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Third Court of Appeals Dismisses Untimely Appeal of Family-Violence Protective Order for Want of Jurisdiction

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Williams v. Mitchell, 03-26-00012-CV, February 19, 2026.

On appeal from the 455th District Court of Travis County

Synopsis

The Third Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal for want of jurisdiction after the appellant filed his notice of appeal nearly seventeen months after the trial court signed the final judgment. The court reaffirmed that a timely notice of appeal is a mandatory jurisdictional prerequisite and that the signing of a family-violence protective order—when it disposes of all claims in the suit—constitutes a final judgment that triggers the appellate timetable.

Relevance to Family Law

For the family law practitioner, this case serves as a critical reminder regarding the finality of protective orders. In many instances, a request for a protective order is filed as a standalone lawsuit or is the sole remaining issue in a specific cause number. Because a signed protective order that disposes of all pending claims is a final judgment, the appellate clock begins to run immediately upon the presiding judge’s signature. Litigators cannot afford to treat these orders as interlocutory or wait for the resolution of separate, related matters (such as a pending divorce in a different cause) before perfecting an appeal. Failure to recognize the finality of a standalone protective order results in the permanent loss of appellate rights once the Rule 26.1 and 26.3 windows expire.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

Megan Mitchell filed suit against Brandon Williams seeking a family-violence protective order. The case proceeded in the 455th District Court of Travis County. On August 16, 2024, an associate judge signed the requested protective order. Later that same day, the presiding district court judge, the Honorable Catherine A. Mauzy, also signed the order. Because the request for the protective order was the only claim presented in Mitchell’s suit, the signing of the order effectively concluded the litigation at the trial level. Despite the judgment being signed in August 2024, Williams did not attempt to file a notice of appeal until January 7, 2026. He further delayed moving for an extension of time to file his notice of appeal until January 6, 2026—over a year past the statutory deadlines.

Issues Decided

The primary issue was whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear an appeal where the notice of appeal was filed well beyond the deadlines established by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.1 and the 15-day extension window provided by Rule 26.3.

Rules Applied

The court relied on Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 25.1 and 26.1, which establish that a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional requirement and define the periods during which such a notice must be filed. The court also applied Rule 26.3, which allows for a 15-day extension under specific circumstances. For substantive finality, the court cited B.C. v. Rhodes, 116 S.W.3d 878 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.), establishing that a protective order disposing of all claims is a final judgment, and Baker v. Bizzle, 687 S.W.3d 285 (Tex. 2024), confirming that a presiding judge’s signature constitutes the rendition of judgment.

Application

The court’s analysis centered on the timeline of the trial court’s actions relative to the appellant’s filing. Jurisdiction in the court of appeals is not a matter of judicial discretion but a matter of strict adherence to the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. The court noted that the “clock” for the appeal began on August 16, 2024, the date Judge Mauzy signed the final judgment. Even if Williams had been entitled to the extended 90-day deadline under Rule 26.1(a)—which typically requires the filing of a motion for new trial or a request for findings of fact—that deadline would have expired in late 2024. By waiting until January 2026 to file his notice, Williams missed not only the primary deadline but also the 15-day “grace period” provided by Rule 26.3. The court extended an opportunity for Williams to explain how jurisdiction might exist, but he failed to respond to the Clerk’s inquiry, leaving the court with no choice but to dismiss.

Holding

The court held that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal because the notice of appeal was untimely filed. The court emphasized that the filing of a notice of appeal within the parameters of the appellate rules is the only way to invoke the court’s power to review a case.

Because the protective order was a final judgment and the appellant failed to act within the prescribed statutory periods, the court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction.

Practical Application

This opinion reinforces the necessity of immediate post-judgment action in protective order litigation. When representing a respondent in a protective order case, counsel must immediately determine if the order is “final” for purposes of appeal. If the order is the result of a standalone application, the 30-day (or 90-day) window begins immediately. Practitioners should not assume that the associate judge’s signature is the only relevant date; as shown here, the presiding judge’s signature on the same day acts as the formal rendition. If you intend to appeal, calendar the Rule 26.3 extension deadline (15 days after the primary deadline) as an absolute “hard stop.”

Checklists

Determining Appellate Finality of a Protective Order

Managing the Appellate Timetable

Citation

Williams v. Mitchell, No. 03-26-00012-CV, 2026 WL ______ (Tex. App.—Austin Feb. 19, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Full Opinion

View Full Opinion Here

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