Richardson v. State, 02-24-00237-CR, January 30, 2026.
On appeal from the 362nd District Court of Denton County, Texas.
Synopsis
The Second Court of Appeals addressed whether a trial court’s oral pronouncement regarding the timing of the collection of court costs overrides a conflicting bill of costs issued by the District Clerk. While the Court affirmed the underlying convictions against an ineffective assistance of counsel challenge, it modified the judgment to delete unsupported subpoena fees and clarified that court costs are not payable until the appellant’s release from confinement, consistent with the trial court’s oral ruling.
Relevance to Family Law
For the family law practitioner, Richardson serves as a critical reminder of the primacy of the oral pronouncement in enforcement and contempt proceedings. When a litigant is committed to county jail for contempt or non-payment of child support, trial courts often make equitable concessions regarding the timing of attorney’s fees or court costs. If the written commitment order or the clerk’s subsequent bill of costs defaults to “immediate payment” language that contradicts the judge’s bench ruling, the practitioner must rely on the “oral pronouncement controls” doctrine to shield their client’s remaining assets or commissary funds from premature seizure.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
Romie Richardson was convicted of burglary of a vehicle and unlawful possession of a firearm following a jury trial. The evidence established that a witness observed Richardson rummaging through a coach’s truck at a sports facility. Richardson was stopped by a parent in the parking lot, and his description matched the witness’s report. Following his conviction, the trial court sentenced him to lengthy terms of confinement. Crucially, during the sentencing phase, the trial court orally pronounced that the assessed court costs were not to be payable until Richardson was released from the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. However, the District Clerk issued a bill of costs that did not reflect this deferment, and the record included a $55.00 subpoena service fee that lacked evidentiary support.
Issues Decided
- Whether trial counsel provided ineffective assistance under the Strickland standard by failing to object to certain evidence or testimony.
- Whether the evidence supported the assessment of a $55.00 subpoena service fee in the bill of costs.
- Whether the written judgment and clerk’s bill of costs must be modified to reflect the trial court’s oral pronouncement deferring the payment of costs until the defendant’s release.
Rules Applied
The Court applied the two-pronged Strickland v. Washington test for ineffective assistance, requiring both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Regarding court costs, the Court looked to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and established appellate doctrine holding that when a written judgment (or a clerk’s ministerial execution of it) conflicts with an oral pronouncement made in the presence of the defendant, the oral pronouncement controls. The Court also utilized its authority under Rule 43.2(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure to modify a judgment to speak the truth when the record provides the necessary information to do so.
Application
The Court first dismissed the ineffective assistance claims, noting that isolated failures to object rarely rise to the level of constitutional deficiency when the “totality of the representation” is otherwise competent. Turning to the more technical cost issues, the Court found the $55.00 subpoena fee was not “supported by the record,” as there was no return of service or testimony justifying that specific amount. More significantly, the Court addressed the conflict between the clerk’s bill of costs—which typically triggers immediate collection efforts—and the judge’s specific oral instruction that Richardson should not be billed until he finishes his sentence. The Court held that the clerk’s ministerial duty to prepare a bill of costs does not grant the clerk the authority to override the trial court’s specific sentencing directives.
Holding
The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, finding that Richardson failed to meet the high burden of proving that his counsel’s performance undermined confidence in the jury’s verdict.
Regarding the financial assessment, the Court sustained the challenge to the $55.00 subpoena fee and ordered it deleted. Finally, the Court modified the judgment and the bill of costs to explicitly state that all costs are not payable until Richardson is released from confinement, thereby aligning the written record with the trial court’s oral pronouncement.
Practical Application
This case highlights a common trap in Texas litigation: the “Boilerplate/Clerk Conflict.” In family law, particularly in high-conflict enforcement actions where a party is jailed, the District Clerk’s office often generates a bill of costs or an Order to Withdraw Funds (Inmate Trust Account) automatically. If the trial judge orally stated that fees are waived or deferred, but the final signed decree contains standard “pay now” language, the clerk will proceed with collection. Practitioners must ensure that the “Mother Hubbard” or “Standard Costs” clauses in their orders are specifically tailored to match the bench ruling, or they must be prepared to file a Motion to Correct the Judgment or a Nunc Pro Tunc if the clerk begins unauthorized collection.
Checklists
Scrutinizing the Bill of Costs
- Verify Service Fees: Compare every “Subpoena Fee” or “Service of Process” charge against the actual returns filed in the record. If no return exists, the fee is vulnerable.
- Audit Clerical Errors: Ensure that fees from a severed or companion case have not been “doubled up” into the current bill of costs.
- Check for Legislative Authority: Ensure every fee listed has a specific statutory basis (e.g., Local Government Code or Code of Criminal Procedure).
Preserving Oral Pronouncements
- Request Specificity: If the court is granting a deferral of fees or a specific payment plan, ask the court to state on the record: “And let the record reflect this overrides any standard clerk billing practices.”
- Drafting the Order: Explicitly include a “Conflict Clause” stating: “To the extent any bill of costs issued by the Clerk conflicts with the timing or amounts set forth in this Order, this Order shall control.”
- Reviewing the Commitment: In contempt cases, ensure the commitment order matches the oral pronouncement regarding when attorney’s fees are due.
Citation
Richardson v. State, No. 02-24-00237-CR, 2026 WL ______ (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 30, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.).
Full Opinion
Family Law Crossover
The “Crossover” here is the weaponization of the “Oral Pronouncement Controls” rule in the context of Chapter 157 enforcement. Often in Texas family courts, a judge may find a party in contempt but stay the commitment on certain conditions, or they may order jail time but orally waive certain costs due to the contemnor’s indigence. If the movant’s counsel drafts a standard “Order Enforcing” that includes boilerplate language regarding “all costs of court for which execution shall issue,” they are effectively circumventing the judge’s mercy. Using Richardson, a respondent’s attorney can move to modify the judgment or resist a clerk’s writ of execution by arguing that the ministerial act of the clerk (the bill of costs) cannot create a liability that the judge specifically deferred or waived from the bench. This is a powerful tool for protecting a client’s ability to pay child support by preventing the state or a creditor from seizing limited funds for court-related fees first.
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