Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kelly, 03-24-00027-CV, January 30, 2026.
On appeal from the 53rd District Court of Travis County, Texas.
Synopsis
The Third Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment that had expanded an express easement to an adjacent 52-acre tract, holding that the phrase “commonly known as the ‘Waterford Marina’” did not objectively include undeveloped neighboring land. The court determined that an ordinary person in the context of the easement’s 2014 creation would not have understood the marina’s name to encompass the separate, undeveloped southerly acreage, thereby stripping that tract of access rights.
Relevance to Family Law
Family law litigators frequently rely on “shorthand” descriptions in Mediated Settlement Agreements (MSAs) and Decrees, such as “the marital residence,” “the family ranch,” or “the [Name] business.” This case serves as a stark warning: if a client’s property consists of multiple tax parcels or adjacent tracts acquired at different times, using a “commonly known as” descriptor may inadvertently exclude portions of the estate. In high-net-worth divorces involving contiguous land or family compounds, failing to include specific metes and bounds or clear “all-inclusive” language can result in a client owning a landlocked parcel or losing access to critical infrastructure—a mistake that is often permanent once the plenary power of the trial court expires.
Case Summary
Fact Summary
The dispute centered on the “Waterford” development on Lake Travis, specifically two tracts: a 36-acre tract containing an active marina and private roads, and a 52-acre undeveloped tract to the south. In 2014, the developer conveyed the roads to a Property Owners Association (POA) but reserved an easement appurtenant for the benefit of “the land and improvements commonly known as the ‘Waterford Marina’.”
In 2021, a Buyer contracted to purchase the 52-acre tract and sought a declaration that this tract was a beneficiary of the 2014 Easement. The title company and the trial court initially agreed with the Buyer, interpreting the “commonly known as” language broadly enough to encompass the adjacent development land. The POA appealed, arguing that the “Waterford Marina” was a distinct geographical and commercial entity that did not include the raw land to the south.
Issues Decided
The primary issue was whether the 2014 Easement, which benefited the “land and improvements commonly known as the ‘Waterford Marina’,” extended its benefits to the adjacent 52-acre tract. Specifically, the court had to determine if the “commonly known as” language was broad enough to include the undeveloped southerly tract at the time the easement was created.
Rules Applied
The court applied standard principles of contract and deed construction, focusing on the “ordinary person” standard. Under Texas law, the scope of an express easement is determined by the terms of the grant. When terms are not specifically defined, they are given their plain, ordinary, and generally accepted meaning unless the instrument shows they were used in a technical or different sense. The court examined the “relevant context” of the 2014 creation, emphasizing that the intent must be objective, based on how an ordinary person would understand the labels used at that time.
Application
The court conducted a narrative analysis of the evidence from 2013 and 2014 to determine the objective meaning of “Waterford Marina.” It looked at marketing brochures, aerial photographs, and the state of development. The evidence showed that in 2014, the 36-acre tract was referred to as “Section 4A” and contained the functional marina, while the 52-acre tract was “Section 4B” and remained undeveloped.
The court reasoned that an ordinary person looking at the “Waterford Marina” would see a specific facility and its immediate surroundings, not a separate, large, undeveloped tract of land to the south. Even though both tracts were owned by the same predecessor and were part of a larger development plan, the court refused to expand the “commonly known” descriptor beyond the specific area associated with the marina’s operations. The legal story turned on the fact that the Buyer could not prove that the 52-acre tract was integrated into the “Marina” identity at the time the easement was drafted.
Holding
The Court of Appeals held that the 2014 Easement did not benefit the 52-acre tract. The court reversed the trial court’s summary judgment and rendered judgment in favor of the POA.
The court’s holding emphasizes that “commonly known as” is a restrictive rather than expansive term. By failing to specifically include the 52-acre tract by legal description or a broader catch-all phrase, the original grantor failed to attach the easement rights to the southern property.
Practical Application
For the family law practitioner, this case is a lesson in “Drafting for the Worst Case Scenario.” When an MSA is signed, the parties are often focused on the broad strokes of the division. However, if a husband is awarded “the Lake House” and that house sits on Lot 1, but the boat dock and the only driveway access sit on an unmentioned Lot 2, the husband may find himself with a house he cannot legally reach. This opinion confirms that Texas appellate courts will not “fix” a vague description by assuming the parties meant to include adjacent parcels just because they were owned by the same entity or used together.
Checklists
Drafting the MSA/Decree
- Verify Legal Descriptions: Cross-reference “common names” with tax records to ensure all contiguous parcels are included.
- Define Scope: If using a common name (e.g., “The Jones Ranch”), explicitly state that it “includes, but is not limited to, [Tax ID 1], [Tax ID 2], and all adjacent acreage owned by the parties.”
- Address Access Specifically: Do not assume an easement follows the name; explicitly state that any easements appurtenant to the “commonly known” property also benefit the specific secondary tracts.
Due Diligence in Property Division
- Request a Survey: In cases involving rural land or subdivided lots, a survey is the only way to ensure the “common name” matches the physical reality.
- Review Existing Easements: Before agreeing to a property division, verify that the tract being awarded to your client actually has the “benefits” of any express easements listed in the title commitment.
- Identify “Section” Distinctions: If the property was marketed or developed in “phases” or “sections,” ensure the MSA doesn’t inadvertently use a name that only applies to “Phase I.”
Citation
WF Property Owners Association, Inc. v. Waterford Development Partners, L.P., No. 03-24-00027-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Jan. 30, 2026, no pet. h.).
Full Opinion
Family Law Crossover
This ruling can be effectively weaponized in post-divorce property disputes or enforcement actions. If you represent the party opposing an access claim, you can use this case to argue that a vague description in an MSA was a “term of limitation.” For example, if a Decree awards the wife “The Smith Equestrian Center,” and the husband later tries to use the center’s private access road to reach his retained “Back 40” acres, you can argue that unless the “Back 40” was specifically named as a beneficiary of the access rights, the “commonly known as” description for the Equestrian Center excludes his land. This allows a party to effectively “landlock” an ex-spouse or force a renegotiation of terms by strictly interpreting the “ordinary person’s” understanding of the property’s name at the time the Decree was entered.
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