CROSSOVER: Concurrent District Courts May Revoke/Adjudicate Without Written Transfer Order in Same County

Russo v. State, 04-25-00141-CR, July 15, 2026.

On appeal from 218th Judicial District Court, Wilson County, Texas

Synopsis

When two district courts in the same county have concurrent jurisdiction, one district judge may hear and determine a proceeding pending in the other court without a written transfer order. In Russo v. State, the Fourth Court held that articles 42A.151 and 42A.754 did not require a transfer order before a different same-county district court revoked deferred-adjudication community supervision, adjudicated guilt, and imposed sentence.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family-law litigators, the procedural point is significant even though Russo is a criminal case. In multi-court counties, divorce, SAPCR, modification, enforcement, and property-related matters are often filed in one district court but heard by another district judge for docket-management reasons; Russo reinforces the broader same-county principle that, absent a contrary local rule or a statute requiring transfer, a different district judge with concurrent jurisdiction may hear and determine a proceeding without a formal transfer order. That matters when evaluating attacks on temporary orders, enforcement rulings, associate-judge referrals, post-judgment proceedings, or final trials based solely on the identity of the presiding district judge rather than the court’s subject-matter authority.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

William Anthony Russo II pleaded guilty to aggravated sexual assault of a child in the 218th Judicial District Court of Wilson County. Judge Russell Wilson presided over that plea proceeding, deferred adjudication, and placed Russo on community supervision for ten years.

Later, the State filed a motion to revoke community supervision. The revocation proceeding was not heard by the 218th District Court. Instead, Judge Jennifer Dillingham of the 81st Judicial District Court of Wilson County presided. Russo pleaded true to a violation, the court accepted the plea, revoked supervision, adjudicated guilt, and imposed a fifty-six-year sentence.

On appeal, Russo’s core complaint was not about the violation evidence or punishment. His argument was jurisdictional: because the 218th District Court originally deferred adjudication, he contended only that court could later revoke and adjudicate unless the case was formally transferred under articles 42A.151 and 42A.754 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Issues Decided

• Whether Texas Code of Criminal Procedure articles 42A.151 and 42A.754 required a formal transfer order before a different district court in the same county could revoke deferred-adjudication community supervision and adjudicate guilt.
• Whether a same-county district court with concurrent felony jurisdiction could hear and determine the proceeding without transfer under Texas Government Code section 24.003 and article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution.
• Whether a written bench-exchange order or written explanation was required for one same-county district judge to preside over a proceeding pending in another district court.

Rules Applied

The court relied on a straightforward set of constitutional, statutory, and precedential authorities:

• Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42A.151, which addresses transfer of community-supervision jurisdiction to another court of the same rank based on geographic specifications.
• Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 42A.754, which provides that only the court in which the defendant was tried may revoke community supervision unless jurisdiction has been transferred under article 42A.151.
• Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 4.05, confirming district courts’ original jurisdiction over felony criminal cases.
• Texas Government Code sections 24.183(a) and 24.396(a), (b), identifying the 218th and 81st Judicial District Courts’ districts and confirming that indictments within Wilson County may be returned to any district court in that county.
• Texas Government Code section 24.003(b)(2), (3), (4), and (d), authorizing a district judge in a county with two or more district courts to hear and determine a case pending in another district court in the county without transfer, sit for another district court, exchange benches temporarily, and complete hearings and render judgment in matters pending in another district court.
• Texas Constitution article V, section 11, allowing district judges to exchange districts or hold court for one another.
• In re Schmitz, 285 S.W.3d 451, 454 (Tex. 2009), recognizing the breadth of Texas law allowing judges to sit for one another.
• Mata v. State, 669 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984), holding that no formal written order is required for an exchange of benches and the file need not reflect the reason for the exchange.

Application

The Fourth Court began by rejecting the premise that Russo’s case had been “transferred” at all. That distinction did the heavy lifting. Articles 42A.151 and 42A.754 govern transfer of community-supervision jurisdiction from one court to another. But the record, as the court viewed it, showed no transfer to another court in the statutory sense. Instead, what occurred was that one district judge in Wilson County presided over a proceeding pending within a county where multiple district courts shared concurrent felony jurisdiction.

From there, the court turned to the broader same-county authority granted by the Texas Constitution and Government Code section 24.003. Because both the 81st and the 218th District Courts had concurrent felony jurisdiction in Wilson County, and because section 24.003 expressly permits a district judge in a county with multiple district courts to hear and determine a proceeding pending in another district court without transfer, Judge Dillingham could preside over the revocation and adjudication proceeding even though Judge Wilson had handled the original plea and deferred adjudication.

The court also treated the absence of a written bench-exchange order as legally insignificant. Citing Mata, it emphasized that Texas law does not require the clerk’s file to contain a formal order or explanation for an exchange of benches between same-county district judges. On that reasoning, the 81st District Court properly exercised jurisdiction, and the adjudication judgment stood.

Holding

The court held that articles 42A.151 and 42A.754 do not require a transfer order when a different district judge in the same county presides over a revocation and adjudication proceeding, so long as the case has not been transferred to another court in the statutory sense. The transfer statutes did not control because the proceeding remained within the same county’s district-court system among courts with concurrent felony jurisdiction.

The court further held that Texas Government Code section 24.003 and article V, section 11 of the Texas Constitution authorize a same-county district judge to hear and determine a proceeding pending in another district court without a transfer order. Under Mata, no written bench-exchange order is required. Accordingly, the 81st District Court had authority to revoke community supervision, adjudicate guilt, and sentence Russo, and the judgment was affirmed.

Practical Application

For family-law practitioners, Russo is best understood as a jurisdiction-versus-assignment case. It underscores that in counties with multiple district courts, a challenge based solely on the fact that a different district judge heard the matter may fail where the courts share concurrent jurisdiction and the governing statutes or local rules permit cross-assignment without transfer.

That principle can matter in several family-law settings:

• A divorce filed in one district court is called to trial by another district judge during a docket equalization setting.
• A modification or enforcement action is heard by a different district judge in the same county after a recusal, scheduling conflict, or administrative reassignment.
• A post-judgment property-enforcement hearing or clarification proceeding is conducted by a different same-county district judge than the one who signed the decree.
• A protective-order-related proceeding intersects procedurally with an underlying SAPCR or divorce docket and is heard by a different district judge with overlapping authority.
• A party attempts to attack an order as void because the “wrong court” heard it, despite no actual defect in subject-matter jurisdiction.

The strategic takeaway is that litigators should distinguish among three concepts: true transfer of a case, permissible same-county judicial assignment or bench exchange, and subject-matter jurisdiction. Those are not interchangeable. If the complaint is really about internal court administration rather than a statutory prerequisite or jurisdictional defect, Russo suggests the attack may go nowhere.

At the same time, family lawyers should not overread the case. It does not erase statutory transfer requirements where the Family Code expressly makes transfer mandatory, such as certain SAPCR transfer provisions. Nor does it override local rules of administration that may structure same-county assignments. The lesson is narrower and more useful: before asserting that an order is void because a different district judge signed it, confirm whether the issue is truly jurisdictional or merely administrative.

Checklists

Evaluate Whether You Have a Real Jurisdictional Complaint

• Identify the court in which the case was originally filed.
• Identify the judge who actually heard the proceeding at issue.
• Determine whether the second judge sits in a court of concurrent jurisdiction within the same county.
• Determine whether the matter was formally transferred, or whether another judge simply heard a proceeding pending in the original court.
• Check whether a statute expressly requires transfer before another court may act.
• Distinguish subject-matter jurisdiction from assignment, bench exchange, or docket-management issues.

Review County-Specific Authority Before Objecting

• Obtain the county’s local rules of administration.
• Confirm whether the local rules restrict or condition same-county bench exchanges or cross-settings.
• Review any standing administrative orders affecting family-court assignments.
• Determine whether the presiding judge, local administrative judge, or regional presiding judge entered any assignment orders.
• Verify whether the courtroom, cause number, and presiding judge align with the county’s routine administrative practice.

Preserve Error Carefully in Family Cases

• Object on the record if you contend the presiding court lacks authority under a specific statute or local rule.
• Cite the exact statute, rule, or constitutional provision supporting the objection.
• Request any assignment, transfer, or exchange documents you believe are required.
• Avoid framing an administrative complaint as a jurisdictional one unless the law supports that characterization.
• If the complaint concerns notice, due process, or an inability to prepare because of reassignment, make that distinct record.
• Obtain a ruling.

Use Russo Defensively When an Opponent Attacks the Presiding Judge’s Authority

• Emphasize the concurrent jurisdiction of same-county district courts.
• Point to Government Code section 24.003 if another district judge heard the proceeding without transfer.
• Cite article V, section 11 for same-county judicial exchange authority.
• Use Mata to answer arguments that a written bench-exchange order was required.
• Argue that absent a contrary statute or local rule, internal assignment does not create a void order.
• Refocus the court on whether any actual prejudice or statutory noncompliance exists.

Avoid the Downside in Mandatory-Transfer Family Proceedings

• Confirm whether the Family Code requires transfer upon filing or motion.
• Do not assume Russo overrides venue-transfer or continuing-jurisdiction provisions in family cases.
• For SAPCR and modification proceedings, confirm the court of continuing, exclusive jurisdiction.
• If transfer is mandatory under the Family Code, obtain a signed transfer order and a clear clerk’s record.
• Ensure subsequent orders are signed by the court authorized to act after transfer.
• Build a clean procedural record whenever jurisdiction and transfer intersect.

Citation

Russo v. State, No. 04-25-00141-CR, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 15, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

The procedural rule established by Russo is that, in a county with multiple district courts, one district judge may hear and determine a proceeding pending in another same-county district court without a formal transfer order when the courts share concurrent jurisdiction and no contrary local rule or statute requires transfer. The key mechanism is not statutory transfer of the case, but same-county judicial authority under Government Code section 24.003 and article V, section 11.

In family law, that can arise when a divorce, SAPCR, enforcement, modification, turnover, clarification, or post-judgment property proceeding is filed in one district court but heard by a different district judge in the same county because of docket equalization, scheduling, recusals, or internal court administration. In that setting, Russo supports the proposition that the validity of the ruling does not depend on a written transfer order or a written bench-exchange order, so long as the acting judge had concurrent authority and the matter remained within the same county’s district-court framework. The practical question for family litigators is whether the governing Family Code provision creates a true transfer requirement or continuing-jurisdiction limitation; if not, a same-county “different judge” objection may not present a viable appellate issue.

~~e8d777fa-e85f-4bce-af45-151d63a11031~~