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Fourth Court of Appeals Dismisses Appeal of Protective Order Denial and Visitation Modification as Non-Appealable Interlocutory Orders

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

A.C. v. S.G.A., 04-25-00761-CV, April 15, 2026.

On appeal from 438th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Synopsis

The Fourth Court of Appeals held it lacked jurisdiction to review an order denying a protective order application and modifying visitation where a related SAPCR and foreign custody/support order registration remained pending. In that procedural posture, both rulings were interlocutory, and no statute authorized an immediate appeal.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family law litigators, this opinion is a clean reminder that appellate timing in protective-order and access litigation is driven by the procedural posture of the underlying family case, not by the practical urgency of the relief sought. When possession, access, or support issues remain embedded in a pending SAPCR, rulings denying protection or adjusting visitation may be unappealable temporary or interlocutory orders, which has direct consequences in divorce cases involving children, post-decree modification proceedings, interstate custody disputes, and any matter in which protective-order relief is pursued alongside ongoing conservatorship or access litigation.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The appellant, proceeding pro se, filed an application for protective order on October 3, 2025. After a hearing, she filed a notice of appeal from the trial court’s oral denial of that application. The trial court later signed a written order on December 4, 2025 denying a temporary protective order and modifying visitation orders.

The clerk’s record reflected the appellant’s own representations that two related matters were still pending in the trial court: a registration of a foreign custody/support order from Lucas County, Ohio, and a SAPCR that had been stayed. Despite those pending proceedings, the protective-order request was filed as a separate action. The appellate court treated those pending family-law proceedings as dispositive for jurisdictional purposes because they meant the December 4 order did not finally dispose of all claims and parties and instead operated within an ongoing family-law framework.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Texas appellate courts generally have jurisdiction only over final judgments unless a statute expressly authorizes an interlocutory appeal. The court cited McFadin v. Broadway Coffeehouse, LLC, 539 S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. 2018), for that baseline finality principle.

The court also relied on Texas Family Code section 81.009(c), which provides that a protective order rendered against a party in a SAPCR may not be appealed until the order providing for child support, possession, or access becomes a final, appealable order. Although the order here denied protective relief rather than granting it, the court used section 81.009(c) and related authority to confirm that protective-order rulings tied to an ongoing SAPCR are not immediately appealable.

The court further cited In re A.J.F., No. 05-06-01514-CV, 2007 WL 465950, at 1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 14, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.), which dismissed an attempted appeal from a protective order rendered in a still-pending SAPCR, and In re B.V., No. 04-21-00086-CV, 2021 WL 2814896, at 2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio July 7, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.), which recognized that an order restricting visitation and possession by modifying prior temporary orders in a pending SAPCR is itself a non-appealable interlocutory order.

Finally, the court proceeded under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42.3(a), which permits dismissal where the appellate court lacks jurisdiction after notice and an opportunity to respond.

Application

The court’s analysis was straightforward and procedural. It began with the appellant’s own description of the underlying litigation landscape: a still-pending registration proceeding involving an Ohio custody/support order and a still-pending SAPCR. Once those representations were accepted, the December 4 order could not be treated as a final judgment because it did not conclude the family-law controversy between the parties. Instead, it functioned as an interim ruling entered against the backdrop of unresolved conservatorship, possession, access, and support issues.

That procedural posture controlled both aspects of the appeal. As to the denial of protective relief, the court viewed the order as interlocutory and found no statute authorizing immediate appellate review. The court’s citation to Family Code section 81.009(c) underscored that protective-order appellate rights are delayed when the dispute is bound up with a SAPCR and child-related final orders have not yet been rendered. As to visitation, the court characterized the December 4 ruling as merely modifying prior temporary orders in the pending SAPCR, which under established authority is not independently appealable.

The court had previously issued a show-cause order identifying the apparent jurisdictional defect and inviting a written response. When the appellant failed to respond, nothing in the record displaced the conclusion that the order was nonfinal and nonappealable. Dismissal followed.

Holding

The Fourth Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the attempted appeal from the denial of the protective-order application because the ruling was an interlocutory order entered while related family-law proceedings remained pending. In that setting, the order was not a final judgment, and no statute authorized immediate appeal.

The court separately held that the portion of the December 4, 2025 order modifying visitation was likewise nonappealable because it constituted an interlocutory modification of temporary orders in a pending SAPCR. On that basis as well, appellate jurisdiction was absent.

Practical Application

This case matters less for any new doctrinal development than for its sharp procedural warning. Family lawyers routinely confront emergency orders that feel dispositive in real time: denial of protection, supervised-access changes, geographic restrictions, suspension of possession, or temporary modifications following allegations of family violence. But unless the order is final or specifically made appealable by statute, the court of appeals may have no jurisdiction, even where the practical consequences are immediate and severe.

In active SAPCRs, counsel should assume that orders affecting possession and access are temporary and interlocutory unless the record clearly establishes finality. That is especially true where the trial court is simultaneously handling registration of a foreign custody order, enforcement proceedings, protective-order requests, or modification claims. Filing a notice of appeal from such an order may waste time, increase expense, and distract from the remedies that actually matter in the short term, such as mandamus analysis, emergency trial-court relief, clarification of the docket, severance where available, or moving the underlying case to a final appealable disposition.

The opinion also highlights a recurring structural issue: filing a protective-order application as a “separate action” does not necessarily create an immediately appealable pathway if the dispute remains substantively tied to a pending SAPCR. Practitioners should evaluate whether the requested relief is functionally part of the broader child-related case and whether Family Code section 81.009(c) or finality principles will delay appellate review.

In interstate cases, the same caution applies. When a foreign custody order has been registered and issues of possession or support remain unresolved in Texas, interim rulings entered during that process may not support an immediate appeal. Counsel should frame strategy around preserving error, building a record, and obtaining a prompt merits setting rather than assuming appellate jurisdiction exists.

Checklists

Evaluate Appealability Before Filing the Notice of Appeal

Protective-Order Jurisdiction Screening in Family Cases

Handling Temporary Visitation Modifications

Build a Record That Clarifies Procedural Posture

Avoid the Non-Prevailing Party’s Procedural Misstep

Citation

A.C. v. S.G.A., No. 04-25-00761-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 15, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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