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Amarillo Court Conditionally Grants Mandamus Where Trial Court Named Father Joint Managing Conservator Despite Uncontroverted Evidence of Family Violence

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In re Zermeno, 07-26-00068-CV, April 16, 2026.

On appeal from 154th District Court, Lamb County, Texas

Synopsis

The Amarillo Court of Appeals conditionally granted mandamus relief after the trial court named Father a joint managing conservator in temporary orders despite uncontroverted evidence that he had committed family violence against Mother within the two years preceding the divorce filing. Under Texas Family Code section 153.004(b), credible evidence of a history or pattern of such abuse bars a joint managing conservatorship appointment, and the trial court therefore abused its discretion by entering an order the statute forbids.

Relevance to Family Law

This is a significant temporary-orders conservatorship decision for Texas family lawyers because it reinforces that section 153.004 is not merely a best-interest factor—it contains statutory prohibitions that cabin trial-court discretion. In divorce and SAPCR litigation, when the record contains credible, uncontroverted evidence of family violence against the other parent within the relevant period, a court cannot sidestep the statute by relying on competing evidence about household conditions, neglect allegations, or recent parental improvement. For litigators handling temporary hearings, this opinion is a reminder that mandamus remains a live corrective tool when a temporary conservatorship order conflicts with section 153.004.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties were married for roughly twenty years and had five minor children. Father filed for divorce in September 2025 and sought to be named sole managing conservator, alleging concerns about Mother’s care of the children. Mother responded by seeking sole managing conservatorship based on Father’s history of family violence, specifically violence committed within the two years preceding the filing of the divorce.

At the temporary-orders hearing, the trial court heard testimony from both parents, two adult children, and Father’s former affair partner, Lisa. Much of the testimony focused on the parties’ parenting deficiencies, including allegations about housekeeping, supervision, food insecurity, medical care, and financial instability. But the appellate court’s focus was narrower: whether the evidence established family violence within the statutory window.

On that point, the record was unusually strong. Father admitted that he had hit Mother several times in the past while intoxicated. More importantly, he admitted striking her shortly before the parties separated in April 2025, which plainly placed the conduct within two years of the September 2025 filing. Mother also testified that Father assaulted her repeatedly during the marriage, including a slap after he had supposedly stopped drinking, an incident that left her with facial injuries, and another altercation that resulted in her breaking her ankle. She further testified that after separation he threatened suicide with a gun and pointed the gun at her. The adult children also described Father’s past drinking and violent conduct. No response was filed in the court of appeals contesting Mother’s mandamus petition.

Despite that record, the trial court entered temporary orders appointing both parents joint managing conservators and giving Father the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence in Lamb County. Mother sought mandamus.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

The court applied the standard mandamus framework: the relator must show a clear abuse of discretion and no adequate remedy by appeal. Because temporary orders in family cases are generally not subject to interlocutory appeal, mandamus is the appropriate vehicle to challenge a temporary conservatorship order that violates a statutory limitation.

The principal statute was Texas Family Code section 153.004. The opinion highlighted several components of that section:

The court also relied on standard abuse-of-discretion authorities, including Walker v. Packer and Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., for the proposition that a misapplication of the law to undisputed facts constitutes an abuse of discretion reviewable by mandamus.

Application

The court treated the case as a straightforward statutory-constraint problem rather than a free-form best-interest dispute. Trial courts ordinarily have broad discretion in temporary conservatorship matters, but that discretion ends where section 153.004(b) begins. The statute does not merely permit a court to weigh family violence against other best-interest evidence; it prohibits a joint managing conservatorship appointment once credible evidence establishes the requisite history or pattern of abuse.

That is what drove the result here. The court emphasized that the evidence of domestic violence was not meaningfully controverted. Father himself admitted hitting Mother on several occasions and admitted a specific assault shortly before the parties’ April 2025 separation. Mother supplied additional testimony describing repeated assaults and a firearm incident. The adult children corroborated Father’s violent conduct. Although there was competing testimony about Mother’s alleged neglect, the cleanliness of the home, and Father’s claimed sobriety and recent improvement, those subjects did not neutralize the statutory bar. In the appellate court’s view, once credible and uncontroverted evidence of family violence within the relevant period was in the record, appointing Father as a joint managing conservator was beyond the trial court’s lawful discretion.

The court’s approach is important strategically. It did not hold that Father could never have possession, access, or any conservatorship-related rights. Nor did it render Mother sole managing conservator as requested. Instead, it held only that the temporary order actually entered—a joint managing conservatorship—could not stand under section 153.004(b). That distinction matters in mandamus practice: the appellate court corrected the unlawful order but left the trial court room to craft a lawful replacement order on remand.

Holding

The Seventh Court of Appeals held that Mother lacked an adequate remedy by appeal because the challenged order was a temporary order in a pending divorce case, and such orders are ordinarily reviewable only by mandamus. That satisfied the second prerequisite for extraordinary relief.

The court further held that the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Father joint managing conservator. The record contained credible, uncontroverted evidence—including Father’s own admissions—that he had committed family violence against Mother within the two years preceding the filing of the divorce. Under Texas Family Code section 153.004(b), a joint managing conservatorship appointment was therefore prohibited.

The court conditionally granted the writ of mandamus and directed the trial court to vacate its temporary order. Although Mother also requested rendition appointing her sole managing conservator, the opinion as provided reflects that the court granted relief by requiring vacatur of the unlawful order rather than substituting its own temporary conservatorship framework.

Practical Application

For family law litigators, the immediate lesson is evidentiary and procedural: if section 153.004(b) is in play, build the hearing record around the statutory elements and time window, not around generalized best-interest rhetoric. Establish the dates of the assaults, identify the victim’s relationship to the child, and obtain clean testimony or admissions showing a history or pattern of abuse. If the opposing parent admits even one or more qualifying incidents within the two-year lookback, counsel should argue explicitly that joint managing conservatorship is statutorily unavailable, not merely disfavored.

The case also matters for how lawyers frame competing proof. Trial courts routinely hear temporary-orders records full of allegations running in both directions—neglect, instability, poor supervision, substance abuse, paramour issues, and school or medical concerns. In re Zermeno shows that those issues do not restore discretion where the Legislature has removed it. If there is credible, uncontroverted evidence of qualifying family violence, the court cannot balance its way back into a joint managing conservatorship order.

For the respondent’s side, the case is a warning against conceding or casually admitting violent conduct without confronting the legal consequences. Where damaging facts cannot be denied, counsel must shift to limiting the relief sought, developing lawful alternatives, and addressing possession, supervised access, geographic restrictions, exchange logistics, and support. What counsel cannot do effectively after Zermeno is defend a joint-managing-conservatorship structure as a permissible middle ground when section 153.004(b) has been triggered.

From an appellate-preservation standpoint, this is also a strong reminder to make the statutory objection unmistakable at the temporary-orders hearing. Tie the evidence to the statutory language, request a compliant order, and if the trial court nevertheless appoints joint managing conservators, move quickly on mandamus. Temporary orders can shape the practical course of the case for months, and this opinion reinforces that appellate courts will intervene when the order violates a mandatory conservatorship prohibition.

Checklists

Proving the Section 153.004(b) Bar at Temporary Orders

Defending Against a Family-Violence-Based Conservatorship Challenge

Preserving Error for Mandamus

Drafting a Compliant Alternative Temporary Order

Citation

In re Zermeno, No. 07-26-00068-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS ___ (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 16, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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