Residence Restriction Violations Preclude Mandatory Venue Transfer in SAPCR Proceedings

In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield, 06-26-00023-CV, March 16, 2026.

On appeal from the County Court at Law of Panola County, Texas.

Synopsis

A trial court is not required to perform the ministerial duty of transferring venue under Texas Family Code Section 155.201 when the child’s residence in the new county was established in violation of a standing geographic restriction. Because an unauthorized county does not constitute a “proper county” for transfer, the court of continuing exclusive jurisdiction retains the authority to deny the transfer and enforce its existing orders through contempt.

Relevance to Family Law

This decision provides a critical appellate shield against “venue shopping” via self-help. It clarifies that the mandatory transfer provisions of the Family Code are not a loophole for parents to bypass geographic restrictions. For practitioners, this reinforces that violating a court order to establish residency elsewhere will not only result in a denial of transfer but also subjects the client to the full enforcement power—including incarceration—of the original trial court, even if the child has physically resided in the new county for more than six months.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Relators, Steven and Lisa Broomfield, were subject to a SAPCR order issued by the Panola County County Court at Law that included a residence restriction, requiring the child, B.B.J., to remain in Panola County or its contiguous counties. In violation of this order, the Relators moved the child to Smith County. After residing there for six months, the Relators filed an original petition in Smith County to terminate parental rights and adopt, followed by a motion in Panola County for mandatory transfer of venue under Texas Family Code Section 155.201.

While the transfer motion was pending, the Panola County court held a hearing on a motion for enforcement and found the Relators in contempt for thirty-six distinct violations of the court’s orders. The court sentenced the Relators to jail time. The Relators then sought mandamus relief, arguing the trial court had a ministerial duty to transfer the case to Smith County and lacked jurisdiction to enter contempt orders once the mandatory transfer was triggered.

Issues Decided

1. Whether a trial court’s ministerial duty to transfer venue under Section 155.201 is triggered when the child’s residency in the transferee county was established in violation of a court order.
2. Whether a trial court retains jurisdiction to issue contempt and commitment orders after a motion for mandatory transfer is filed based on an unauthorized residence.

Rules Applied

• Texas Family Code § 155.201: Generally mandates the transfer of a proceeding to another county if the child has resided in that county for six months or longer.
• Texas Family Code § 155.204: Outlines the procedural requirements for moving for and controverting a transfer of venue.
• Proffer v. Yates, 734 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1987): Establishes that the transfer of a SAPCR to a county where the child has resided for six months is typically a mandatory ministerial duty.
• Huey v. Huey, 200 S.W.3d 851 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2006, no pet.): Holds that before a court transfers venue, a “proper county” for transfer must be identified.
• In re Christon, 698 S.W.3d 597 (Tex. App.—Waco 2024, orig. proceeding): Establishes that a county is not a proper county for transfer if the residence was established in violation of a geographic restriction.

Application

The court began its analysis by acknowledging the general rule that venue transfer is mandatory when a child has resided in a new county for six months. However, the court distinguished this case by focusing on the definition of a “proper county.” Relying on the reasoning in In re Christon and Huey, the court determined that the mandatory nature of Section 155.201 does not extend to counties where residency was established through “unjustifiable conduct” or in direct contravention of a standing permanent injunction or geographic restriction.

The court noted that the Relators had never filed a motion to modify the existing geographic restriction. By moving the child to Smith County—a non-contiguous county barred by the Panola County order—the Relators attempted to manufacture venue through a violation of the law. The court concluded that Smith County could not be considered a “proper” county for the purposes of the transfer statute. Consequently, the trial court was not stripped of its jurisdiction and acted within its discretion to deny the transfer and proceed with enforcement.

Holding

The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Relators’ motion for mandatory transfer. Because the child’s residence in Smith County was established in violation of an existing court order, Smith County was not an authorized or “proper” county for transfer under the Texas Family Code.

In a second holding, the court denied the Relators’ request for habeas relief. It ruled that because the trial court was not required to transfer the case, its continuing, exclusive jurisdiction remained intact. Therefore, the contempt orders and the resulting commitment of the Relators were not void for lack of jurisdiction.

Practical Application

This case serves as an essential reminder for practitioners that “possession is nine-tenths of the law” does not apply to venue in the face of a geographic restriction. If a client moves in violation of an order, the “six-month clock” for mandatory transfer effectively never starts because the target county is legally disqualified. Strategically, when representing the party opposing a transfer, counsel should focus on the “propriety” of the new residence and use any existing geographic restrictions as a jurisdictional bar to the transfer, coupled with an immediate motion for enforcement to maintain the home court’s authority.

Checklists

Challenging a Mandatory Transfer

• Audit Existing Orders: Review the most recent SAPCR or Divorce Decree for specific geographic restrictions (e.g., “Panola County and contiguous counties”).
• Verify Transferee County: Confirm if the county to which transfer is sought falls outside the restricted area.
• File Controverting Affidavit: Ensure the affidavit specifically alleges that the child’s residence was established in violation of a court order, citing In re Broomfield and In re Christon.
• Request an Evidentiary Hearing: Present evidence of the unauthorized move to establish “unjustifiable conduct.”
• File for Enforcement: Concurrently file a motion for contempt regarding the residency violation to reinforce the current court’s jurisdiction.

Advising Relocating Clients

• Pre-Move Analysis: Identify if the intended move violates the current decree.
• Seek Modification First: Advise the client to file a Motion to Modify Geographic Restriction before moving the child.
• Temporary Orders: Obtain temporary orders authorizing the move to ensure the new county eventually becomes a “proper” county for venue purposes.
• Warn of Contempt Risk: Explicitly document the risk of jail time and the inability to transfer venue if the move is made unilaterally.

Citation

In re Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield, No. 06-26-00023-CV, 2026 WL ______ (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 16, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Full Opinion Text

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