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CROSSOVER: Child-Sex-Abuse Conviction Highlights When a New-Trial Hearing Is Required—and How Recanting Affidavits Fail Without ‘Reasonable Grounds’

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Jay Morgan v. The State of Texas, 03-24-00519-CR, March 18, 2026.

On appeal from 299th District Court of Travis County, Texas.

Synopsis

The Third Court of Appeals affirmed an indecency-with-a-child-by-contact conviction, holding the evidence was legally sufficient based primarily on the complainant’s testimony and corroborating circumstances. The court also held the trial court acted within its discretion by denying a motion for new trial without an evidentiary hearing where a post-trial affidavit from a non-testifying witness did not establish “reasonable grounds” showing the defendant could be entitled to relief.

Relevance to Family Law

For Texas family-law litigators, this criminal appeal is a roadmap for how courts evaluate recanting or “walk-back” affidavits, especially when a party claims a witness changed their story pretrial and was told they need not appear. In SAPCRs, divorces with parenting disputes, and any case involving abuse allegations or parallel DFPS/criminal investigations, the same credibility mechanics show up—particularly when one side tries to reopen temporary orders, set aside mediated settlements, or obtain post-judgment relief based on a newly surfaced affidavit. The opinion underscores that bare assertions, unmoored from admissible specifics and without a showing of materiality and diligence, often fail to trigger an evidentiary hearing—an analytic frame that is highly portable to family-court motions to reopen evidence, motions for new trial, and bills of review.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

A Travis County jury convicted Jay Morgan of indecency with a child by sexual contact and assessed a fifteen-year sentence; the jury did not reach a verdict on an aggravated sexual assault count, resulting in a mistrial on that count. The complainant (identified by pseudonym) testified at length about abuse occurring when the complainant was approximately six to seven years old, including (1) Morgan placing the child’s hand on Morgan’s penis and (2) a separate incident described as oral penetration (charged in the hung count). The State presented the complainant’s testimony, text-message evidence reflecting a contemporaneous disclosure to a friend years later, journals, and a recorded police interview; the defense presented an expert criticizing interview/forensic dynamics and family witnesses, along with custody-litigation context and evidence concerning the mother’s relationship and related risks.

Post-trial, Morgan moved for new trial relying largely on an affidavit from a non-testifying witness (his ex-fiancée). The affidavit asserted she had made incriminating statements to investigators, later recanted those statements before trial, and was told it was “fine” and she no longer needed to testify. The trial court denied the motion without conducting an evidentiary hearing. On appeal, Morgan challenged (1) the denial of a hearing on the new-trial motion and (2) legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the indecency-by-contact conviction. The Third Court modified the judgment to correct a clerical error and affirmed as modified (nunc pro tunc).

Issues Decided

Rules Applied

Application

On the new-trial-hearing complaint, the Third Court focused on the threshold question: did the motion and affidavit provide “reasonable grounds” to believe relief might be warranted, such that live testimony was necessary to resolve a fact issue outside the record? The court treated the ex-fiancée’s post-trial affidavit as insufficient—both because the affiant did not testify at trial and because the affidavit’s assertions did not meaningfully demonstrate a material, outcome-altering fact that required a credibility hearing to adjudicate. The affidavit’s “I recanted” and “I was told I didn’t need to testify” narrative, without a developed showing of what admissible evidence would have been presented, why it was unavailable with diligence, and how it probably would have changed the result, did not cross the “reasonable grounds” line.

On legal sufficiency, the court credited the jury’s prerogative to believe the complainant’s account of sexual contact. The complainant testified to specific acts fitting the indecency-by-contact charge (including placing the child’s hand on the defendant’s penis), with surrounding circumstances that a rational juror could treat as corroborative (contextual evidence of disclosure dynamics, contemporaneous communications, and other record evidence). The existence of a hung jury on the aggravated sexual assault count did not undercut the indecency verdict; it reflected count-by-count decision-making, not a legal insufficiency on the count of conviction.

Finally, the court addressed a clerical error in the written judgment and modified it, affirming the judgment nunc pro tunc as modified.

Holding

The court held the trial court did not err in denying the motion for new trial without an evidentiary hearing because the supporting affidavit did not establish “reasonable grounds” that the defendant could be entitled to relief. Without that predicate showing, the trial court retained discretion to deny the motion on the papers.

The court held the evidence was legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict for indecency with a child by sexual contact. The complainant’s testimony, viewed under the proper standard, permitted a rational juror to find each element beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court modified the judgment to correct a clerical error and affirmed the judgment nunc pro tunc as modified.

Practical Application

Family lawyers will recognize the litigation pattern: one side produces a late-breaking affidavit—often from a conflicted or newly aligned witness—claiming the “truth” is different, and seeks a redo (new trial, reopened evidence, set-aside of temporary orders, or leverage for a settlement reset). Morgan is a reminder that Texas appellate courts demand more than a narrative; they demand a showing that the affidavit is (1) specific, (2) admissible in substance, (3) material, (4) diligence-proof, and (5) plausibly outcome-changing.

Practical litigation scenarios where Morgan’s logic matters:

Checklists

Building an Affidavit That Actually Triggers a Hearing (Family-Court Analog)

Opposing a “Recanting” Affidavit in a SAPCR/Divorce

Managing Parallel Criminal Allegations in Family Litigation

Citation

Jay Morgan v. State of Texas, No. 03-24-00519-CR (Tex. App.—Austin Mar. 18, 2026) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

Read the full opinion here

Family Law Crossover

Used strategically in divorce or custody litigation, Morgan is a credibility-control case: it can be cited (as persuasive reasoning, even though it is criminal) to argue that courts should not reward late-stage narrative shifts—especially when packaged as a post-hearing affidavit from a witness who never took the stand. The move is straightforward: characterize the affidavit as failing the threshold showing necessary to justify reopening the evidentiary record, then force the proponent to prove diligence, admissibility, and outcome-materiality. In custody fights where one party tries to weaponize a recantation to unwind supervised visitation, vacate protective provisions, or relitigate temporary orders, Morgan supplies the appellate-safe framing: absent “reasonable grounds” that relief is warranted, the court can deny the request without a mini-trial on an affidavit whose substance is vague, conclusory, or strategically timed.

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