Fourth Court of Appeals Affirms Termination of Mother’s Parental Rights Based on Drug Abuse and Endangerment

In re H.R.J., J.G.J., T.J.P., and L.P., 04-25-00641-CV, April 15, 2026.

On appeal from 365th Judicial District Court, Zavala County, Texas

Synopsis

The Fourth Court of Appeals affirmed termination of Mother’s parental rights, holding the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support endangerment findings under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E), as well as the best-interest finding under § 161.001(b)(2). The court relied on evidence of ongoing drug abuse, multiple prior removals tied to addiction, and Mother’s decision to place one child with a father despite a protective order protecting that child from him.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a termination case, its practical significance extends well beyond CPS litigation. For Texas family-law litigators handling SAPCRs, modifications, protective-order matters, and contested conservatorship disputes, the opinion reinforces how substance abuse, repeated instability, and exposing a child to dangerous adults can support findings of endangerment even when the record does not show a specific physical injury to the child. It also underscores a recurring appellate reality: when a judgment includes subsection (D) or (E) findings, those findings carry collateral consequences under § 161.001(b)(1)(M), so they must be directly and thoroughly challenged on appeal. That principle matters strategically in any case where a record made in one proceeding may shape future litigation involving other children.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department became involved after receiving a referral that Mother was abusing drugs and had left L.P. with L.P.’s father even though a protective order was in place protecting the child from that father. By the time of the new referral, Mother already had a substantial history with the Department: her children had previously been removed three times because of her drug addiction. When the Department attempted to intervene, it initially could not locate Mother and learned that the older three children were staying with their maternal aunt and uncle.

The Department then sought removal after Mother tested positive for illegal drugs. The case proceeded to a four-day bench trial over several months in 2025. The trial court heard from the Department’s removal investigator, the caseworker, L.P.’s father, the maternal aunt, Mother’s counselor, and Mother herself. After trial, the court terminated Mother’s parental rights under both subsection (D), concerning endangering conditions or surroundings, and subsection (E), concerning endangering conduct, and also found termination to be in the children’s best interests.

The appellate court’s reasoning centered on three factual themes: persistent drug abuse, a continuing course of instability reflected in prior removals, and Mother’s decision to place a child with a parent subject to a protective order. Taken together, those facts supplied the evidentiary framework for both endangerment grounds and the best-interest determination.

Issues Decided

The court decided the following issues:

• Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) for knowingly placing or allowing the children to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings.
• Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E) for engaging in conduct, or knowingly placing the children with persons who engaged in conduct, that endangered the children’s physical or emotional well-being.
• Whether legally and factually sufficient evidence supported the finding that termination was in the children’s best interests under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2).
• Whether, as a matter of appellate due process, the court was required to review both subsection (D) and subsection (E) findings because of their future collateral consequences under subsection (M).

Rules Applied

The court applied the familiar termination framework under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b): the Department had to prove by clear and convincing evidence both at least one predicate ground under subsection (b)(1) and best interest under subsection (b)(2). The opinion also relied on the statutory definition of clear and convincing evidence in Texas Family Code § 101.007.

On appellate review, the court followed the legal- and factual-sufficiency standards articulated in cases such as In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256 (Tex. 2002), In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. 2005), and In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105 (Tex. 2006). The court reiterated that, particularly after a bench trial, appellate courts defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations and weighing of the evidence, citing In re J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021), and In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. 2024).

As to the substantive endangerment standards, the court distinguished subsection (D) from subsection (E). Under subsection (D), the focus is on the child’s environment, including living conditions and the conduct of those in the home, and a single act or omission may suffice if it creates an endangering environment. Under subsection (E), the inquiry centers on the parent’s conduct and typically requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of endangering conduct. The court cited authorities recognizing that illegal drug use, especially when part of a larger pattern showing impairment of the parent’s ability to safely parent, can support endangerment findings.

Critically, the court also applied In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019), along with later Supreme Court authority such as In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726 (Tex. 2022), and In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269 (Tex. 2024), to emphasize that appellate courts may not bypass challenges to subsection (D) and (E) findings because those findings may later be used under § 161.001(b)(1)(M) to terminate rights to other children.

Application

The Fourth Court approached the record as one showing not an isolated lapse, but a sustained pattern of endangering behavior. Mother’s ongoing illegal drug use was central. The court did not treat drug use in the abstract as automatically dispositive; instead, it examined the surrounding facts showing why the drug abuse mattered in relation to parenting capacity and child safety. The opinion framed the evidence as demonstrating repeated instability and recurring Department intervention, including three prior removals attributable to Mother’s addiction. That history allowed the trial court to infer that the danger to the children was not speculative or theoretical.

The protective-order evidence supplied another important bridge between abstract risk and concrete endangerment. Mother left L.P. with a father from whom the child was protected by court order. That decision supported the conclusion that Mother knowingly exposed the child to dangerous conditions and to a dangerous adult. In subsection (D) terms, it reflected an endangering environment. In subsection (E) terms, it reflected Mother’s own endangering conduct and her decision to place the child with a person whose conduct posed a risk.

The court’s analysis also reflects the continued importance of deference in bench-trial termination appeals. Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, but the appellate court emphasized that the trial judge, as factfinder, was entitled to resolve credibility disputes, weigh conflicting testimony, and draw reasonable inferences from Mother’s drug history, the Department’s prior involvement, and the placement decisions at issue. On that record, the court held that a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that Mother had endangered the children under both statutory grounds.

As to best interest, the same body of evidence carried substantial weight. A persistent addiction problem, repeated removals, inability to provide a safe environment, and willingness to disregard the protective-order context all supported the trial court’s determination that termination, rather than reunification, served the children’s welfare. The opinion illustrates the common overlap in termination cases between evidence relevant to predicate grounds and evidence relevant to best interest.

Holding

The court held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D). The evidence permitted the trial court to find that Mother knowingly placed or allowed the children to remain in endangering conditions or surroundings, particularly in light of her ongoing drug abuse and her decision to leave L.P. with a father who was the subject of a protective order protecting the child.

The court separately held that legally and factually sufficient evidence supported termination under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Mother’s persistent drug use, coupled with the history of prior removals and her placement decisions, constituted a voluntary and continuing course of endangering conduct affecting the children’s physical and emotional well-being.

The court also held that sufficient evidence supported the trial court’s best-interest finding under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(2). The same evidence that established endangerment also supported the conclusion that termination was in the children’s best interests.

Finally, the court reiterated that due process required appellate review of both the subsection (D) and subsection (E) findings because either finding may have collateral consequences in future proceedings under § 161.001(b)(1)(M). That point is as significant strategically as the merits holding itself.

Practical Application

For family-law litigators, this case is a reminder that endangerment proof is often cumulative and contextual. In termination cases, the Department does not need a photograph of injury or testimony about a singular catastrophic event if the record shows a persistent course of drug abuse, repeated instability, and parental decisions that expose children to unsafe adults or prohibited environments. In private conservatorship and modification litigation, the same categories of evidence can shape findings on possession restrictions, supervised access, sole managing conservatorship, and protective conditions.

From a trial-strategy perspective, the opinion reinforces the need to build a chronology rather than a snapshot. A parent defending against endangerment allegations must address not only current sobriety claims but also the full historical record: prior removals, prior positive tests, failures to complete treatment, inconsistent participation in services, and disregard of court orders or safety plans. Conversely, the party asserting endangerment should connect substance abuse to specific parenting deficits, housing instability, unsafe caregivers, or prohibited contact, because courts continue to insist that drug-use evidence be evaluated in context, not in isolation.

Appellate practitioners should take particular note of the court’s due-process discussion. If the judgment contains (D) or (E) findings, those findings cannot be treated as surplusage. They must be attacked directly with issue-specific briefing, because an affirmance on either ground may materially affect future litigation involving other children through subsection (M). For trial lawyers, that means error preservation and evidentiary development on (D) and (E) remain essential even where another predicate ground may appear easier to defend or attack.

In related custody and divorce litigation, this opinion also has practical value in framing requests for temporary orders and final restrictions. A record showing a parent’s substance abuse combined with knowing exposure of a child to a dangerous partner, restrained person, or unsafe home environment can support aggressive interim relief, including supervised possession, injunctions concerning contact, and geographic or caregiver restrictions. The case is therefore useful not only in termination trials, but in any proceeding where “endangerment” is the organizing factual theory.

Checklists

Building an Endangerment Record Under Subsections (D) and (E)

• Establish a detailed timeline of drug use, relapses, positive tests, refusals to test, and treatment history.
• Tie substance abuse to concrete parenting risks such as missed supervision, unstable housing, impaired judgment, or unsafe caregiving decisions.
• Develop evidence of prior Department history, including prior removals, safety plans, or prior service plans.
• Identify all adults with whom the parent placed or allowed the child to remain, and determine whether those adults posed known safety risks.
• Introduce protective orders, criminal records, family-violence evidence, or prior judicial findings bearing on child safety.
• Distinguish environment-based endangerment evidence for subsection (D) from conduct-based evidence for subsection (E), even though the proof may overlap.
• Present the record in a way that shows a continuing course of conduct, not merely isolated bad acts.

Defending Against Endangerment Allegations

• Confront prior removals and prior positive tests directly rather than minimizing them.
• Present corroborated sobriety evidence, including treatment completion, sponsor or counselor testimony, and sustained negative testing.
• Show concrete changes in living conditions, employment, support systems, and daily caregiving capacity.
• Rebut any allegation that the child was placed with an unsafe adult by addressing knowledge, timing, and subsequent protective action.
• Clarify compliance with protective orders, safety plans, and court directives.
• Offer credible third-party testimony from relatives, counselors, or service providers who can speak to current stability.
• Anticipate that the court may treat a pattern of instability as more persuasive than short-term improvement.

Preserving and Briefing Appeal Points on (D) and (E)

• Challenge both legal and factual sufficiency if the record supports both complaints.
• Brief subsection (D) and subsection (E) separately; do not assume success on another predicate ground makes them irrelevant.
• Address the collateral consequences under Texas Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(M) and cite In re N.G..
• Identify precisely which facts allegedly support environment-based endangerment and which support conduct-based endangerment.
• Attack inferential gaps in the Department’s case, especially where drug use was not directly linked to parenting impairment.
• Preserve objections to documentary exhibits, hearsay, and conclusory testimony at trial.
• Request findings or clarify the basis of the ruling where helpful to sharpen appellate issues.

Using This Case in Non-CPS Family Litigation

• In modification suits, use patterns of substance abuse and unsafe third-party exposure to support material-and-substantial-change arguments.
• In temporary-orders hearings, frame unsafe placement decisions as immediate endangerment warranting supervised possession or injunctive relief.
• In protective-order proceedings, connect violations or disregard of protective conditions to child-safety concerns.
• In conservatorship trials, use repeated instability and poor safety decisions to support sole managing conservatorship or restricted access.
• When defending a parent, distinguish historical misconduct from current functioning with credible, recent, and well-documented evidence.
• Consider whether the same factual record may have downstream consequences in future litigation involving other children.

Citation

In re H.R.J., J.G.J., T.J.P., and L.P., No. 04-25-00641-CV, 2026 WL ___ (Tex. App.—San Antonio Apr. 15, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

~~ba51e85a-dbcb-44f1-9c8b-f350c311a5a6~~