Texarkana Court Vacates SAPCR Final Order for Lack of Continuing Exclusive Jurisdiction

In the Interest of C.B., D.N.B., and J.B., Children, 06-25-00081-CV, March 30, 2026.

On appeal from County Court at Law, Panola County, Texas

Synopsis

The Sixth Court held that a Panola County Chapter 262 court could enter emergency and temporary orders, but it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to render a final SAPCR order affecting Jarod because a Denton County district court already had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction (CEJ) based on a prior parentage order. The final order was therefore vacated as to Jarod and otherwise affirmed as to the other children, and the trial court’s denial of Mother’s motion for new trial attacking the agreed order was upheld.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion is a jurisdictional tripwire for custody litigation that frequently overlaps with divorce and modification practice: an existing paternity/support order in another Texas court can lock in CEJ and make a later “new” SAPCR (including a Department case) non-final as to that child unless the case is transferred correctly. For family-law litigators, the lesson is strategic and immediate—if you are trying to resolve conservatorship, possession, child support redirection, or termination in a county where the child is found, you can litigate temporary relief under Chapter 262, but you cannot “paper” a global final order as to a CEJ child without a valid Chapter 155 transfer (or transfer into the Chapter 262 court). The result is avoidable appellate disruption: a seemingly comprehensive agreed final order can be partially void.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The Department filed a Chapter 262 removal/SAPCR in the Panola County Court at Law concerning three children (Charlie, Dalton, and Jarod). The case proceeded to a final hearing where a final order—based on the parties’ agreement—was signed naming Mark managing conservator of Charlie and Dalton and non-parent managing conservator of Jarod; Mother (Susan) was named a conservator of all three children with phased-in possession for Dalton and Jarod. The final order also recognized Jarod’s father (Jack) but did not award him conservatorship and purported to redirect Jack’s child-support payments to Mark.

The jurisdictional problem: years earlier, the 211th District Court of Denton County had entered a parentage order (and later modification) regarding Jarod, which—by statute—conferred continuing, exclusive jurisdiction on the Denton court over SAPCR matters “in connection with” Jarod. During the Panola County proceeding, the Department attempted to obtain Vital Statistics confirmation of CEJ, but the requests misidentified Jarod (wrong birthplace on one request; wrong birth year on another), producing responses that did not identify the Denton CEJ case. At the final hearing, counsel flagged that there was likely a Denton County (or Arkansas) order already in place; the trial court nonetheless signed the agreed final order.

Only after rendition did the Department move in Denton County to transfer, and Denton signed a transfer order the next day. By then, however, the Panola final order had already been rendered without CEJ or a pre-rendition transfer.

Issues Decided

• Whether the Panola County Court at Law had subject-matter jurisdiction to render a final SAPCR order affecting Jarod when a Denton County district court had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction based on a prior parentage order.
• Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying Mother’s motion for new trial asserting she involuntarily signed the agreed final order.

Rules Applied

• Texas Family Code § 155.001(a), (c): A court that renders a final order determining parentage acquires CEJ; once CEJ attaches, no other Texas court has jurisdiction over a suit regarding that child except as allowed by Chapter 155, § 103.001(b), or Chapter 262.
• Texas Family Code § 155.101(a)(1): In a SAPCR, the petitioner or the trial court must request identification of the court that last had CEJ, unless the petition properly alleges no CEJ and the pleadings do not dispute it.
• Texas Family Code §§ 262.001–.003, .102, .202–.203: The Department may file in the county where the child is found and obtain emergency/temporary relief; after temporary orders, the Department must request CEJ identification and the court must transfer to the CEJ court (or obtain a transfer into the Chapter 262 court) as prescribed.
• Texarkana CEJ/Chapter 262 precedent: In re J.I.M., 516 S.W.3d 674 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, no pet.); In re D.W., 533 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied); and the court’s transfer-focused discussion consistent with In re E.B., No. 06-23-00083-CV, 2024 WL 1125096 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 15, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Application

The Sixth Court treated the question as classic CEJ doctrine with a Chapter 262 overlay. Denton County’s 2015 parentage order (and later modification) meant Denton had CEJ over “matters . . . in connection with” Jarod. That statutory status deprived every other Texas court of jurisdiction to render final orders concerning Jarod unless and until a transfer occurred in compliance with Chapter 155/262.

The Panola County Court at Law was not powerless: because the Department brought a governmental Chapter 262 case in the county where Jarod was found, the Panola court could issue emergency orders, conduct the adversary hearing, and enter temporary orders. But the point of demarcation is finality. Without a transfer from Denton (or an order transferring CEJ to Panola), the Panola court could not render a final order that substantively adjudicated conservatorship and support for Jarod—no matter that the parties agreed, and no matter that the trial court attempted to “redirect” a Denton support obligation.

The record underscored how easily CEJ can be missed in practice. The Department did attempt to use Vital Statistics to identify CEJ, but it fed incorrect identifying information, resulting in “no SAPCR found” responses that were not reliable for Jarod. And even though CEJ was discussed at the final hearing (including the existence of a support order), the trial court proceeded to final judgment anyway. The later post-judgment transfer order from Denton did not retroactively supply jurisdiction for a final order already rendered.

Holding

The court vacated the final order as it related to Jarod because Denton County’s 211th District Court had CEJ under Chapter 155, and Panola County—sitting as the Chapter 262 court—lacked jurisdiction to render final orders affecting Jarod absent a transfer. The opinion emphasizes that Chapter 262 creates a narrow lane for emergency and temporary orders in the county where the child is found, not a bypass around CEJ for final adjudication.

Separately, the court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Mother’s motion for new trial challenging the agreed order as involuntary and affirmed the final order as to the other children. In other words, the jurisdictional defect required a targeted vacatur (Jarod only), not a total reversal of the entire decree.

Practical Application

Texas family-law litigators should treat CEJ as an initial-file triage issue, not an end-of-case housekeeping item—especially in multi-child cases where one child has a different father or a prior parentage/support history. This case is a reminder that you can negotiate an “agreed final” all day long, but you cannot stipulate your way into subject-matter jurisdiction, and you cannot fix a CEJ defect with a post-judgment transfer.

A few common scenarios where this bites in private litigation (not just DFPS cases):

• Divorce with children “of the marriage” plus a child subject to a prior paternity case: The divorce court may be able to proceed as to some children but lacks power to enter final SAPCR relief for the CEJ child without transfer/consolidation.
• Modification/relocation practice: If an old support case exists in another county, a new suit filed where the child now lives may yield enforceable temporary orders (in limited contexts) but a void final order without Chapter 155 compliance.
• Agreed orders that “redirect” support: Redirection language can be an implicit admission another court’s order exists; if that other court has CEJ, the redirection is exactly the kind of “final” relief that cannot be granted without transfer.
• Multi-child decrees: Expect partial vacatur risk—your final order may survive as to some children and be void as to others, creating operational chaos for possession schedules, support calculations, and enforcement.

Checklists

CEJ Triage at Intake (Private SAPCR, Divorce, or DFPS)

• Ask whether any child has ever been the subject of a prior SAPCR, paternity, or support order (including default orders).
• Obtain cause numbers, counties, and courts immediately; do not rely solely on client recollection.
• Run a clerk/case search in likely counties (prior residence, where support was set, where paternity was established).
• If DFPS is involved, confirm whether the case is proceeding under Chapter 262 and what temporary orders have been signed.

Vital Statistics / CEJ Verification (Avoiding “False Negative” Searches)

• Confirm the child’s full name, DOB, and birth state before submitting any request.
• Compare the request data to the birth certificate (or other reliable record) rather than a petition allegation.
• File the CEJ response and the underlying request in the record so the appellate court can evaluate diligence and accuracy.
• If the response is “no suit found” but you have any CEJ “smoke” (support withholding, AG letters, prior county mentioned), treat it as a lead—not closure.

Litigation Strategy When a Chapter 262 Court Is Not the CEJ Court

• Seek emergency/temporary relief in the county where the child is found as permitted by Chapter 262.
• After temporary orders, press for CEJ identification and a prompt transfer under §§ 262.202–.203.
• Do not set a final hearing (or announce an agreed final) for a CEJ child until transfer posture is clean and documented.
• If the parties want the Chapter 262 court to finish the case, pursue transfer into that court from the CEJ court—before final judgment.

Drafting and Proving Up Agreed Finals (Preventing Partial Void Orders)

• Include a jurisdiction section that identifies the CEJ court (or attaches the transfer order) for each child if they differ.
• Avoid “support redirection” or modification language tied to another court’s order unless your court has CEJ or a valid transfer.
• If multiple children are involved, confirm CEJ child-by-child; do not assume one court’s jurisdiction applies to all siblings.
• Make the transfer order(s) part of the exhibit set at prove-up and reference them explicitly in the decree.

Citation

In the Interest of C.B., D.N.B., and J.B., Children, No. 06-25-00081-CV (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 30, 2026) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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