Private Process Server Declaration Under Rule 107(e)

Attacking a Family-Law Default on Service Grounds

Defending a Family-Law Default Against Restricted Appeal

Family Law Crossover

The procedural rule this case clarifies is Rule 107(e)’s requirement for a private process server’s return when the return is not notarized but instead is supported by an unsworn declaration signed under penalty of perjury. In family-law matters, that mechanism appears constantly: original divorce petitions, SAPCRs, modifications, enforcements, and post-decree property actions often rely on private service, and defaults are frequently taken when the respondent does not answer. This opinion confirms that a return is not rendered defective solely because the server’s declaration uses federal unsworn-declaration language under 28 U.S.C. § 1746 rather than expressly invoking Texas law, so long as the return otherwise contains the identifying information, execution details, signature, and perjury attestation required by Rule 107(e) in substantial form. For family practitioners, that means the real appellate inquiry remains whether the face of the record reflects the essential service elements, not whether the jurat uses exclusively Texas-specific phrasing.

Citation

Juan Fidel Lopez Antonio v. PNC Bank National Association, No. 12-26-00090-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Tyler July 31, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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