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Section 161.211(c) Limits Review of Relinquishment Challenges | In re A.V. and B.L. (2026)

Thomas Daley
New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of A.V. and B.L., Children, 11-26-00112-CV, July 16, 2026.

On appeal from 220th District Court, Comanche County, Texas

Synopsis

When termination is based on an unrevoked affidavit of voluntary relinquishment that complies with Family Code Section 161.103, Section 161.211(c) sharply narrows appellate review to fraud, duress, or coercion in the affidavit’s execution. In In re A.V. and B.L., the Eleventh Court held the mother did not carry her burden to prove any of those grounds by a preponderance of the evidence, so the appeal was frivolous and the termination order was affirmed.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a parental-rights termination case, its practical reach extends well beyond CPS dockets. Texas family litigators regularly confront executed affidavits, waivers, mediated agreements, Rule 11 disputes, and post-judgment attempts to unwind signed instruments based on alleged pressure or misunderstanding. This opinion reinforces a broader litigation lesson that matters in divorce, SAPCR, modification, and even property enforcement practice: once a statutorily compliant family-law document is executed and admitted, appellate options may narrow dramatically unless trial counsel builds a record showing specific wrongful procurement. For practitioners handling conservatorship disputes, relative placements, or contested relinquishments in private termination and adoption matters, the case is a reminder that the battle over voluntariness is usually won or lost in the trial court, not on appeal.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The mother appealed from a final order terminating her parental rights to A.V. and B.L. The trial court terminated under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(K) after finding that she had executed an irrevocable affidavit of voluntary relinquishment, and it also found termination was in the children’s best interest. Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief and motion to withdraw, representing that no nonfrivolous appellate issues existed.

The mother then filed a pro se response asserting that she signed the affidavit because she was manipulated through fear, pressure, and false hope, including an alleged understanding that she might regain custody within two years if the children were not adopted. The court of appeals independently reviewed the record. That record showed the affidavit was unrevoked, complied with Section 161.103, and was admitted without objection at the final hearing. The court also noted that the mother did not file a motion for new trial developing evidence to support a claim of fraud, duress, or coercion.

The opinion additionally mentions that the affidavit contained a handwritten provision allowing post-termination contact while the children were in the Department’s care. But the court found no indication in the record, and no claim by the mother, that relinquishment had been conditioned on prohibited post-termination visitation under Section 161.103(h).

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court relied principally on the following authorities:

Application

The Eleventh Court’s analysis was straightforward and highly instructive. It began with the statutory premise that because the termination order rested on an unrevoked affidavit of relinquishment, Section 161.211(c) restricted the universe of appellate complaints. That meant the mother could not obtain meaningful review of generalized fairness concerns, regret, or later dissatisfaction with the consequences of signing. The only viable lane was proof that the affidavit itself had been procured by fraud, duress, or coercion.

From there, the court treated the affidavit as prima facie valid because it complied with Section 161.103 and had been admitted without objection. That shifted the practical burden to the mother to affirmatively develop evidence undermining the voluntariness of execution. Her pro se assertions that she signed due to fear, pressure, and false hope were not enough on this record. The court emphasized the absence of a motion for new trial or any developed evidentiary record supporting those allegations. In other words, the mother offered accusation without record support, while the Department had a facially valid statutory affidavit.

The court also addressed, albeit briefly, a potentially sensitive feature of the affidavit: the handwritten reference to post-termination contact while the children remained in the Department’s care. Practitioners will recognize the danger here, because Section 161.103(h) prohibits conditioning relinquishment on post-termination visitation. But the court found no evidence that the affidavit was conditioned on prohibited future contact. That detail matters because it signals that not every mention of post-termination contact will invalidate an affidavit; the question is whether the relinquishment was actually contingent on such a promise.

Finally, under the Anders framework, the court independently reviewed the record and agreed that no nonfrivolous issue existed. Even so, it denied counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M., preserving counsel’s ongoing duty through any petition for review stage.

Holding

The court held that when a termination order is based on an unrevoked affidavit of voluntary relinquishment that complies with Family Code Section 161.103, Section 161.211(c) confines appellate review to claims of fraud, duress, or coercion in the execution of the affidavit. That holding is significant because it confirms the statute’s gatekeeping effect and forecloses broader appellate attacks on the termination judgment once a compliant affidavit is in place.

The court further held that the mother did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that her affidavit was executed as a result of fraud, duress, or coercion. Because the affidavit was prima facie valid and the appellate record contained no developed evidentiary basis for her assertions, the court concluded there was no reversible error and no nonfrivolous appellate ground.

The court also held that appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw should be denied, not because the appeal had merit, but because under In re P.M. appointed counsel’s duties in parental-rights termination appeals generally continue through the exhaustion of appellate remedies.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, the strategic lesson is plain: if your case turns on a relinquishment affidavit, treat execution, statutory compliance, and record preservation as the central battlefield. On the proponent’s side, this case underscores the value of a clean Section 161.103 affidavit, careful admission into evidence, and a hearing record that reflects voluntariness and lack of improper inducements. On the challenger’s side, this opinion is a warning that appellate rhetoric cannot substitute for trial-court proof.

This matters in several recurring settings:

Practitioners should also pay attention to the court’s note regarding handwritten post-termination-contact language. Any reference to future contact should be handled with precision. If such language appears in or around the affidavit, be prepared to show that it was not a condition of relinquishment and did not render the execution involuntary or statutorily defective.

Checklists

Vetting a Relinquishment Affidavit Before Trial

Building a Record to Defend the Affidavit

Challenging an Affidavit of Relinquishment

Preserving Error for Appeal

Avoiding the Non-Prevailing Parent’s Problem

Citation

In the Interest of A.V. and B.L., Children, No. 11-26-00112-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Eastland July 16, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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