Nunez v. Nichols, 03-24-00263-CV, April 30, 2026.
On appeal from 201st District Court of Travis County
Synopsis
The Austin Court of Appeals held that the trial court had sufficient evidence under Family Code section 154.302 to order ongoing and retroactive support for an adult disabled child, along with health-insurance and unreimbursed medical-expense obligations. But it reversed the attorney’s-fee award because the record did not contain the evidentiary support Texas law requires for a fee recovery of that amount.
Relevance to Family Law
This decision matters well beyond post-majority support disputes. For Texas family-law litigators, it is a useful roadmap on two recurring fronts: first, how to prove or defeat an adult disabled-child support claim in a modification or post-divorce enforcement setting; and second, how easily an otherwise successful family-law order can be partially undone by an inadequately proven attorney’s-fee request. The case also has direct implications for divorce drafting, SAPCR modification strategy, conservatorship-related caregiving proof, and allocation of extraordinary medical expenses where a child’s disabling condition extends into adulthood.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The parties divorced in 2008, and their daughter primarily lived with the mother thereafter. By the time of the challenged order, the daughter was an adult. The mother sought support for an adult disabled child under Texas Family Code section 154.302, contending that the daughter’s disabling conditions arose before age eighteen, continued into adulthood, rendered her incapable of self-support, and required substantial care and personal supervision.
The evidence reflected a significant medical and psychiatric history beginning well before majority. According to the mother, the daughter had migraines beginning around age six, epileptic seizures beginning around age twelve, disordered eating behaviors beginning around age twelve, psychiatric hospitalization in 2014, a later suicide attempt at age seventeen followed by acute and residential treatment, and additional treatment for an eating disorder in 2020-2021. The daughter was also diagnosed with Postural Orthostatic Tachycardia Syndrome (POTS), requiring medication and a stent. A psychiatric mental-health nurse practitioner had treated the daughter for years.
The father pushed back on the degree of impairment rather than the existence of diagnoses. He emphasized evidence suggesting some functional capacity: the daughter had a restricted driver’s license, had traveled alone to visit a boyfriend in Illinois, and was not shown by the record to be categorically incapable of future employment. His retained expert, who reviewed records but did not perform a vocational assessment, testified that he could not determine employability without further evaluation and did not see an indication in the records that the daughter was incapable of employment. He also opined that she might be capable of more than she believed and that work could improve her self-esteem.
The trial court nevertheless found that the daughter required substantial care and personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability, was not capable of self-support, and had a qualifying disability that existed before age eighteen and continued thereafter. Based on those findings, the court ordered monthly support, retroactive support back to June 1, 2021, monthly health-insurance reimbursement as additional child support, and one-half of unreimbursed medical expenses. The court also awarded the mother $25,468.46 in attorney’s fees, but did not characterize those fees as additional child support.
Issues Decided
- Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the findings required by Texas Family Code section 154.302 for adult disabled-child support.
- Whether the evidence supported the trial court’s order requiring the father to pay ongoing monthly support.
- Whether the evidence supported retroactive support to June 1, 2021.
- Whether the evidence supported requiring the father to pay the cost of the daughter’s health insurance and one-half of unreimbursed medical expenses.
- Whether the attorney’s-fee award of $25,468.46 was supported by sufficient evidence.
Rules Applied
Texas Family Code section 154.302 permits a court to order one or both parents to support an adult child for an indefinite period if the court finds:
- the child requires substantial care and personal supervision because of a mental or physical disability and will not be capable of self-support; and
- the disability exists, or the cause of the disability is known to exist, on or before the child’s eighteenth birthday.
The appellate court applied the familiar abuse-of-discretion framework governing child-support orders, including modifications and adult disabled-child support orders. Under that framework, evidentiary sufficiency is folded into the abuse-of-discretion review: the appellate court asks whether the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to exercise discretion and whether it then acted reasonably in applying that discretion.
The opinion also relied on the standard principle that, in a bench trial, findings of fact carry the weight of a jury verdict if supported by the evidence, and the trial court remains the sole judge of witness credibility and the weight to assign competing testimony.
On attorney’s fees, the court relied on the requirement that the fee claimant present adequate proof of the hours worked and the value of those services. The opinion cited El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas and Austin authority applying those proof requirements in SAPCR litigation, making clear that a family-law fee award is still subject to meaningful evidentiary scrutiny.
The court also referenced prior adult disabled-child support decisions illustrating the statutory line between diagnosis alone and true dependency. One case showed that a person may have a serious impairment but still not qualify if the evidence demonstrates practical independence and self-support. Another showed that partial work capacity does not defeat support if the adult child still needs substantial supervision and assistance in daily life.
Application
The appellate court treated the father’s arguments as going primarily to the weight of the evidence, not to a complete failure of proof. The daughter’s ability to travel, hold a restricted license, or potentially benefit from vocational intervention did not compel a finding of self-sufficiency. Section 154.302 does not require proof of total helplessness. The real statutory question is whether the adult child requires substantial care and personal supervision because of a qualifying disability and will not be capable of self-support.
On that point, the record contained evidence of longstanding and serious physical and psychiatric conditions predating age eighteen, including seizures, migraines, eating-disorder behavior, suicidality, hospitalizations, residential treatment, and POTS. The father’s own expert did not undermine the existence of those conditions; indeed, he conceded key limitations in his opinion by acknowledging that he had not conducted the vocational work necessary to determine employability and that he was not saying the daughter could simply go obtain a job immediately. That left the trial court with a record in which the mother’s evidence supported present incapacity and continuing need, while the father’s evidence suggested only possible future improvement or untapped capacity.
The court therefore deferred to the trial court’s role as factfinder. It accepted that the evidence was enough to support findings that the daughter’s disabling condition existed before age eighteen, continued into adulthood, rendered her incapable of self-support, and required substantial care and supervision. Once those predicate findings stood, the support structure built on them—monthly support, retroactive support, insurance-cost reimbursement, and allocation of unreimbursed medical expenses—fell within the trial court’s discretion.
The attorney’s-fee award was different. There, the problem was not discretion in weighing conflicting facts but the absence of the kind of proof required to support the amount awarded. The court concluded that the fee evidence did not adequately substantiate the $25,468.46 figure. Because the deficiency went to evidentiary support rather than the abstract availability of fees, the proper disposition was reversal and remand for further proceedings on fees alone.
Holding
The court affirmed the support order requiring the father to pay ongoing monthly support for the adult child. The evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings that the daughter’s disabilities originated before age eighteen, persisted into adulthood, and caused her to require substantial care and personal supervision while leaving her incapable of self-support.
The court also affirmed the retroactive support component and the related medical-support provisions. That included the monthly health-insurance amount payable as additional child support and the requirement that the father pay one-half of the daughter’s reasonable and necessary unreimbursed health-care expenses.
The court reversed the attorney’s-fee award of $25,468.46 and remanded that issue to the trial court. Although the mother prevailed on the substantive support issues, the record did not contain sufficient evidence to sustain the amount of fees awarded.
Practical Application
For practitioners seeking adult disabled-child support, Nunez reinforces that the winning presentation is not merely diagnostic; it is functional and longitudinal. The evidence should tie pre-majority diagnoses and symptoms to current incapacity, demonstrate the need for substantial supervision in daily life, and address why isolated signs of independence do not equate to self-support. A parent opposing such relief should recognize that evidence of some discrete functioning—travel, limited driving, intermittent social independence, or theoretical employability—will often be insufficient unless tied to a developed evidentiary theory of actual self-support.
The case is also strategically important in modification practice. Retroactive adult-child support can create significant arrearage exposure when the record supports an earlier accrual date. Counsel should therefore evaluate these claims early, develop affirmative proof on onset and functional limitations, and quantify insurance and unreimbursed medical burdens with precision.
On fees, the lesson is blunt. Even in emotionally compelling family-law litigation, a fee award remains vulnerable if counsel does not put on disciplined lodestar-type proof. If you want the fee award to survive appeal, build the record as if the fee issue is the only issue the appellate court will read.
In divorce drafting and post-divorce planning, this case also suggests that counsel should think ahead where a minor child has a serious medical or psychiatric history. Standard child-support language may prove inadequate if there is a realistic prospect of post-majority dependency. Settlement documents, discovery planning, and later modification strategy should all account for the possibility of section 154.302 litigation.
Checklists
Build the Section 154.302 Liability Record
- Establish that the disability existed, or its cause was known to exist, on or before the child’s eighteenth birthday.
- Present a coherent medical timeline showing diagnoses, treatment, hospitalizations, and functional decline.
- Offer evidence connecting the diagnosis to present-day limitations, not just historical symptoms.
- Prove the child requires substantial care and personal supervision, using specifics about daily living, safety, medication management, transportation, hygiene, meals, and supervision needs.
- Address employability directly with competent evidence, including vocational evidence when appropriate.
- Show why any isolated instances of functioning do not amount to actual capacity for self-support.
Defend Against an Adult Disabled-Child Support Claim
- Test whether the claimant has proven functional incapacity, not just a diagnostic label.
- Develop evidence of actual independence: work history, transportation, financial management, education, self-care, and community functioning.
- Use expert testimony carefully; avoid opinions that concede too much while offering only speculative future employability.
- Consider obtaining a vocational assessment rather than relying solely on a records review.
- Challenge the causal link between the pre-majority condition and the claimed present inability to self-support.
- Attack retroactivity with a focused timeline and evidence about when statutory criteria were actually met.
Prove Medical-Support Components
- Document health-insurance premiums attributable specifically to the adult child.
- Separate premium evidence from general household or family coverage where necessary.
- Introduce records of reasonable and necessary unreimbursed medical expenses.
- Tie recurring medical costs to the disabling condition and ongoing need for care.
- Request clear findings and precise allocation language in the order.
Preserve and Protect Attorney’s-Fee Awards
- Offer detailed billing records or testimony showing the services performed.
- Break down hours by task, issue, and timekeeper.
- Prove hourly rates and their reasonableness in the relevant market.
- Segregate recoverable from nonrecoverable work when required.
- Provide testimony supporting necessity and reasonableness, not just a bottom-line total.
- Ask the trial court for findings that correspond to the fee proof in the record.
Avoid the Appellate Problems Seen Here
- Do not rely on broad testimony that fees were “reasonable and necessary” without backup.
- Do not assume success on the merits will carry an underdeveloped fee record.
- Do not present only aspirational evidence that the adult child might work someday if current incapacity is the core issue.
- Do not overlook retroactivity exposure when advising the obligor parent.
- Do not leave credibility-sensitive factual disputes unsupported by contemporaneous records and third-party testimony.
Citation
Nunez v. Nichols, No. 03-24-00263-CV, ___ S.W.3d ___, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Austin Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
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