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Twelfth Court of Appeals Affirms Juvenile Jurisdictional Waiver in Murder Case

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Matter of K.M., 12-25-00118-CV, February 18, 2026.

Synopsis

The Twelfth Court of Appeals affirmed a juvenile court’s order waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction and transferring a minor to adult criminal district court for a murder charge. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion, as the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the findings that the seriousness of the offense and the protection of the community necessitated the transfer under Texas Family Code § 54.02.

Relevance to Family Law

While many practitioners view the Texas Family Code through the lens of Title 1 (Marriage) or Title 5 (Parent-Child Relationship), Title 3 (Juvenile Justice) remains a critical pillar of family law practice, particularly for firms handling high-stakes litigation involving “dual-status” youth or high-risk domestic environments. This case highlights the intersection of CPS history—often the bread and butter of family litigators—and the ultimate “death penalty” of juvenile law: the transfer to adult court. It serves as a stark reminder that the “best interest of the child” standard, so prevalent in Chapters 153 and 263, is superseded in the juvenile transfer context by the “welfare of the community” and the “seriousness of the offense.”

Case Summary

Fact Summary

K.M., a sixteen-year-old at the time of the offense, was charged with the murder of his best friend, Camo Morton. The State alleged K.M. shot the victim in the head. During the transfer hearing, law enforcement testimony contradicted K.M.’s initial claim of an accidental shooting during a struggle. Specifically, blood splatter patterns and the downward trajectory of the bullet suggested the victim was either kneeling or lying down when shot, rather than standing as K.M. described.

K.M.’s background included a history of Department of Family and Protective Services (DFPS) involvement stemming from his biological mother’s substance abuse and domestic violence, leading to his aunt and uncle being named permanent managing conservators. Despite reports of being a generally respectful youth with no prior violent incidents, a second risk assessment (PACT) categorized him as a moderate risk for re-offending once his CPS history was factored in. Crucially, the chief juvenile probation officer testified that the local juvenile resources were inadequate to address the rehabilitation needs of a minor charged with such a violent offense.

Issues Decided

The sole issue before the court was whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction and transferring K.M. to adult criminal court. Within this inquiry, the court examined whether the evidence was legally and factually sufficient to support the juvenile court’s findings under Texas Family Code § 54.02.

Rules Applied

Under Texas Family Code § 54.02(a), a juvenile court may waive jurisdiction if the child is 14 or older (for first-degree felonies), there is probable cause to believe the child committed the offense, and the seriousness of the offense or the child’s background requires criminal proceedings for the welfare of the community.

In making this determination, Section 54.02(f) requires the court to consider four non-exclusive factors:
1. Whether the offense was against a person or property;
2. The sophistication and maturity of the child;
3. The child’s record and previous history; and
4. The prospects of adequate protection of the public and the likelihood of rehabilitation using available juvenile facilities.

The appellate court applies a two-step standard of review: first, reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings, and second, reviewing the ultimate waiver decision for an abuse of discretion.

Application

The court’s application of the law centered on the weight of the Section 54.02(f) factors. The court noted that the offense—murder—is the most serious offense against a person, which the statute explicitly says should be given greater weight. The court found the physical evidence particularly damning; the forensic details regarding the bullet’s trajectory and defensive blood splatter on the victim’s hand undermined the defense’s “accidental shooting” theory.

Regarding the adequacy of juvenile facilities, the court leaned heavily on the testimony of the chief probation officer, who stated that Shelby County’s juvenile resources could not meet K.M.’s rehabilitation needs. Even though K.M. had a relatively clean disciplinary record at the detention center and a supportive family environment with his guardians, the court determined that the gravity of the act and the moderate risk of re-offending (as identified in the revised PACT assessment) justified the juvenile court’s conclusion that the community’s welfare required adult criminal proceedings.

Holding

The Twelfth Court of Appeals held that the juvenile court did not act arbitrarily or without reference to guiding principles. The court found the evidence legally and factually sufficient to support the transfer order.

The court further held that the juvenile court is not required to exhaustively catalogue every piece of evidence in its written order, provided the order specifies the reasons and findings for the waiver as required by Section 54.02(h). The appellate court affirmed the transfer, effectively upholding K.M.’s subsequent twenty-year sentence in the adult system.

Practical Application

For the family law practitioner, this case underscores the vital importance of the social evaluation and psychological reports in juvenile proceedings. When representing a minor or a guardian in these matters, the “rehabilitative potential” must be evidenced by more than just family testimony. If the State’s probation officers testify that local resources are inadequate, the defense must be prepared to present specific, alternative juvenile programs (such as specialized boot camps or private facilities) to rebut the “necessity of adult transfer” argument.

Checklists

Preparing for a Section 54.02 Transfer Hearing

Challenging the Waiver on Appeal

Citation

In the Matter of K.M., No. 12-25-00118-CV, 2026 WL ______ (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 18, 2026, no pet.).

Full Opinion

Full Opinion Link

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