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CROSSOVER: San Antonio Court Holds Civil Assault by Offensive Contact May Be Proven by Circumstantial Evidence in Courthouse Family-Law Encounter

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Manka v. Acosta, 04-25-00089-CV, May 13, 2026.

On appeal from 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Synopsis

The Fourth Court of Appeals held that a civil assault claim under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(3) may be proved without any showing of bodily injury. Testimony, surrounding circumstances, and courthouse video were legally and factually sufficient to support a finding that the defendant intentionally made offensive physical contact and knew, or reasonably should have known, the contact would be regarded as offensive or provocative.

Relevance to Family Law

This is a true crossover opinion for Texas family-law litigators because the underlying events arose in a courthouse family-law setting and the court approved a circumstantial-evidence pathway to proving offensive-contact assault. In divorce, SAPCR, and post-judgment enforcement litigation, allegations of grabbing, crowding, touching, intimidation, or boundary-testing conduct often arise in hallways, mediation rooms, exchanges, and courthouse corridors; this opinion confirms that those claims do not fail merely because there is no bodily injury, no audio recording, or no eyewitness to the precise point of contact. It also underscores that conduct occurring around family-law proceedings can generate substantial parallel civil exposure and can become highly consequential in conservatorship, possession, protective-order, and credibility disputes.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Both parties were attorneys appearing in a Wilson County family-law matter. The appellee, Michelle Acosta, was appearing in court for the first time to argue on behalf of her brother in a dispute involving his ex-wife. While the clients attempted to resolve the case privately, the attorneys and Acosta’s father waited in the courthouse lobby.

According to Acosta and her father, the appellant, Allan Roy Manka, made statements that when he represented women in family cases, he liked to put his arms around his clients to make opposing counsel and the opposing party uncomfortable. Courthouse security footage then showed a sequence of escalating physical interactions: Manka moved next to Acosta, slid his hand across her lower back and around her waist, later touched her hair, and put his arm around her shoulder.

When the clients returned and announced they had reached an agreement, Manka again positioned himself beside Acosta. She extended her hand, but instead of shaking it, he leaned into her personal space. Acosta testified he grabbed and squeezed her buttocks. The video did not clearly capture the hand on the buttocks itself, but it did show him leaning in, Acosta immediately slapping his chest, gesturing toward her buttocks, and speaking to him as he walked away. Her brother testified he saw contact in the lower-back-to-buttocks area and that Acosta immediately reacted by stating that Manka had grabbed her butt. Manka denied grabbing her buttocks but did not deny the earlier touching reflected on video.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court relied on the settled principle that the elements of civil assault mirror criminal assault. Under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(3), a person commits assault if he intentionally or knowingly causes physical contact with another when he knows or reasonably should believe the other will regard the contact as offensive or provocative.

The court cited Loaisiga v. Cerda, 379 S.W.3d 248 (Tex. 2012), for the basic framework governing civil assault. It also relied on Louisiana-Pacific Corp. v. Andrade, 19 S.W.3d 245 (Tex. 1999), for the proposition that mental state may be established by circumstantial evidence. On sufficiency review, the court applied standard legal- and factual-sufficiency principles, including deference to the jury on credibility and resolution of conflicting evidence.

Critically, the court rejected the notion that bodily injury is an element of an offensive-contact assault claim. Section 22.01(a)(3) reaches offensive or provocative touching even where the plaintiff does not claim bodily injury.

Application

The San Antonio court treated the case as a straightforward offensive-contact assault analysis rather than allowing the defense to reframe it as a bodily-injury case. That mattered. Once the court identified section 22.01(a)(3) as the operative theory, the real question became whether the jury had enough evidence to infer the required mental state.

The court held that it did. It emphasized the parties were strangers who had never met before that day. It considered Acosta’s testimony that Manka took “a huge handful” of her buttocks and squeezed it. It then placed that testimony in context: earlier touching shown on video, his movement into her personal space, the immediate slap to his chest, her gesture toward her buttocks, her contemporaneous statement, her brother’s corroboration that he saw startling contact near the lower-back/buttocks area, and the father’s testimony that Manka had articulated a deliberate tactic of using physical proximity and contact to make others uncomfortable in family-law cases.

From that sequence, the court concluded the jury could reasonably infer not only that the touching occurred, but also that Manka knew or reasonably should have known such contact would be regarded as offensive or provocative. The court did not require direct proof of subjective admission. Instead, it accepted the ordinary evidentiary reality that intent and knowledge are usually proved through conduct, context, and immediate reaction. The video’s lack of audio and lack of a perfect angle did not defeat the verdict; it supplied enough circumstantial support to reinforce the testimonial account rather than negate it.

Holding

The court held that civil assault by offensive physical contact under Texas Penal Code section 22.01(a)(3) does not require proof of bodily injury. A plaintiff may recover for intentional or knowing offensive contact even if the claim rests on indignity, violation of personal autonomy, and mental anguish rather than physical harm.

The court further held that the defendant’s knowledge, or reason to know, that the contact would be regarded as offensive or provocative may be proved by circumstantial evidence. In this case, the testimony of the plaintiff and corroborating witnesses, combined with the security video and the surrounding circumstances, was legally and factually sufficient to support the jury’s liability finding.

Practical Application

For family-law practitioners, this opinion has several immediate uses. First, it is a reminder that courthouse, mediation, and exchange-location conduct can become an independent tort case with serious damages exposure. Second, it strengthens the evidentiary viability of offensive-contact allegations in family-law-adjacent settings where the proof is pieced together from partial video, witness observations, statements, and immediate outcry rather than a clean recording of the exact touching. Third, it gives practitioners a useful authority when opposing arguments that “there was no injury” or “there is no objective proof of intent.”

In active divorce or custody litigation, this case can shape temporary-orders strategy, protective-order applications, supervised-exchange requests, and credibility framing at trial. It is especially useful where one side has engaged in physically intrusive but non-injurious conduct designed to intimidate opposing parties, counsel, or family members. The opinion supports the proposition that escalating boundary violations matter, and that a factfinder may infer knowledge from context, including prior comments, calculated positioning, prior touching, and the immediacy of the complainant’s reaction.

For defense-side family lawyers, the case is equally instructive. Minimizing “non-injurious” touching as trivial is risky. If there is video, contemporaneous reporting, corroborative reaction evidence, or testimony showing a pattern of calculated discomfort, the case may survive and sustain a verdict. Advising clients—and frankly, counsel themselves—about professional boundaries in emotionally charged family-law environments is not merely decorum; it is liability prevention.

Checklists

Offensive-Contact Claim Development

Proving Knowledge Through Circumstantial Evidence

Family-Law Trial Strategy

Risk Management for Family Lawyers and Their Firms

Avoiding the Defense Mistakes Highlighted by the Opinion

Citation

Manka v. Acosta, No. 04-25-00089-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 13, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

This ruling can be weaponized in divorce or custody litigation in at least three ways. First, it gives litigants a published appellate framework for arguing that non-injurious but intrusive physical conduct is still legally serious and probative of coercive, intimidating, or boundary-deficient behavior. In conservatorship disputes, that can be recast as evidence bearing on best interest, emotional safety, parental judgment, and the need for structured exchanges or contact limitations. Second, where the alleged actor is a party, new spouse, paramour, or even counsel whose conduct affects the litigation environment, the opinion supports using partial video, immediate outcry, and surrounding circumstances to defeat “nothing happened” narratives. Third, in property and fault-based divorce cases, a pattern of humiliating or sexually charged touching may feed into cruelty allegations, disproportionality arguments, or settlement leverage, especially when the conduct occurred in connection with the litigation itself and reveals a willingness to use intimidation as a tactic.

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