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Waco Court Affirms Termination After Anders Review and Denies Appointed Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B., 10-26-00024-CV, April 30, 2026.

On appeal from 361st District Court of Brazos County, Texas

Synopsis

The Waco Court of Appeals affirmed termination after conducting its own Anders review and concluding the appeal was wholly frivolous. The court also reiterated an important procedural point for appointed appellate counsel in termination cases: filing an Anders brief, standing alone, is not good cause to withdraw, so counsel remains obligated to continue representation through a petition-for-review stage if the parent seeks further review.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a parental-rights termination appeal, its practical significance extends beyond CPS litigation. For Texas family-law litigators handling SAPCRs, custody modifications, conservatorship disputes, and any matter involving family violence, child endangerment, or unstable home conditions, the opinion underscores how appellate courts evaluate endangerment evidence under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), especially where the proof includes abuse of one child, failure to accept responsibility, incomplete therapeutic progress, and ongoing instability. It also matters for practitioners who accept appointments: in termination appeals, appointed counsel cannot assume that an Anders filing ends the representation, which affects docket management, client communications, and preservation of Supreme Court deadlines.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Father appealed orders terminating his parental rights to multiple children. The trial court found clear and convincing evidence supporting predicate grounds under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), along with best interest. Appellate counsel filed an Anders brief representing that, after a diligent review, no nonfrivolous appellate issue existed.

The record the court summarized was severe. The Department became involved after allegations of physical abuse of an eight-year-old child in the home, Z.T., who was not one of the children directly at issue on appeal. The evidence included scarring on the child’s arms and legs, fifty-two documented bruises across the body including the labia, marks on the wrists and ankles consistent with zip-tie restraint, and a loop-shaped mark on the lower back. Father did not deny the conduct outright; instead, he characterized it as discipline and claimed to possess video evidence, which he never produced.

The court also noted that the other children were present in the home while the abuse occurred. One child, B.B.T., was born after the initial case began and was removed at birth because the Department’s concerns remained unresolved, Father and Mother were subject to bond conditions prohibiting contact with children, services had not been timely commenced in the earlier case, and neither parent had taken accountability. After removal, the children were placed with their maternal grandmother, where their needs were being met, and the permanency plan was adoption by the maternal grandparents so the siblings could remain together in a stable placement.

As to services, the record showed Father completed them in a technical sense, but that did not carry the day. He still did not acknowledge responsibility, had not fully addressed the core concerns in therapy, and no therapist recommended reunification. Father filed a pro se response after receiving notice of his right to review the record and respond to counsel’s Anders brief.

Issues Decided

The court decided the following issues:

Rules Applied

The court relied on the familiar Anders framework, as adapted to parental-rights termination appeals in Texas. Under Anders v. California, appointed counsel who concludes an appeal is frivolous must file a brief providing a professional evaluation of the record and explaining why no arguable ground exists. The appellate court then must independently review the entire record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. The opinion cites Penson v. Ohio, McCoy v. Court of Appeals, In re Schulman, Stafford v. State, High v. State, and Kelly v. State for the mechanics of that review and notice procedure.

On the merits, the court applied Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). Subsection (D) addresses knowingly placing or allowing a child to remain in conditions or surroundings that endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being. Subsection (E) addresses engaging in conduct, or knowingly placing the child with persons who engage in conduct, that endangers the child’s physical or emotional well-being. The court also cited In re N.G., which requires appellate courts to address subsection (D) or (E) when affirming on either ground because of their collateral consequences in future termination litigation.

The court further relied on precedent recognizing that endangerment findings may be supported by a parent’s failure to complete or benefit from services, missed visits, and conduct exposing a child to instability and uncertainty, citing In re A.R.M. It also cited In re K.A.S. for the proposition that the evidence concerning subsections (D) and (E) is often interrelated and may be examined together.

Finally, on withdrawal, the court applied In re P.M. and Family Code § 107.016. Those authorities make clear that, in parental-rights termination cases, appointed counsel’s conclusion that an appeal lacks merit does not by itself constitute good cause for withdrawal in the court of appeals. Counsel’s duties may continue through the filing of a petition for review that satisfies Anders standards.

Application

The court’s analysis was straightforward but important. It first determined that counsel’s Anders submission was procedurally adequate: the brief gave a professional evaluation of the record, discussed the relevant law, and explained why no reversible issue existed. Counsel had also complied with the notice requirements by furnishing the brief to Father, advising him of the right to review the appellate record, and facilitating pro se access. The court then fulfilled its independent obligation to review the full record, including Father’s pro se response.

On the substantive termination grounds, the court did not stop at a generic statement that it had found no arguable issue. Because subsection (D) and (E) findings carry lasting consequences under In re N.G., the court expressly addressed evidentiary sufficiency. The abuse evidence concerning Z.T. was particularly significant, not only because of its severity but because the other children were present in the home and therefore exposed to the same dangerous environment and parental conduct. The court treated Father’s failure to deny responsibility in any meaningful way, his attempt to reframe the abuse as discipline, his failure to produce supposedly exculpatory evidence, and his lack of accountability in therapy as reinforcing the endangerment findings.

The court also considered the broader context of instability. The newborn was removed because the underlying dangers remained unresolved, bond conditions prevented Father from being around children, and there had been no meaningful progress early in the case. Although Father had technically completed services, the court focused on whether he had actually benefitted from them. The absence of any therapeutic recommendation for reunification, coupled with Father’s continuing refusal to accept responsibility, supported the conclusion that a sufficiency challenge to subsection (D) and (E) findings would be frivolous.

The withdrawal issue was handled separately. The court acknowledged that counsel had filed motions to withdraw in keeping with older Anders practice, but under In re P.M., that is no longer enough in termination cases. Because counsel offered no ground for withdrawal other than the Anders filing itself, the court denied the motions and reminded counsel that, if Father wished to pursue further review, counsel remained obligated to file an Anders-compliant petition for review in the Texas Supreme Court.

Holding

The court held that, after an independent review of the entire record, the appeal was wholly frivolous and presented no arguable basis in law or fact for reversal. It therefore affirmed the termination order.

The court further held that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s findings under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). In doing so, the court relied on the severe physical-abuse evidence, the presence of the other children in the home during that abuse, Father’s failure to accept responsibility, the lack of meaningful therapeutic progress, and the absence of any recommendation for reunification.

The court also held that appointed counsel’s filing of an Anders brief does not, by itself, establish good cause to withdraw in a parental-rights termination appeal. Because counsel identified no additional basis for withdrawal, the motions to withdraw were denied, and counsel’s continuing obligations remained in place through any petition-for-review stage.

Practical Application

For trial lawyers, this case is another reminder that endangerment proof is rarely siloed. Abuse directed at one child can provide compelling support for endangerment findings as to siblings and newborns, particularly when the record shows shared household exposure, unresolved parental conduct, and a refusal to acknowledge responsibility. In termination cases, counsel should build a record that links abusive conduct, home environment, therapeutic nonprogress, and future risk; appellate courts are receptive to viewing those facts as a single evidentiary narrative under both subsection (D) and (E).

For appellate lawyers, the opinion reinforces two strategic points. First, where subsection (D) or (E) findings are in play, sufficiency analysis matters even in an Anders posture because In re N.G. requires meaningful review of those grounds. Second, appointed counsel should not treat Anders as an exit mechanism. Unless separate good cause exists, representation continues, which means calendaring petition-for-review deadlines, advising the client accordingly, and preparing a Supreme Court filing if requested.

For non-CPS family litigation, the reasoning has spillover value. Allegations of excessive corporal punishment, restraint, family violence, untreated mental-health concerns, or chronic instability routinely surface in conservatorship and modification disputes. This opinion shows how courts weigh not only the underlying acts but also post-incident behavior: denial, minimization, failure to benefit from services, and absence of reliable professional support for reunification or expanded possession. Those same dynamics can shape best-interest and possession analyses even outside Chapter 161.

Checklists

Preserving an Endangerment Record for Appeal

Defending Against Subsection (D) and (E) Findings

Handling Anders in Termination Appeals

Using This Opinion in Conservatorship and Modification Cases

Citation

In the Interest of Baby Boy T; In the Interest of L.B., S.B., and B.B., No. 10-26-00024-CV, 10-26-00025-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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