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Eleventh Court Strikes Repealed Predicate Ground but Affirms Termination in Anders Appeal

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child, 11-25-00316-CV, April 23, 2026.

On appeal from 446th District Court, Ector County, Texas

Synopsis

In this Anders termination appeal, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held that no nonfrivolous appellate issue existed because the record contained legally sufficient support for termination under Family Code section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), as well as best interest. But because the trial court also relied on repealed subsection (O) after the effective date of the 2025 amendments, the court modified the order to delete that void predicate finding, affirmed the order as modified, and denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a parental-rights termination case, its procedural lessons reach well beyond CPS litigation. For family-law litigators handling SAPCRs, conservatorship modifications, custody restrictions, and even divorce cases with child-related findings, G.L.M. is a reminder that statutory amendments can immediately invalidate legacy pleadings, charge language, and proposed orders if the case remains pending after the effective date. It also reinforces the continuing appellate significance of endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E), which can have collateral consequences in later custody litigation, and it underscores that appointed counsel in termination matters may remain obligated through a petition-for-review stage even after an Anders affirmance in the court of appeals.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights to G.L.M. after finding three predicate grounds: endangering conditions under section 161.001(b)(1)(D), endangering conduct under section 161.001(b)(1)(E), and failure to comply with a court-ordered service plan under former section 161.001(b)(1)(O). The court also found termination to be in the child’s best interest.

On appeal, appointed counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw, representing that no arguable issues existed. The Eleventh Court noted that counsel had complied with the procedural requirements associated with Anders practice by furnishing the mother with the brief, motion, explanatory letter, and appellate record, and by advising her of the right to respond. The mother filed no pro se response.

The appellate court nevertheless conducted its own review of the record. In doing so, it focused particularly on the evidentiary basis for the endangerment findings. The opinion states that the evidence showed a pattern of drug and alcohol abuse by the mother, together with related dangers to the child, sufficient to create a substantial risk of harm and to render the mother incapable of parenting.

The wrinkle in the case was statutory. The Legislature had repealed subsection (O) in 2025, and the amendment applied to suits pending on or after the effective date. Because the final hearing began on September 16, 2025, and the final order was signed on September 25, 2025—after the amendment took effect—the subsection (O) finding was no longer legally available. That made the trial court’s reliance on former subsection (O) improper, even though other grounds remained supported.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court relied on the familiar termination framework in Family Code section 161.001(b): at least one valid predicate ground plus best interest, both supported by clear and convincing evidence. Here, the relevant surviving grounds were subsections (D) and (E), and the court expressly tied its discussion to the heightened appellate importance of those two endangerment findings under In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234–35 (Tex. 2019), because of their due-process and due-course implications.

For the evidentiary sufficiency of endangerment, the court cited In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024), and In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex. 2009), recognizing that a parent’s pattern of substance abuse can constitute endangering conduct and can support a conclusion that the parent is unable to safely parent the child.

On the statutory-amendment issue, the court applied the 2025 legislative act repealing section 161.001(b)(1)(O), including the session law’s applicability provision stating that the amendment applies to suits affecting the parent-child relationship pending on or after the effective date. Because this case was pending after that date, subsection (O) no longer supplied a lawful predicate ground.

As to remedy, the court invoked Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43.2(b), allowing modification of the judgment, and relied on prior authorities permitting appellate courts to modify termination orders to delete unsupported or impermissible predicate findings while otherwise affirming the judgment.

Finally, on counsel’s motion to withdraw, the court applied Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), together with In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008), and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), to evaluate the adequacy of the Anders filing. But it denied withdrawal under In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27–28 (Tex. 2016), which holds that appointed counsel’s duty in parental-termination cases generally continues through the exhaustion of appeals and that a motion to withdraw in the court of appeals may be premature absent additional grounds.

Application

The Eleventh Court took the standard Anders path but did not treat the appeal as a rubber stamp. After confirming that counsel had complied with the notice and record-delivery requirements, the court independently reviewed the entire record. It agreed that no arguable appellate issue existed as to the core termination decision because the evidence of the mother’s drug and alcohol abuse, and the resulting danger to the child, adequately supported the endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E). Once those findings and best interest were supported by clear and convincing evidence, the affirmance of termination itself followed.

But the court did not stop there. It recognized that one predicate ground in the order—former subsection (O)—was legally defective because it had been repealed before the final hearing and final order. This is the important appellate move in the case: even in an Anders posture, and even where the invalid predicate does not change the ultimate disposition, the court treated the order as needing correction so that it reflected only findings still authorized by law. Rather than reverse and remand, the court used its power to modify the judgment and simply deleted the void subsection (O) finding.

The court then addressed counsel’s request to withdraw. Although it agreed that the appeal lacked merit, it held that appointed counsel could not exit the representation at that stage solely because the court of appeals had completed its Anders review. Under In re P.M., appointed counsel in termination cases generally remains responsible through the petition-for-review process in the Texas Supreme Court. So the court affirmed the judgment as modified but denied the motion to withdraw as premature.

Holding

The court held that the mother’s appeal was frivolous after an independent Anders review because no nonfrivolous issue could be identified. Specifically, clear and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s findings under section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), as well as its best-interest determination. On that basis, the termination of parental rights was substantively affirmed.

The court separately held that the trial court’s finding under former section 161.001(b)(1)(O) could not stand. Because subsection (O) had been repealed and the case was pending after the amendment’s effective date, that predicate finding was void. The proper remedy was to modify the final order to delete the subsection (O) finding and affirm the order as modified.

The court also held that appointed appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw was premature. Under In re P.M., appointed counsel’s duties in parental-rights termination cases generally extend through exhaustion of appellate remedies, including the filing of a petition for review that satisfies Anders standards if necessary. The motion to withdraw was therefore denied.

Practical Application

For trial lawyers, G.L.M. is a blunt warning to scrub termination pleadings, jury charges, and proposed decrees for superseded statutory language. If your case was pending on or after the effective date of the 2025 amendment, a finding under former subsection (O) is not merely weak—it is void. That matters not only in CPS cases but in any family-law matter where practitioners recycle forms or proposed findings across statutory changes.

For appellate lawyers, the case confirms that Anders review in termination appeals remains a genuine merits screen, not a ministerial exercise. If the record supports (D) and (E), the court is likely to affirm even while cleaning up an erroneous additional predicate. But because In re N.G. elevates the significance of (D) and (E), counsel should still examine those grounds carefully before concluding that no arguable issue exists.

For lawyers handling custody and modification litigation, the opinion is also a reminder that endangerment findings carry downstream consequences. A parent saddled with affirmed (D) or (E) findings may face substantial barriers in later conservatorship or access disputes, and those findings can shape risk assessments in related private-family-law cases. Strategic appellate attention to endangerment findings remains essential.

For appointed counsel, the case reiterates a practice point too often overlooked: a successful Anders filing in the court of appeals does not automatically end representation. Unless some additional basis for withdrawal exists, counsel should expect to remain in the case through the petition-for-review stage and plan client communication, deadlines, and file management accordingly.

Checklists

Audit Termination Grounds After Statutory Amendments

Preserve and Defend Endangerment Findings

Draft Orders That Will Survive Appeal

Handle Anders Termination Appeals Correctly

Avoid the Non-Prevailing Party’s Appellate Position

Citation

In the Interest of G.L.M., a Child, No. 11-25-00316-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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