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Eleventh Court Affirms Termination of Mother’s Rights to Eight Children After Anders Review

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of P.S.R.F., D.M.R.F., D.A.R., P.R.R., B.I.R., B.E.R., B.L.R., and Y.R.R., Children, 11-25-00315-CV, April 23, 2026.

On appeal from 446th District Court, Ector County, Texas

Synopsis

After an Anders review, the Eleventh Court of Appeals held there was no nonfrivolous basis to challenge termination of the mother’s parental rights to eight children and affirmed the order. The court specifically noted record support for the endangerment findings under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) based on the mother’s pattern of drug abuse and related danger to the children, but denied appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw as premature under In re P.M. because appointed counsel’s duties continue through exhaustion of appeals.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a termination case rather than a divorce or SAPCR modification, it has immediate significance for Texas family-law litigators across custody litigation. First, it reinforces the continued appellate centrality of endangerment findings under Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), which carry collateral consequences and therefore demand careful preservation, proof, and appellate treatment. Second, the opinion is a practical reminder that substance-abuse evidence, especially when framed as a continuing pattern that impairs parenting and exposes children to danger, remains among the strongest pathways to endangerment findings in both termination and conservatorship disputes. Third, for appointed appellate counsel, the case underscores that an Anders filing does not automatically end representation in parental-rights appeals; under In re P.M., counsel must generally remain in the case through the petition-for-review stage absent additional grounds for withdrawal.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The trial court terminated the mother’s parental rights to eight children after a final termination hearing. The termination order rested on predicate findings under Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), and (O), along with a best-interest finding under Section 161.001(b)(2). As summarized by the court of appeals, the record showed a pattern of drug abuse by the mother, together with related dangers to the children, sufficient to present a substantial risk of harm and to render her incapable of parenting.

On appeal, the mother’s court-appointed counsel did not raise a merits challenge in the conventional sense. Instead, counsel filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw, representing that after a professional review of the record and governing law, no arguable appellate issue existed. Counsel complied with the applicable Anders procedures by providing the mother the brief, motion, explanatory letter, and access to the appellate record, and by advising her of the right to respond pro se. The mother did not file a pro se response.

The Eleventh Court then conducted its own independent review of the record. That review focused not only on the usual Anders inquiry—whether any nonfrivolous appellate issue existed—but also on the due-process-sensitive treatment of endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E). The court ultimately agreed that the appeal lacked merit, affirmed the judgment, and separately addressed counsel’s request to withdraw.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court applied the Anders framework as adapted to parental-rights appeals. Under Anders v. California, and Texas authorities such as In re Schulman and Kelly v. State, appointed counsel may file a brief explaining why the appeal presents no arguable issue, but the appellate court must still independently review the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.

The opinion also relied on Family Code Section 161.001, which governs involuntary termination. The trial court’s predicate findings were under subsections (D), (E), (N), and (O), with best interest under subsection (b)(2). The court noted the 2025 legislative renumbering of certain provisions, including the movement of former subsection (P) to subsection (O), and clarified that the applicable version was the one in effect while the case was pending below.

As to the substantive endangerment analysis, the court cited In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. 2024), and In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336 (Tex. 2009), for the proposition that a parent’s pattern of drug abuse can support endangerment findings when it creates a substantial risk of harm and reflects parental incapacity. The court also cited In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019), underscoring the special appellate significance of subsection (D) and (E) findings because of their future consequences.

On counsel’s withdrawal request, the court applied In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24 (Tex. 2016), and Family Code Section 107.016(2). Those authorities establish that, in termination cases, appointed counsel’s duties ordinarily continue through exhaustion of appeals and that a motion to withdraw filed in the court of appeals may be premature absent additional grounds.

Application

The Eleventh Court followed the standard Anders sequence with notable care. It first confirmed that appointed counsel had satisfied the procedural prerequisites by filing a professionally conscientious brief, serving the client, supplying the relevant records, and advising the mother of her rights. With those procedural protections in place, the court turned to its own review of the appellate record rather than simply accepting counsel’s conclusion.

In conducting that review, the court homed in on the endangerment findings. That focus is not incidental in termination appeals. Since In re N.G., courts must meaningfully address subsections (D) and (E) when they are implicated because those findings can affect a parent’s rights in future proceedings. Here, the court concluded that the record reflected more than isolated misconduct. It reflected a pattern of drug abuse accompanied by circumstances that endangered the children and demonstrated the mother’s inability to parent safely. Framed that way, the evidence aligned with established Supreme Court guidance recognizing that persistent drug use may constitute endangering conduct, particularly when it exposes children to instability or danger and undermines parental functioning.

Having found no arguable challenge to the endangerment findings, the court likewise agreed there was no nonfrivolous appellate issue as to the remaining predicate grounds or the best-interest determination. The opinion is concise, but its logic is straightforward: once the court independently determined the record supported the key findings and presented no viable appellate argument, affirmance followed.

The court then pivoted to a separate issue that Texas appellate practitioners in this space cannot ignore: withdrawal. Even though counsel correctly concluded the appeal was frivolous, that did not mean counsel’s representation ended at the intermediate appellate stage. Under In re P.M., appointed counsel in parental-rights termination cases ordinarily remains obligated to continue representation through further review, including a petition for review in the Supreme Court of Texas if necessary. Accordingly, the court denied withdrawal as premature.

Holding

The Eleventh Court held that, after an independent Anders review, the mother’s appeal was frivolous and without merit. The court affirmed the trial court’s termination order because the record supported the statutory grounds found below, with specific emphasis on subsections (D) and (E). The court stated that the mother’s pattern of drug abuse, together with related dangers to the children, created a substantial risk of harm and rendered her incapable of parenting.

The court also held that appointed counsel’s motion to withdraw should be denied. Even though counsel complied with Anders and correctly determined that no nonfrivolous issue existed, the motion was premature under In re P.M. because appointed counsel’s duties in parental-rights cases generally continue through exhaustion of appellate remedies.

Practical Application

For trial lawyers, this opinion is another reminder that drug-use evidence is most persuasive when developed as a pattern rather than a series of disconnected incidents. In termination litigation, and often in high-conflict conservatorship litigation, the difference between merely “bad facts” and legally sufficient endangerment evidence is the narrative of continuing conduct: repeated use, resulting instability, exposure of children to danger, noncompliance with services, and resulting parental incapacity. If you represent the petitioner, build that chain deliberately. If you represent the parent, break it deliberately.

For appellate lawyers, the case confirms that Anders review in termination appeals remains active and substantive, especially as to subsection (D) and (E) findings. A conclusory no-merit brief is not enough; counsel must still account for the special significance of endangerment findings and ensure strict compliance with Anders service and notice requirements. And just as importantly, counsel should not assume that affirmance will be accompanied by leave to withdraw.

In divorce and nontermination custody litigation, the opinion still matters. Allegations of substance abuse frequently drive temporary-orders strategy, restrictions on possession, supervised access, geographic limitations, and sole-managing-conservatorship requests. This case reinforces the kinds of proof that appellate courts view as compelling when substance abuse is tied to actual danger and impaired parenting. The same evidentiary architecture often determines outcomes in modifications and emergency relief proceedings, even though the governing legal standard differs from termination.

Practitioners should also take note of the statutory-renumbering comment. When briefing Family Code predicate grounds, especially in cases straddling statutory amendments, identify the version in force when the suit was pending and cite carefully. Sloppy statutory references can create unnecessary confusion in briefing and at submission.

Checklists

Building an Endangerment Record for the Petitioner

Defending a Parent Against Endangerment Findings

Preparing an Anders Brief in a Termination Appeal

Avoiding a Premature Withdrawal Request

Trial-Level Preservation for Future Appeal

Citation

In the Interest of P.S.R.F., D.M.R.F., D.A.R., P.R.R., B.I.R., B.E.R., B.L.R., and Y.R.R., Children, No. 11-25-00315-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—Eastland Apr. 23, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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