Tenth Court Holds Family Code Section 161.211(a) Bars Untimely Bill of Review Attacking Termination Order

In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child, 10-24-00197-CV, April 30, 2026.

On appeal from 74th District Court of McLennan County, Texas

Synopsis

The Tenth Court of Appeals held that Texas Family Code section 161.211(a) barred a father’s bill of review filed more than six months after a termination order signed under section 161.002(b), even though he argued he was actually an adjudicated father and the termination rested on legal and factual mistake. Because the bill of review was filed well outside the six-month deadline, and because no summary-judgment response preserved those arguments in the trial court, summary judgment for the Department was proper.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion matters well beyond termination practice. For Texas family-law litigators, it is a sharp reminder that statutory finality rules can override otherwise familiar equitable remedies, and that preservation failures at the summary-judgment stage can foreclose appellate rescue. The lesson translates directly to SAPCR, divorce, custody-modification, and even property litigation: where the Legislature has imposed a hard deadline or jurisdictional bar, arguments about factual error, legal misclassification, lack of counsel, or defective procedure may become irrelevant if they are not asserted in the correct vehicle and within the prescribed time. In the parentage context especially—which often overlaps with divorce, custody, and support litigation—counsel must reconcile competing orders across courts immediately, because a mistaken “alleged father” designation in one proceeding can become effectively unassailable once the statutory review window closes.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The procedural posture drove the result. In June 2020, the Office of the Attorney General filed a parentage action naming Appellant as the father of the child, A.A.C.C. After a hearing in November 2020, the associate judge in the 414th District Court signed a written order on May 26, 2022 establishing the parent-child relationship between Appellant and the child.

Meanwhile, in July 2021, the Department filed a separate suit in the 74th District Court seeking termination of Mother’s and Appellant’s parental rights. In that termination suit, Appellant was identified as the child’s “alleged” father. On July 26, 2022, the associate judge signed a final order terminating Appellant’s parental rights under Family Code section 161.002(b), the provision addressing termination of an alleged father’s rights in specified circumstances.

Appellant did not file a timely direct appeal from that termination order. Instead, on December 8, 2023—well over a year later—he filed a petition for bill of review attacking the termination judgment. The Department moved for traditional summary judgment, arguing that Family Code section 161.211(a) barred any direct or collateral attack brought more than six months after the termination order was signed. Appellant did not file a written response to the summary-judgment motion. The trial court granted the Department’s motion and dismissed the bill of review, and Appellant appealed.

Issues Decided

The court addressed, in substance, the following issues:

• Whether Family Code section 161.211(a) bars a bill of review filed more than six months after a termination order signed under section 161.002(b).
• Whether Appellant could avoid the six-month bar by arguing that he was actually an adjudicated father rather than an alleged father, and that the termination order therefore rested on legal or factual mistake.
• Whether Appellant could obtain reversal based on complaints about evidentiary sufficiency, lack of appointed counsel, or invalid waiver of service when he filed no written response to the Department’s summary-judgment motion.
• Whether the Department’s summary-judgment evidence was legally sufficient to establish the section 161.211(a) bar as a matter of law.

Rules Applied

The court relied primarily on the following authorities:

• Texas Family Code section 161.211(a):
  A termination order involving a person who was personally served, executed a relinquishment or waiver, or whose rights were terminated under section 161.002(b) is not subject to direct or collateral attack after the sixth month after the order was signed.

• Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166a(c):
  In a traditional summary judgment, the movant must conclusively establish entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

• Community Health Systems Professional Services Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. 2017):
  De novo standard of review for summary judgments.

• KCM Financial LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015):
  Summary-judgment burdens.

• Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Grant, 73 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2002):
  Movant must establish no genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.

• Palacio v. AON Properties, Inc., 110 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. App.—Waco 2003, no pet.):
  If the summary-judgment order does not specify the ground, appellate courts affirm if any asserted ground is meritorious.

• McConnell v. Southside Independent School District, 858 S.W.2d 337 (Tex. 1993):
  Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written response are not considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.

• City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Authority, 589 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1979):
  A nonmovant may not raise new reasons on appeal for why summary judgment should have been denied; absent a response, appellate review is generally limited to whether the movant’s proof is legally sufficient.

• C.M.C. v. Texas Department of Family & Protective Services, 696 S.W.3d 185 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, pet. denied, cert. denied, 146 S. Ct. 213 (2025)):
  Section 161.211(a) imposes a six-month jurisdictional time bar that cannot be waived.

Application

The Tenth Court approached the case through two converging procedural principles: statutory finality and error preservation. The Department’s summary-judgment theory was straightforward. It needed to show that the termination order at issue was one signed under section 161.002(b), and that no direct or collateral attack had been filed within six months after the order was signed. Its proof did exactly that. The termination order itself reflected that Appellant’s rights were terminated under section 161.002(b), and the bill-of-review petition—judicially noticed by the trial court at Appellant’s request—was file-stamped December 8, 2023, long after six months had passed from the July 26, 2022 termination order.

Appellant attempted on appeal to reframe the case as one about misclassification: he argued that because a separate parentage order had adjudicated him the father, he could not lawfully have been terminated as an “alleged father” under section 161.002(b), and therefore section 161.211(a) should not protect the termination judgment from later attack. But that theory never made it into a written response to the summary-judgment motion. That omission was fatal. Under McConnell and Clear Creek Basin, the appellate court could not consider new substantive reasons for denying summary judgment when those reasons were not expressly presented in the trial court.

That left Appellant with only a narrow appellate argument: that the Department’s own summary-judgment evidence was legally insufficient. The court rejected that contention because the evidence conclusively established both required facts—the statutory basis of the termination order and the untimeliness of the collateral attack. Once those facts were established, section 161.211(a) controlled. The court also treated the statute as a jurisdictional time bar, citing C.M.C., which further undermined any attempt to invoke equitable bill-of-review principles after the deadline expired.

The court therefore did not need to reach the merits of Appellant’s complaints about the original termination proceeding—legal and factual sufficiency, failure to appoint counsel, or invalid waiver of service. Those complaints were either unpreserved in the summary-judgment posture or foreclosed by the statute’s six-month bar.

Holding

The court held that Family Code section 161.211(a) barred Appellant’s bill of review because the challenged termination order was signed under section 161.002(b), and the bill of review was filed more than six months after the order was signed. On that basis alone, the Department was entitled to traditional summary judgment.

The court further held that Appellant could not avoid summary judgment by raising, for the first time on appeal, arguments that he was actually an adjudicated father, that the termination order was legally or factually mistaken, that counsel should have been appointed, or that his waiver of service was invalid. Because he filed no written response to the Department’s motion, those theories were not preserved as grounds for reversal.

Finally, the court held that the Department’s summary-judgment evidence was legally sufficient. The record conclusively showed a July 26, 2022 termination under section 161.002(b) and a December 8, 2023 bill of review, which made the collateral attack untimely as a matter of law.

Practical Application

For practitioners representing parents, this case is a deadline case first and a merits case second. If a termination order is signed under section 161.002(b), counsel should assume that any challenge—direct or collateral—must be evaluated and pursued inside the six-month window set by section 161.211(a). Do not assume that a later-discovered parentage order, a misnomer in the pleadings, defective waiver language, or even serious due-process complaints will keep the courthouse door open indefinitely. This opinion underscores that the Legislature’s preference for finality in termination cases is extraordinarily strong.

The case also highlights a recurring inter-court risk in family practice: parentage and termination proceedings may develop on parallel tracks in different courts. Lawyers handling divorce, SAPCR, support, or parentage matters should immediately check for related DFPS litigation and should place parentage adjudications squarely before the court in the termination case. If there is a mismatch between a parentage order and the Department’s characterization of a parent as merely “alleged,” that issue must be raised promptly, explicitly, and in writing.

For appellate and post-judgment counsel, the opinion is equally important as a preservation case. When the Department files a traditional motion for summary judgment based on section 161.211(a), a nonmovant’s failure to file a written response drastically narrows the appellate path. You may still challenge the legal sufficiency of the movant’s proof, but you cannot use the appeal to introduce new substantive reasons why summary judgment should have been denied. In other words, if your theory is “the statute does not apply because the order was substantively wrong,” that theory must be preserved in the trial court.

This reasoning also has broader strategic implications in divorce and custody litigation. Family lawyers often rely on equitable mechanisms—motions to set aside, restricted appeals, bills of review, collateral attacks on void orders—but this case is a reminder that when a statute creates a specialized finality regime, equity yields. The first task is not simply identifying error; it is identifying the correct procedural vehicle and filing deadline.

Checklists

When Reviewing a Termination Order for Post-Judgment Remedies

• Confirm the exact statutory ground stated in the signed termination order.
• Determine whether the order expressly terminates rights under Family Code section 161.002(b).
• Calendar the six-month deadline under Family Code section 161.211(a) from the date the order was signed.
• Evaluate all available appellate and post-judgment remedies immediately, including direct appeal, restricted appeal, and any motion practice that must occur before plenary power expires.
• Do not assume a bill of review remains available after six months if section 161.211(a) applies.

When Parentage Orders and DFPS Litigation Overlap

• Search for any OAG parentage, support, or SAPCR orders involving the same child and parent.
• Obtain certified copies of any adjudication of parentage before the final termination hearing.
• File the parentage order in the termination case record.
• Raise in writing any inconsistency between the parentage adjudication and the Department’s allegation that the parent is only an “alleged father.”
• Request express rulings and ensure the final order accurately reflects the parent’s legal status.

When Responding to a Summary-Judgment Motion in a Family Case

• File a written response before the hearing deadline.
• State every reason the motion should be denied; do not rely on oral argument alone.
• Attach or cite competent summary-judgment evidence supporting each defense or avoidance theory.
• If the movant relies on a statutory bar, expressly argue why the statute does not apply on your facts.
• Preserve complaints about service, counsel, due process, and factual misclassification in the written response.

To Avoid the Nonmovant’s Outcome in A.A.C.C.

• Do not let a termination order sit unchallenged past the statutory review deadline.
• Do not assume a legal or factual mistake in the original judgment defeats a statutory finality provision.
• Do not raise dispositive theories for the first time on appeal.
• Do not ignore the distinction between attacking the merits of the original termination and defending against a summary-judgment motion in a later bill-of-review proceeding.
• Do not overlook judicially noticeable filings that may conclusively establish untimeliness.

For Trial Counsel Protecting the Record

• Verify whether your client has been appointed counsel where required and object on the record if not.
• Scrutinize any waiver of service or waiver of interest for statutory and constitutional adequacy.
• Make sure all defects are presented to the trial court in a timely written filing.
• If a final order contains a material legal error, pursue direct review immediately rather than banking on collateral relief.
• Build a record that clearly identifies dates, service events, parentage status, and statutory bases for relief.

Citation

In the Interest of A.A.C.C., a Child, No. 10-24-00197-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 30, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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