Section 161.001(b)(1)(C) and (F) Insufficiency | In re V.C. (2026)

In the Interest of V.C., a Child, 13-26-00266-CV, August 06, 2026.

On appeal from 267th District Court of Victoria County, Texas

Synopsis

The Thirteenth Court of Appeals reversed and rendered a private termination order based on Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(C) and (F), holding the evidence was legally and factually insufficient on both predicate grounds. Incarceration, nonpayment during incarceration, and a custodial parent’s refusal to permit contact do not, without more, establish voluntary abandonment or failure to support in accordance with the parent’s ability to pay.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters well beyond stand-alone termination and adoption cases. It directly affects strategy in SAPCR modifications, custody disputes, step-parent adoption cases, and divorce-related conservatorship litigation where one side attempts to convert a weak access or support record into a termination case. In re V.C. is a reminder that Texas courts will strictly scrutinize predicate-ground proof, especially where the noncustodial parent was incarcerated, later sought contact, and the record shows gatekeeping by the custodial side. For family-law litigators, the case is a useful appellate counterweight against overreading nonpayment, absence, or a child’s integration into a stepfamily as substitute proof for the actual statutory elements.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The case arose from a private termination and adoption proceeding filed by the child’s biological father and the father’s wife, who sought termination of the biological mother’s rights so the stepmother could adopt. The child was born in December 2017. The mother was incarcerated for approximately four years and was released in March 2024. The petition to terminate was filed on May 14, 2024.

At trial, the appellees put on no documentary proof aimed at the statutory predicates and called only the father. He testified that when the child was about six months old, the mother gave the child to him because she “couldn’t handle him anymore.” He further testified that during the mother’s incarceration, he obtained an order requiring her to pay child support, and she never paid. He also acknowledged that after her release, the mother reached out wanting to see the child, but he did not think contact was in the child’s best interest. The record reflected that any post-release access was subject to the father’s advance agreement and supervision arrangements designated by him.

The mother’s testimony cut sharply against abandonment. She denied having simply left the child with the father, instead describing an arrangement under which the parties were co-parenting after separation. She testified that while incarcerated she sent letters and tried to call, and that her own mother also tried to maintain communication but was blocked by appellees. After release, she repeatedly contacted the father and stepmother seeking information, photographs, and an opportunity to see the child, but appellees prevented access. She also testified she could not provide support while in prison.

Text messages admitted at trial reinforced that account. The mother repeatedly asked how the child was doing, asked for photographs, expressed love for the child, thanked the stepmother for caring for him, and described how painful it was to be shut out. The stepmother responded that the situation was beyond her control and acknowledged that she had preserved the letters and drawings the mother had sent.

Issues Decided

• Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(C), which requires proof that the parent voluntarily left the child alone or in the possession of another without providing adequate support and remained away for at least six months.

• Whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(F), which requires proof that the parent failed to support the child in accordance with the parent’s ability during the relevant one-year statutory period.

• Whether, in a record showing incarceration, attempted post-release contact, and blocked access, nonpayment and absence could satisfy either predicate ground.

Rules Applied

The court began from the familiar but critical premise that termination proceedings are strictly scrutinized because they implicate constitutional parental rights. The opinion applied the clear-and-convincing-evidence burden under Texas Family Code §§ 101.007 and 161.001(b), together with the heightened legal- and factual-sufficiency review articulated in cases such as In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624 (Tex. 2018), In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002), and In re K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. 2014).

As to Subsection (C), the court relied on the text of § 161.001(b)(1)(C) and on Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. 1985), for the proposition that the subsection requires proof the parent voluntarily left the child without providing adequate support, but does not require personal support if the parent made arrangements for adequate support. The court also cited authority recognizing that Subsection (C) is not satisfied where the parent placed or agreed to placement with caregivers who adequately supported the child.

As to Subsection (F), the court applied the settled rule that the petitioner must prove the parent had the ability to support the child during the relevant twelve-month period and failed to do so. The court cited In re J.G.S., 574 S.W.3d 101 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, pet. denied), and In re T.B.D., 223 S.W.3d 515 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2006, no pet.), both of which recognize that incarceration alone does not prove an ability to pay and that a termination record fails under Subsection (F) where there is no evidence of accessible funds or earning ability during the statutory window.

Application

The court’s analysis was straightforward and useful for practitioners because it refused to let equitable themes substitute for statutory proof. On Subsection (C), the appellees’ theory effectively was that the mother left the child with the father, disappeared through incarceration, and did not provide support. But the evidentiary record also established that the child was adequately supported in the father’s home and that the mother either placed the child there or at least acquiesced in that custodial arrangement. Under Holick and related authority, that was fatal to the theory. Subsection (C) is aimed at voluntary abandonment without adequate support, not at situations where the child is left in a placement that in fact provides adequate care.

On Subsection (F), timing and proof both mattered. Because the petition was filed on May 14, 2024, the relevant one-year period had to fall between December 14, 2022, and May 14, 2024. During that window, the mother was incarcerated until March 2024 and then living in a halfway house. The appellees proved only nonpayment, not ability. They offered no evidence of wages, prison income, assets, outside resources, commissary funds, or any other facts from which the trial court could infer that the mother had the present ability to support the child during the statutory period. Her better circumstances at the 2026 trial—employment, housing, and transportation—did not retroactively fill that gap.

The contact evidence also undermined any abandonment narrative. The mother’s testimony and texts showed repeated efforts to communicate after release, while the appellees’ own evidence showed they denied or tightly controlled access. That did not merely fail to help appellees; it affirmatively undercut any inference that the mother voluntarily remained away from the child.

Holding

The court held the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support termination under § 161.001(b)(1)(C). On this record, a reasonable factfinder could not form a firm belief or conviction that the mother voluntarily left the child without providing adequate support where the evidence showed the child was well supported by the father and stepmother.

The court likewise held the evidence was legally and factually insufficient under § 161.001(b)(1)(F). The appellees failed to prove that the mother had the ability to support the child during the relevant statutory period and nevertheless failed to do so. Her incarceration and halfway-house placement, without evidence of accessible resources, could not satisfy the subsection.

Because the predicate grounds failed, the court reversed the termination order and rendered judgment. The opinion did not need to reach best interest.

Practical Application

For petitioner’s counsel, this case is a warning that private termination suits cannot be tried on moral force alone. A child’s stable placement with the custodial parent and step-parent, the child’s lack of familiarity with the biological parent, and the custodial household’s understandable desire for permanency do not relieve the petitioner of proving the exact statutory elements by clear and convincing evidence. If your theory is abandonment under Subsection (C), you need evidence that the parent left the child without arranging adequate support, not merely that the child ended up thriving elsewhere. If your theory is non-support under Subsection (F), you need evidence of actual ability to pay during the relevant statutory period.

For respondent’s counsel, In re V.C. is an excellent record-building roadmap. Lock down the statutory dates. Establish incarceration status during the relevant window. Develop evidence of lack of income, lack of accessible funds, and transitional housing after release. Equally important, document every attempt to call, write, obtain photographs, request visitation, and engage through relatives or intermediaries. Where the custodial side has blocked or conditioned access, that evidence can be powerful in defeating any claim of voluntary abandonment.

The case also has practical implications in modification and enforcement settings. Litigants sometimes attempt to leverage periods of incarceration or nonpayment into a broader narrative of parental unfitness. This opinion reinforces that such facts may be relevant to other disputes, but they are not self-proving under termination predicates that require voluntariness, ability, and statutory precision. Family-law trial lawyers should therefore separate “bad facts” from legally sufficient facts and build their case theory accordingly.

Checklists

Pleading and Proof for Subsection (C)

• Confirm that the evidence supports each statutory element of § 161.001(b)(1)(C), not just a general abandonment theme.
• Determine whether the child was left with a caregiver who in fact provided adequate support.
• Evaluate whether the respondent made arrangements for the child’s care, even if the respondent did not personally provide money.
• Avoid relying solely on the respondent’s absence, incarceration, or weak relationship with the child.
• Develop evidence showing the parent voluntarily remained away for the required period.
• Anticipate and address evidence that the custodial side blocked contact or controlled access.

Pleading and Proof for Subsection (F)

• Identify the precise statutory one-year period tied to the petition filing date.
• Gather evidence of the parent’s actual ability to support during that period.
• Obtain records showing wages, assets, trust funds, benefits, or other available resources.
• If incarceration is involved, determine whether the parent had any accessible funds while incarcerated.
• Do not assume a support order plus nonpayment equals proof under Subsection (F).
• Exclude evidence outside the statutory window unless it has a clear evidentiary bridge to the relevant period.

Defending Against a Private Termination Suit

• Create a clean chronology of incarceration, release, housing, employment, and support capacity.
• Preserve letters, text messages, call logs, social media messages, and third-party communications showing efforts to maintain contact.
• Prove any custodial gatekeeping with screenshots, saved messages, and testimony.
• Clarify whether access was conditioned on the other parent’s permission or supervision.
• Distinguish inability to pay from refusal to pay.
• Emphasize the constitutional requirement of strict scrutiny and clear-and-convincing proof.

Trial Strategy for Petitioner’s Counsel

• Do not rest on a single witness if documentary proof is available.
• Tie every exhibit and every witness to a specific statutory element.
• Prove ability to pay with competent evidence, not inference piled on inference.
• Address foreseeable defenses such as incarceration, blocked access, and attempted contact.
• Avoid conflating best-interest evidence with predicate-ground evidence.
• Request termination only on grounds the record can actually sustain on appeal.

Appellate Preservation and Framing

• Challenge both legal and factual sufficiency on each predicate ground separately.
• Identify the exact evidentiary gaps as to voluntariness, adequate support, and ability to pay.
• Use the petition date to anchor the Subsection (F) timeline.
• Highlight undisputed evidence of attempted contact and denied access.
• Argue for rendition, not merely remand, where the record conclusively fails on predicate proof.
• Keep best interest separate if reversal on predicate grounds is dispositive.

Citation

In the Interest of V.C., a Child, No. 13-26-00266-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Aug. 6, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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