Site icon Thomas J. Daley

Challenges to Nonparent Standing and Conservatorship Awards in Texas Divorce Proceedings

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

In the Matter of the Marriage of Gertha Marie Chatman and Kraton Dorrell Chatman and In the Interest of A.M.H. and A.L.H., Children, 12-25-00091-CV, February 11, 2026.

On appeal from Unknown

Synopsis

This appeal addresses the jurisdictional threshold for nonparent standing under Texas Family Code § 102.003(a)(9) and the subsequent evidentiary burden required to displace a biological parent in a conservatorship dispute. The Twelfth Court of Appeals scrutinized whether intervenors exercised the requisite “actual care, control, and possession” for the statutory six-month period and evaluated the trial court’s ultimate award of custody to nonparents over a fit biological father.

Relevance to Family Law

For the Texas family law practitioner, this case serves as a critical reminder that standing is not a static determination; a party lacking standing at the commencement of a suit may subsequently acquire it through the passage of time and the filing of a new petition. Furthermore, the opinion reinforces the high evidentiary bar set by the parental presumption, illustrating that even when standing is established, a nonparent must provide specific evidence of significant impairment to the child’s physical health or emotional development to justify an award of managing conservatorship.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The underlying litigation arose from a divorce between Kraton and Gertha Chatman. During the pendency of the proceeding, Gertha gave birth to twins. While Gertha initially sought to facilitate a kinship adoption with her sister and brother-in-law (the Intervenors) in Louisiana, Kraton eventually established his biological paternity through testing. The children were born in August 2022 and spent their initial months moving between Louisiana and Texas, often residing with the mother. The Intervenors filed their first petition for intervention in March 2024, which the trial court struck after finding they had not exercised independent care and control for the requisite six months—specifically noting they did not take sole responsibility until December 2023. However, following the mother’s departure from the residence and the Intervenors’ continued care of the twins, they filed a second petition for intervention in July 2024. Following a series of hearings and a mediation impasse, the trial court entered a final decree awarding conservatorship to the nonparent Intervenors, despite Kraton’s status as the biological father and his evidence of recent negative drug screenings.

Issues Decided

The court addressed whether: (1) the Intervenors established standing under Texas Family Code § 102.003(a)(9) in their second petition; (2) the trial court erred in awarding conservatorship to nonparents over a biological parent; (3) the appellant received adequate notice of hearings; and (4) the trial court erred in denying appointed counsel to the appellant.

Rules Applied

The court applied Texas Family Code § 102.003(a)(9), which grants standing to a nonparent who has had “actual care, control, and possession of the child for at least six months ending not more than 90 days preceding the date of the filing of the petition.” Under the Shook v. Gray and In re C.J.C. line of cases, the court also analyzed the “parental presumption,” which mandates that a parent be appointed managing conservator unless the court finds that the appointment would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development. Additionally, the court looked to Texas Family Code § 153.131 regarding the requirements to rebut this presumption.

Application

The appellate court’s analysis centered on the temporal requirements of standing and the quality of possession. Regarding the first petition, the trial court correctly determined that the Intervenors’ time spent living with the mother did not constitute “actual care, control, and possession” sufficient to satisfy § 102.003(a)(9), as the mother retained legal and actual authority. However, by the time the second petition was filed in July 2024, the Intervenors had exercised exclusive care since the mother moved out in December 2023, satisfying the six-month statutory window.

Moving to the merits of the conservatorship award, the court examined whether the evidence supported overcoming the parental presumption. Although the Intervenors raised concerns regarding Kraton’s past drug use, his “lifestyle,” and the neighborhood where he resided, the court found these factors insufficient to meet the “significant impairment” standard. The court noted that while Kraton had failed a prior drug test, his more recent tests were negative, and there was no evidence of specific acts or omissions that would imminently harm the twins. The court highlighted that a trial court cannot simply weigh the “best interest” of the child between a parent and a nonparent without first finding the parent unfit or finding that the parental appointment would cause harm.

Holding

The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s ruling regarding standing as to the second petition for intervention. The court held that the Intervenors successfully pleaded and proved the jurisdictional facts necessary under § 102.003(a)(9) by the time of the subsequent filing.

The court reversed the portion of the final decree awarding managing conservatorship to the Intervenors. The court held that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to overcome the parental presumption under § 153.131, as the Intervenors failed to demonstrate that Kraton’s appointment would significantly impair the children’s physical health or emotional development. The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this holding.

Practical Application

This case highlights the “revolving door” of standing in custody litigation. If a nonparent client fails to meet the six-month residency requirement at the outset of a case, counsel should monitor the calendar. If the child remains in the client’s care, a subsequent filing can cure the jurisdictional defect. For those defending parents, this case reaffirms that “vague concerns” about a parent’s lifestyle, socioeconomic status, or past (but corrected) drug use are legally insufficient to strip a parent of their primary rights in favor of a nonparent.

Checklists

Vetting Nonparent Standing (§ 102.003(a)(9))

Defending the Parental Presumption

Citation

In the Matter of the Marriage of Gertha Marie Chatman and Kraton Dorrell Chatman and In the Interest of A.M.H. and A.L.H., Children, 12-25-00091-CV (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 11, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

Full Opinion Link

~~d5d088e5-6ee3-487c-ac9d-613f2bc6a51c~~

Share this content:

Exit mobile version