Waco Court Affirms Termination in Anders Appeal and Denies Counsel’s Withdrawal Absent Independent Good Cause

In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B., 10-26-00025-CV, April 30, 2026.

On appeal from 361st District Court of Brazos County, Texas

Synopsis

The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination after conducting the required independent Anders review and concluding the father’s appeal presented no nonfrivolous issue. The court also expressly held that the evidence was sufficient on Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and it denied appointed counsel’s motions to withdraw because an Anders filing, standing alone, is not independent good cause for withdrawal in parental-rights appeals under In re P.M.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family-law litigators, this opinion matters well beyond a single termination appeal. It reinforces two recurring appellate realities in child-protection litigation: first, endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E) will continue to receive focused appellate attention because of their collateral consequences under In re N.G.; second, appointed appellate counsel in parental-rights cases remain on the case through the petition-for-review stage unless they can show good cause beyond merely filing an Anders brief. Strategically, that affects trial preservation, appellate briefing, post-judgment counseling, and workload planning for lawyers handling CPS, SAPCR, conservatorship, and high-risk custody cases where abuse, instability, or service-plan noncompliance may become dispositive.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The father appealed an order terminating his parental rights to multiple children. The trial court found by clear and convincing evidence that he engaged in conduct falling within Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), and that termination was in the children’s best interest.

The record, as summarized by the court, reflected severe abuse allegations involving an eight-year-old child in the household who was not the direct subject of this particular appeal. Those allegations included scarring, dozens of bruises across the child’s body, injuries to intimate areas, visible marks consistent with restraint by zip ties, and a loop-shaped mark on the child’s back. The father did not deny the underlying conduct; instead, he characterized it as discipline and claimed to possess video support, which he never produced. The appellate court also noted that the other children were present in the home while the abuse occurred.

A newborn child was later removed at birth because the Department’s concerns remained ongoing, the parents were subject to bond conditions preventing contact with children, services had not initially been commenced in the original case, and the parents had not accepted responsibility. Although the father eventually completed services, the record showed that he did not acknowledge responsibility, had not fully addressed the Department’s concerns in therapy, and had not obtained any therapist recommendation for reunification. Meanwhile, the children were placed with their maternal grandmother, their needs were being met, and the Department’s permanency plan was adoption by the maternal grandparents so the children could remain together in a stable placement.

Appointed appellate counsel filed an Anders brief, representing that the appeal was frivolous after a diligent review of the record. The father was advised of his right to review the record and file a pro se response, and he did so. The court then undertook its own review of the entire record.

Issues Decided

• Whether the father’s appeal from the termination order presented any nonfrivolous issue after counsel filed an Anders brief.
• Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E).
• Whether appointed counsel in a parental-rights appeal may withdraw based solely on filing an Anders brief and asserting that the appeal is frivolous.

Rules Applied

The court relied on the familiar Anders framework, as adapted to parental-rights appeals, to assess whether appointed counsel had properly concluded that no arguable appellate issue existed. The opinion cites Anders v. California, In re E.L.Y., In re Schulman, Stafford v. State, Kelly v. State, High v. State, Penson v. Ohio, McCoy v. Court of Appeals, and Bledsoe v. State for the governing mechanics of Anders review and the appellate court’s obligation to independently examine the record.

On the substantive termination issues, the court applied Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), which address endangering conditions or surroundings and endangering conduct. It also invoked In re N.G., which requires meaningful appellate review of subsection (D) or (E) findings because those findings can carry future collateral consequences in later termination proceedings.

In discussing the sufficiency analysis, the court referenced authority recognizing that endangerment may be supported by a parent’s failure to complete a court-ordered service plan, missed visitation, and conduct exposing a child to instability and uncertainty, citing In re A.R.M. It also cited In re K.A.S. for the proposition that evidence relevant to subsections (D) and (E) is often interrelated and may be analyzed together.

Finally, on withdrawal, the court applied In re P.M. and Family Code § 107.016, emphasizing that in parental-rights appeals, an Anders motion to withdraw is not automatically supported by counsel’s determination that no arguable issue exists. Additional, independent good cause must be shown.

Application

The court first addressed counsel’s Anders submission procedurally. It concluded that the brief satisfied Anders requirements because it presented a professional evaluation of the case, set out the relevant procedural history and facts, cited the governing law, and explained why no reversible error could be identified. The court further confirmed that counsel had complied with the required notice obligations by providing the father with the brief, advising him of his right to review the record, and facilitating record access. Because the father filed a pro se response, the court considered that response as part of its review.

From there, the court conducted the independent examination required when an Anders brief is filed. That review encompassed the full record, counsel’s analysis, and the father’s pro se filing. After doing so, the court determined the appeal was wholly frivolous—that is, it lacked any basis in law or fact.

Importantly, the court did not stop at the generic Anders disposition. Because the trial court had terminated under subsections (D) and (E), the court expressly addressed the sufficiency of the evidence on those grounds in light of In re N.G. The opinion emphasized the severity of the physical abuse allegations, the father’s failure to deny the conduct, the presence of the other children in the home during the abuse, the continuing concerns that led to removal of the newborn at birth, the lack of accountability, and the absence of therapeutic progress sufficient to support reunification. Even though the father had completed services, the court treated completion alone as insufficient where the parent had not meaningfully addressed the underlying safety concerns. In that setting, the evidence adequately supported both endangerment predicates.

The court then turned to counsel’s motions to withdraw. Historically, Anders practice often included withdrawal motions as a matter of course. But the court emphasized that parental-rights appeals are different after In re P.M. Because counsel identified no ground for withdrawal other than the Anders filing itself, the court found there was no independent good cause. It therefore denied withdrawal and reminded counsel that, if the client seeks further review, counsel remains obligated to file a petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court that satisfies Anders standards.

Holding

The court held that the father’s appeal was wholly frivolous after its independent review of the entire record, counsel’s Anders brief, and the father’s pro se response. On that basis, it affirmed the termination order.

The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support termination under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). In doing so, it expressly complied with the heightened appellate obligation to address endangerment findings because of their future consequences.

Separately, the court held that appointed counsel was not entitled to withdraw merely because counsel filed an Anders brief and concluded there were no arguable grounds for appeal. Absent some additional showing of good cause, In re P.M. required denial of the motions to withdraw, leaving counsel responsible for further representation through any petition-for-review stage.

Practical Application

This opinion is a useful reminder that appellate strategy in termination cases begins in the trial court. If the Department pleads and proves subsections (D) and (E), counsel should expect those findings to receive specific appellate scrutiny even in an Anders posture, because courts cannot simply affirm on another predicate and ignore endangerment. For trial lawyers representing parents, that means the record must directly confront abuse evidence, environmental danger, household exposure, credibility gaps, service-plan performance, and—critically—acceptance of responsibility. Service completion without insight, remediation, or therapeutic buy-in is rarely enough.

For Department and child advocates, the opinion shows the continued value of building a record that ties the parent’s conduct not just to historical misconduct but to ongoing endangerment and future instability. Evidence that other children were exposed to abuse, that a newborn was removed because underlying risks remained unresolved, and that no clinician supported reunification can be especially powerful in sustaining both (D) and (E).

For appointed appellate counsel, the practical lesson is operational as much as doctrinal. In parental-rights cases, Anders does not automatically end the representation. Counsel should calendar potential petition-for-review deadlines at the outset, advise the client in writing about the continuing scope of representation, and avoid assuming that a court of appeals will grant withdrawal absent case-specific good cause. Firms and court-appointed practitioners should build that continuing obligation into staffing, budgeting, and file-closing procedures.

The opinion also has indirect relevance to private family litigation. Although it arises from a CPS termination case, the court’s treatment of abuse, instability, therapeutic non-remediation, and failure to accept responsibility reflects the same factual themes that often drive conservatorship restrictions, supervised possession, and best-interest determinations in private SAPCRs and divorce cases involving family violence or child abuse allegations. Trial lawyers should treat these facts as record-development priorities, not merely background noise.

Checklists

Preserving the Record on Endangerment Findings

• Require the trial record to address each pleaded termination predicate separately, especially subsections (D) and (E).
• Develop testimony on whether the child was directly harmed, exposed to harm, or lived in an environment shaped by abuse or instability.
• Elicit evidence connecting historical abuse to present and future risk.
• Address whether siblings or other children in the home witnessed or were exposed to the conduct.
• Obtain clear testimony from therapists, caseworkers, CASA, and placement witnesses on accountability, progress, and reunification prospects.
• Do not rely on service completion alone; build or attack evidence about insight, behavioral change, and safety remediation.

Defending Against Subsections (D) and (E)

• Contest the factual basis for abuse or endangerment allegations with actual evidence, not unsupported denials or promises of later proof.
• If discipline is asserted as an explanation, make sure the record squarely addresses proportionality, injuries, and statutory limits.
• Present corroborated evidence of therapy progress and changed behavior.
• Obtain expert or therapist testimony, if available, supporting safety and reunification.
• Show concrete protective changes in the home environment, caregivers, routines, and supervision.
• Address credibility problems directly, including prior inconsistent statements or delayed explanations.

Drafting and Filing Anders Briefs in Termination Appeals

• Ensure the brief contains a professional evaluation of the record, procedural history, facts, and pertinent authority.
• Include record citations sufficient to demonstrate a conscientious review.
• Specifically analyze subsection (D) and (E) findings when those grounds were found below.
• Document service of the Anders brief on the client.
• Inform the client in writing of the right to review the record and file a pro se response.
• Provide the client with the materials necessary to request access to the appellate record.
• Review and account for any pro se response before final disposition.

Managing Withdrawal and Post-Opinion Duties

• Do not assume an Anders filing establishes good cause for withdrawal in a parental-rights appeal.
• If withdrawal is sought, identify any independent basis beyond the absence of arguable issues.
• Calendar petition-for-review deadlines even after filing the Anders brief.
• Advise the client in writing that representation may continue through the Supreme Court stage.
• Be prepared to file a petition for review satisfying Anders standards if the client wishes to pursue further review.
• Incorporate In re P.M. obligations into internal appellate workflows and appointment protocols.

Using This Case in Private Family Litigation

• Use the opinion to frame arguments that abuse of one child can inform risk to other children in the household.
• Tie non-acknowledgment of abuse to ongoing best-interest and conservatorship concerns.
• Emphasize that nominal compliance with services or therapy does not equal remediation.
• Develop evidence showing instability, unsafe discipline, or unresolved violence as part of a best-interest presentation.
• In modification or restriction cases, focus on whether the parent has actually addressed the underlying conduct rather than merely completed formal requirements.

Citation

In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B., No. 10-26-00025-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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