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CROSSOVER: Texas Rule 193.6 ‘Automatic Exclusion’ of Untimely Experts Can Zero-Out Your Proof at a No‑Evidence Summary Judgment (Family-Law Crossover)

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Lomerson v. Lyle Reid & Associates, L.L.C., 07-25-00067-CV, March 11, 2026.

On appeal from the 342nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas.

Synopsis

When the only proof defeating a no-evidence summary judgment depends on expert opinions, an untimely expert designation can be dispositive. Under TRCP 193.6, those expert reports are automatically excluded from summary judgment consideration unless the proponent proves good cause or lack of unfair surprise/prejudice—“mistake” and counsel inadvertence will not do.

Relevance to Family Law

Family cases routinely turn on expert-dependent elements—tracing separate property, valuing closely held businesses, proving waste/fraud on the community, rebutting SAPCR custody evaluations, or establishing medical/psychological causation issues. Lomerson is a reminder that missed expert deadlines are not merely “discovery problems”; they can zero-out your proof at the exact procedural moment when you need admissible evidence to survive a no-evidence summary judgment (or analogous dispositive posture), even if the trial court never signs a separate written order sustaining objections.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying dispute was a property-damage case involving alleged alteration of surface-water flow during residential construction. The plaintiff asserted trespass, negligence, and negligence per se under Texas Water Code § 11.086, claiming the defendants’ conduct caused damage to land and a seawall.

After an adequate time for discovery, the defendants moved for no-evidence summary judgment under TRCP 166a(i), targeting all elements and specifically arguing the plaintiff lacked admissible proof of causation and damages because his experts were not timely designated. In response, the plaintiff attached two technical expert reports (engineering/geotechnical). The defendants objected, invoking TRCP 193.6’s automatic exclusion due to untimely designation. The plaintiff conceded the deadline was missed and argued it was a “mistake,” without developing record support for good cause or lack of surprise/prejudice. The trial court granted the no-evidence motion and did not expressly rule on the objections.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued the summary judgment was error. The court of appeals affirmed, holding the reports were automatically excluded and the remaining evidence (affidavit, photos, drainage plan, invoices) did not raise a fact issue on causation—an expert-required subject under the circumstances.

Issues Decided

  • Whether a trial court properly grants a no-evidence summary judgment when the nonmovant’s only evidence of causation and damages consists of expert reports from experts who were not timely designated.
  • Whether TRCP 193.6 operates to exclude untimely expert reports from consideration at the summary-judgment stage absent proof of good cause or lack of unfair surprise/prejudice.
  • Whether the nonmovant’s non-expert materials (affidavit, photographs, plans, invoices) created a genuine issue of material fact on causation where expert testimony was required.

Rules Applied

  • TRCP 166a(i) (no-evidence summary judgment): after adequate time for discovery, movant can challenge specific essential elements; trial court must grant unless nonmovant produces evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact.
  • TRCP 193.6(a) (automatic exclusion): untimely disclosed material (including experts and expert reports) is inadmissible unless the proponent proves good cause or lack of unfair surprise/prejudice.
  • Automatic exclusion applies in summary judgment proceedings: relying on Fort Brown Villas III Condo. Ass’n v. Gillenwater, 285 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. 2009), and intermediate appellate authority (including Fort Worth cases applied due to transfer under TRAP 41.3).
  • Burden of proof is on the proponent of late-disclosed evidence to establish an exception under Rule 193.6.
  • Inadvertence of counsel is not good cause: citing Cunningham v. Columbia/St. David’s Healthcare Sys., L.P., 185 S.W.3d 7 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005, no pet.).
  • Expert testimony required when causation is beyond lay understanding, including flooding/property hydrology causation: citing Tenaris Bay City Inc. v. Ellisor, 718 S.W.3d 193 (Tex. 2025).

Application

The court treated the evidentiary fight as the case. Because the plaintiff conceded the experts were not designated by the scheduling order deadline, TRCP 193.6 triggered automatic exclusion unless the plaintiff carried his burden to prove either (1) good cause, or (2) no unfair surprise/prejudice. At the hearing, the plaintiff’s explanation boiled down to “it was a mistake,” with no developed facts explaining why the deadline was missed, what diligence was exercised, what was promptly done to cure, or how the opposing parties were not disadvantaged. The court held that kind of conclusory assertion does not satisfy Rule 193.6’s exception—especially where the only articulated cause resembled counsel inadvertence, which Texas courts consistently reject as “good cause.”

Critically, the trial court’s failure to expressly rule on the objections did not save the late reports. Rule 193.6 is exclusionary by default, and the court of appeals reasoned the trial court could not consider the untimely reports when determining whether the nonmovant raised a fact issue to defeat no-evidence summary judgment.

With the expert reports out, the remaining evidence collapsed on the element the motion targeted most effectively: causation. The plaintiff’s affidavit was largely conclusory and expressly tethered its assertions to expert “findings” that were inadmissible. Photographs showed conditions, but not the causal pathway attributable to defendants; drainage plans and invoices likewise failed to establish the causal nexus. Because the causation theory (flooding/surface water alteration) required expert testimony under Tenaris, the nonmovant had no competent evidence on an essential element. No-evidence summary judgment was therefore proper and had to be affirmed.

Holding

The court held that under TRCP 193.6, expert reports from untimely designated experts are automatically excluded from consideration at the summary judgment stage unless the proponent proves good cause or lack of unfair surprise/prejudice. A bare assertion that the failure to designate was a “mistake,” or counsel inadvertence, does not satisfy that burden.

The court also held that without admissible expert evidence, the nonmovant failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact on causation—an essential element common to the pleaded tort and statutory claims in that case—so the trial court correctly granted and the appellate court affirmed the no-evidence summary judgment.

Practical Application

Family-law litigators should treat this as a dispositive-procedure case masquerading as a property dispute. Many family claims and defenses are expert-dependent in a way that is easy to underestimate until the no-evidence motion hits: tracing (forensic accounting), valuation (business appraisal), earning capacity (vocational), medical/psych causation (therapy records, diagnoses), and sometimes digital forensics. If your only proof on a challenged element is an expert report or expert-based affidavit, an untimely designation can functionally convert “we have strong merits” into “we have no evidence.”

Strategically, Lomerson also sharpens the movant’s playbook in family cases: combine a TRCP 166a(i) no-evidence motion with targeted Rule 193.6 objections to late experts and force the nonmovant to prove an exception on the record. The case also underscores that you cannot assume the trial court must sign a separate order sustaining objections; if the evidence is excludable by rule and the proponent fails to carry the exception burden, the no-evidence disposition may stand on appeal.

Checklists

Expert Deadline Control (Prevent the 193.6 Trap)

  • Calendar expert designation deadlines from the scheduling order the day it is signed (primary and redundant calendaring)
  • Identify which claims/defenses are expert-dependent (tracing, valuation, psych, vocational, medical, digital forensics)
  • Retain experts early enough to produce a report that is usable in a summary-judgment response
  • Serve written designations and disclosures timely (do not rely on informal production of a report)
  • Immediately supplement if the expert opinions evolve (treat supplementation as a deadline-driven task)

If You Missed the Deadline (Build a Rule 193.6 Exception Record)

  • Move promptly for leave and supplementation; do not wait until a dispositive motion is filed
  • Develop evidence of good cause (diligence timeline, obstacles outside counsel’s control, prompt cure steps)
  • Develop evidence showing no unfair surprise/prejudice (trial setting distance, deposition availability, offer of continuance, narrowed opinions, document production already in opponent’s possession)
  • Request an express ruling admitting the expert under Rule 193.6(b) and ensure the court’s findings are in the record
  • Consider requesting a continuance tied to expert discovery to mitigate prejudice arguments

No-Evidence Summary Judgment Response (When Experts Matter)

  • Confirm each challenged element has admissible proof independent of excluded materials
  • Avoid affidavits that “launder” excluded expert opinions through a party witness
  • Tie causation/damages opinions to competent expert testimony when the subject is beyond lay knowledge
  • Prepare to meet evidentiary objections in writing and at hearing—assume the court will enforce automatic exclusion
  • If the expert is essential, seek continuance early and support it with a detailed record

Citation

Lomerson v. Lyle Reid & Associates, L.L.C., No. 07-25-00067-CV (Tex. App.—Amarillo Mar. 11, 2026) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

In divorce and SAPCR litigation, Lomerson can be weaponized as a procedural choke point: force the opponent to prove a claim (or defense) that is functionally impossible without experts, then remove the experts through Rule 193.6 and finish the case (or key issues) through a no-evidence motion. Think: separate-property tracing in a commingled estate, business valuation disputes where the proponent lacks an admissible valuation opinion, claims for economic contribution/reimbursement requiring accounting methodology, or psychological/medical causation where lay testimony cannot bridge the gap.

On the defense side, the case is equally a warning: do not assume “the judge knows what happened” or that photos, invoices, and a party affidavit can substitute for technical causation, valuation methodology, or tracing. If you are the party with the burden on an expert-dependent element and you miss the designation deadline, you must be prepared to prove—by an actual record, not argument—that good cause exists or that the late designation creates no unfair surprise/prejudice. Otherwise, Lomerson shows how quickly an opponent can convert your missed deadline into an evidence vacuum and an affirmed no-evidence judgment.

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Tom Daley is a board-certified family law attorney with extensive experience practicing across the United States, primarily in Texas. He represents clients in all aspects of family law, including negotiation, settlement, litigation, trial, and appeals.