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Tenth Court Reverses Termination Order Signed Before Completing De Novo Hearing

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Interest of I.S., a Child, 10-25-00077-CV, March 26, 2026.

On appeal from 272nd District Court of Brazos County, Texas

Synopsis

The Tenth Court of Appeals reversed a termination judgment because Mother timely requested a de novo hearing under Family Code § 201.015, yet the referring court signed an order adopting the associate judge’s termination order before completing the de novo hearing. That premature adoption order was a final, voidable judgment that triggered accelerated appellate deadlines and started (and ultimately exhausted) plenary power—so the trial court could not “cure” the error later by finishing the de novo hearing and signing new adoption/affirmance orders after the notice of appeal.

Relevance to Family Law

Although this is a termination case, the procedural trap is not limited to SAPCRs. Any family-law litigant using an associate judge/referring court structure (temporary orders, enforcement, modifications, discovery sanctions, custody determinations) must treat an associate-judge ruling plus a referring-court “adoption” order as a jurisdictional and deadline-driving event—especially when a de novo request is filed. The opinion is a pointed reminder that (1) premature adoption can create a final, appealable judgment even when it is procedurally wrong, and (2) once appellate jurisdiction attaches (particularly in accelerated contexts), later “cleanup” hearings and orders may be legal nullities rather than cures.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

An associate judge conducted a bench trial and issued a letter ruling (February 3, 2025) finding statutory predicate grounds under Family Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) and best interest, and stating Mother’s parental rights were terminated. Mother timely requested a de novo hearing on February 6, 2025. The associate judge then signed a formal termination order on February 14, 2025.

The referring district court convened the start of the de novo hearing on February 18, 2025, but did not complete it—explaining that it had requested the reporter’s record from the associate-judge trial and would complete the de novo hearing once the record was received. Before completion, on March 7, 2025, the referring court signed an order adopting the associate judge’s termination order, reciting (incorrectly) that “no demand for hearing” had been made.

Mother filed a notice of accelerated appeal the same day, expressly noting that a de novo hearing had been timely requested and was still pending. Despite that, the referring court later completed the de novo hearing on April 10, 2025 and signed additional orders on April 15 and April 21 purporting to adopt/affirm the associate judge’s termination order.

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Application

The Tenth Court treated the March 7, 2025 adoption order as the pivotal jurisdictional event. Everyone agreed Mother timely invoked § 201.015 by requesting a de novo hearing, and that the referring court should not have adopted the associate judge’s termination order before completing that hearing. The dispute was whether later proceedings fixed the problem.

The Department argued the later completion of the de novo hearing and subsequent adoption/affirmance orders cured the premature adoption. The court rejected that attempt to “repair” the record because the March 7 adoption order—though procedurally wrong—was still a final, appealable, voidable judgment. That final judgment triggered appellate deadlines and started the clock on the referring court’s plenary power.

Because no plenary-power-extending motion or timely modification occurred, plenary power expired before the April 10 completion of the de novo hearing and before the later April 15/April 21 orders. Moreover, Mother’s accelerated notice of appeal reinforced that the appellate timetable and jurisdictional transfer were already in play. Once plenary power expired (and with the appeal pending), the trial court lacked jurisdiction to complete the de novo hearing or sign additional merits orders. Those later actions were therefore legal nullities and could not cure the original § 201.015 error.

Holding

The court held that the referring court reversibly erred by signing a final adoption order on March 7, 2025—adopting the associate judge’s termination order—before completing Mother’s timely requested de novo hearing under Family Code § 201.015. The failure to provide the completed de novo hearing in the proper procedural posture required reversal.

The court further held that the attempted cure failed because the March 7 adoption order was a final, appealable (but merely voidable) judgment that triggered deadlines and limited the trial court’s plenary power. By the time the referring court later completed the de novo hearing and entered additional adoption/affirmance orders, it had lost jurisdiction; those later proceedings and orders were a nullity. The case was reversed and remanded for a de novo hearing.

Practical Application

Texas family-law litigators should read this case as a warning that “everyone knows” a de novo is pending does not prevent a premature adoption order from becoming final and deadline-triggering. The trial bench may view a premature adoption as correctable housekeeping; the court of appeals viewed it as a final judgment with real jurisdictional consequences.

Key implications for day-to-day practice:

Checklists

When You Request a De Novo Hearing (Preserve and Control the Timeline)

If the Referring Court Signs an Adoption Order While De Novo Is Pending (Immediate Triage)

For the Prevailing Party: Avoid Building a “Nullity” Record

Citation

In the Interest of I.S., a Child, No. 10-25-00077-CV (Tex. App.—Waco (10th Dist.) Mar. 26, 2026) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

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