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Seventh District Affirms Order Modifying Conservatorship and Primary Residence Designation

New Texas Court of Appeals Opinion - Analyzed for Family Law Attorneys

Opinion by Chief Justice Parker, 07-25-00156-CV, January 28, 2026.

On appeal from the 121st District Court of Terry County, Texas.

Synopsis

The Seventh Court of Appeals affirmed a trial court’s modification order that transferred the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of two children from Mother to Father. Because Mother conceded the existence of a material and substantial change in circumstances, the appellate court’s review was confined to whether the trial court abused its discretion in determining that the modification was in the children’s best interest under the Holley factors.

Relevance to Family Law

This opinion reinforces the formidable “abuse of discretion” barrier facing appellants in SAPCR modification suits, particularly when a material and substantial change in circumstances is conceded. For the practitioner, it underscores that once the threshold of a material change is crossed (either by evidence or concession), the trial court’s “best interest” determination is afforded extreme deference. It also clarifies the interplay between general best interest factors under Holley and the more specific relocation factors under Lenz, suggesting that while Lenz is relevant to residency restrictions, the broad discretion of the trial court often rests on the cumulative weight of the evidence regarding parental abilities and stability.

Case Summary

Fact Summary

The parties divorced in 2022, at which time Mother was granted the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of their two children, A.N.G. and A.G.G., without geographic restriction. In early 2024, Father filed a petition to modify the parent-child relationship, seeking the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence. Following a bench trial in October 2024, the trial court granted Father’s request, appointing him as the conservator with the exclusive right to designate primary residence within Lubbock or Andrews counties, while awarding Mother standard possession. Mother requested, and the trial court provided, findings of fact and conclusions of law. On appeal, Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the best-interest determination but conceded that a material and substantial change in circumstances had occurred.

Issues Decided

The primary issues before the Seventh Court of Appeals were:

  1. Whether the trial court erred in its best-interest determination regarding the relocation of the children’s primary residence.
  2. Whether there was legally and factually sufficient evidence to support the appointment of Father as the conservator with the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence.

Rules Applied

The court applied Texas Family Code § 156.101(a), which permits modification if it is in the best interest of the child and there has been a material and substantial change in circumstances. The court utilized the abuse of discretion standard, incorporating a two-prong inquiry: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion (legal and factual sufficiency), and (2) whether the trial court erred in the application of that discretion.

The court relied on the Holley v. Adams factors to evaluate the children’s best interest, which include the children’s desires, emotional and physical needs, parental abilities, and the stability of the home. Additionally, the court addressed Mother’s argument for the application of the Lenz v. Lenz factors, which are specifically tailored to cases involving the modification of geographic residency restrictions and relocation.

Application

The court’s analysis began with the acknowledgment that because Mother conceded a material and substantial change in circumstances, the only hurdle remaining for Father was the best-interest prong. Mother argued that the trial court failed to properly apply the Lenz factors, which she contended are mandatory whenever a court creates or modifies a geographic restriction. However, the appellate court maintained that under an abuse of discretion review, it must afford “great deference” to the factfinder, particularly regarding witness credibility and demeanor—elements that a cold record cannot capture.

The court examined the evidence through the lens of the Holley factors. While Mother focused on the “relocation” aspect, the court viewed the evidence holistically, looking at the parental abilities of both parties and the stability Father could provide. The court determined that as long as there was some evidence of a substantive and probative character to support the trial court’s decision, that decision must stand. Because the trial court had sufficient information to conclude that Father’s appointment would serve the children’s emotional and physical needs and provide a stable environment, its decision was neither arbitrary nor unreasonable.

Holding

The Seventh Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the conservatorship to grant Father the exclusive right to designate the children’s primary residence. The court found that the best-interest determination was supported by sufficient evidence under the applicable legal standards.

Regarding the specific challenge to the residency designation, the court held that the trial court’s findings were consistent with the guiding principles of the Texas Family Code. Each issue raised by Mother was overruled, and the trial court’s modification order was affirmed in its entirety.

Practical Application

For litigators, this case serves as a cautionary tale regarding the concession of a material and substantial change in circumstances. While such a concession may seem strategic to narrow the issues, it effectively shifts the entire battlefield to the “best interest” analysis, where the trial court’s discretion is at its zenith.

Practitioners should also note the court’s treatment of Lenz factors versus Holley factors. While Lenz is the standard for relocation, a trial court’s failure to explicitly check every Lenz box in its findings may not be fatal if the broader Holley evidence supports the judgment. When representing the party seeking to maintain the status quo, it is imperative to build a record that goes beyond the “reasons for the move” and addresses the long-term stability and emotional ties outlined in Holley.

Checklists

Defending Against a Modification of Primary Residence

Building the Record for the Movant (Father’s Position)

Citation

In the Interest of A.N.G. and A.G.G., Children, No. 07-25-00156-CV, 2026 Tex. App. LEXIS (Tex. App.—Amarillo Jan. 28, 2026, no pet. h.).

Full Opinion

View the full opinion here.

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